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Abstract 
The study of mass public opinion and political behaviour has developed a 
substantial corpus of theoretical claims and empirical results linking political, 
attitudinal and demographic variables to different policy attitudes. Still, the research 
literature has, to date, paid scant attention to how space – that is, proximity and 
distance to salient geographic features – influences policy attitudes. Research in 
political behaviour has long proceeded as though policy attitudes among mass 
publics ‚come from nowhere.‛ The unifying argument of the four articles 
comprising this thesis is that mass public opinion does indeed come from 
somewhere: spatial dynamics matter for policy attitudes in a variety of domains. 
The articles develop the argument that spatial proximity to geographic features act 
as an indirect measure of intergroup contact, localized knowledge, issue awareness, 
and issue salience. The articles deal with three substantive topics: the Canada–
United States relationship, attitudes toward energy transportation infrastructure, 
and attitudes toward immigration policy. Specifically, the thesis draws on survey 
data to investigate: (1) the mutual perceptions of the Canadian and American 
publics, (2) Canadian attitudes toward North American integration, (3) attitudes 
toward the Keystone XL pipeline in the United States, and (4) American attitudes 
toward illegal immigration. The major finding in each article is an interactive 
relationship between proximity and political attitudes: depending on the political 
context, proximity serves to either amplify or mute the effects of political party 
identification or ideology on policy attitudes. An innovative aspect of this research 
is the integration of spatial data through geocoding (appending latitude–longitude 
coordinates to) respondent-level data and calculating distances to relevant 
geographic features (e.g., the Canada–United States border, oil pipelines and the 
United States–Mexico border). 
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1. Introduction: Proximity, Politics, and the Study of Mass Public Opinion 
 
It takes much longer to change many minds than to change a few. It 
takes time to inform and to persuade and to arouse large scattered 
varied multitudes of persons. [...T]he majority will be more aware of 
what they have just caught up with near at hand than with what is still 
distant< (Lippmann 1955, 20–21; emphasis added). 
Grover: This is near, you see? [Runs a distance into the background] This 
is far! [Runs back to the foreground] And this is near again, okay? 
(‚Sesame Street, Episode 57‛ 1970) 
 
1.1 Introduction 
As the first epigraph above attests, notions of proximity and distance have 
been present in thinking about mass public opinion from its early days as a subject 
of study. The second, taken from a television skit performed by Grover of Sesame 
Street, an earnest, blue-furred monster familiar to successive generations of 
American (and Canadian) school children, attests to the simplicity of the notions of 
near and far. Yet in spite of their longevity and simplicity, my contention is that the 
fields of public opinion and political behaviour have not adequately explored how 
spatial proximity (and conversely, distance) shapes policy attitudes. This is in part 
due to the legacy of foundational research on mass public opinion that locates the 
causes of individual attitudes and behaviours in personal, individual characteristics 
to the exclusion of broader contextual factors (A. Campbell et al. 1960; Converse 
1964). My project in the four articles comprising this thesis is to address this 
omission in the literature. Specifically, I demonstrate how policy attitudes are a 
function of not simply the individual-level political factors (e.g., political party 
identification and ideology) and demographic characteristics typically referenced in 
the political behaviour literature, but are rather the outcome of the interaction of 
political factors with spatial proximity to salient geographic features. By spatial 
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proximity (and its inverse spatial distance) I mean simply the continuum between 
nearness and remoteness of two points on the surface of the earth. Put another way, 
the articles of the thesis demonstrate how the effects of party identification and 
ideology are conditional upon spatial proximity (or conversely distance). In making 
this argument and presenting statistical analysis to support it, this thesis moves the 
field of political behaviour beyond standard elite cue theories of mass public 
opinion (Jacoby 1991; Zaller 1991; Zaller 1992) and simpler not-in-my-backyard 
(‚NIMBY‛) theories of public attitudes current in the literature on environmental 
attitudes (Ansolabehere and Konisky 2009; Greenberg 2009; Kraft and Clary 1991; 
E. R. A. N. Smith 2002) which fail to consider the interactive relationship between 
proximity and politics. 
The argument about the interaction between proximity and political 
variables is at the core of each of the four articles, which collectively span public 
opinion in three substantive policy areas: Canada–United States relations, energy 
policy (specifically, the siting of oil pipelines), and immigration policy. In chapter 2, 
I examine the mutual perceptions of the Canadian and American publics – that is, 
the positive (or negative) affective feelings of Canadians toward the US, and 
Americans toward Canada. Still dealing with Canadian–American affairs, chapter 3 
shifts the focus from affective feelings to more specific policy attitudes relating to 
the ties between Canada and the US among the Canadian public. Chapter 4 explores 
American attitudes toward the Keystone XL pipeline, a highly politicized pipeline 
proposal intended to take bitumen from Canada’s oil sands region in northern 
Alberta to refineries on the Gulf Coast in Texas. Chapter 5 deals with an equally 
contentious policy issue in American politics, examining attitudes toward policy 
options to deal with the challenge of illegal immigration. To preview the key 
empirical findings from the articles, proximity to (or distance from) salient, context-
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specific geographic features, such as the Canada–US border, the proposed route of 
the Keystone XL pipeline, and the US–Mexico border, moderates the effect of party 
identification (or ideology) on policy attitudes.  
Why study these particular cases? Posed in this way, it is important to state 
that the issue of case selection (as the term has been typically used in social science 
methodology) is not nearly as relevant to large-N, survey-based research in public 
opinion and political behaviour as it is to small-N, comparative case study research, 
which has a separate set of challenges related to making valid, scientific inferences 
from the cases studied to the population of interest (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994; 
George and Bennett 2005; Gerring 2006). Case selection in this methodological sense 
is handled by random selection: with probability sampling techniques, each case 
(that is, survey respondent) has a known, non-zero probability of selection, and this 
allows for inferences from the sample data to the larger population (Kalton 1983; 
Kish 1965). 
Posed in different away, what makes a deeper understanding of mass 
attitudes on these topics an important scholarly endeavour? As King, Keohane and 
Verba note, ‚there is no rule for choosing which research project to conduct,‛ and 
indeed the reasons why individual social scientists gravitate toward particular 
research topics are often personal and idiosyncratic, but there are nevertheless ways 
‚of determining the likely value of a research enterprise to the scholarly 
community‛ (1994, 14–15). The value of a research project hinges on its ability to 
fulfill two criteria. The first criterion is that ‚a research project should pose a question 
that is ‘important’ in the real world. The topic should be consequential for political, 
social, or economic life<.‛ The second criterion is that ‚a research project should make 
a specific contribution to an identifiable scholarly literature by increasing our collective 
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ability to construct verified scientific explanations of some aspect of the world‛ (King, 
Keohane, and Verba 1994, 15; emphasis in the original). 
The individual articles comprising the thesis and the thesis as a whole fulfil 
both criteria. As noted in chapters 2 and 3, Canada–US trade constitutes the largest 
bilateral trading relationship in the world. Further, the geography shared by 
Canada and the US imply shared threats to their security and shared challenges to 
preserving the environment. Critically, both Canadian and American foreign policy 
are constrained by domestic public opinion (J. H. Aldrich et al. 2006; Soroka 2003). 
Analysts of Canada–US relations should therefore pay attention to public opinion 
(and the causes of public opinion) because policy makers do in formulating policy. 
Still, there is only a modest literature on public opinion toward Canadian–American 
affairs, one in which space is little acknowledged. 
Chapter 4 is motivated by the recognition that while the Keystone XL 
pipeline is a hotly-contested proposal with a clear political dimension, as a relatively 
new development in energy policy, little is known about what factors shape public 
support for the pipeline. Further, existing literature on environmental attitudes and 
energy infrastructure siting is unclear as to whether a NIMBY or an ‚inverse 
NIMBY‛ dynamic in attitudes ought to prevail in the case of Keystone XL. Given the 
implications of Keystone XL to the economic viability of the Canadian oil sands 
industry, its contribution to global carbon emissions, and both the economic benefits 
and environmental risks it presents to local populations, a better understanding of 
mass public opinion toward Keystone XL is essential. 
Chapter 5 begins by noting that reform of American immigration and 
naturalization policy is equally politically contentious. While there is a well-
developed scholarly literature on American immigration policy attitudes, the extant 
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literature is far from clear about which factors – political, demographic, behavioural 
or spatial/contextual – are most important in leading Americans to be alternatively 
open or restrictionist in their attitudes. Specifically, there is a need to better 
delineate the effects of personal contact from spatial and demographic context (or 
rather, contexts). There is also a need to consider whether the effects of political 
factors are contingent upon spatial or demographic contexts. 
Simply put, Canada–US relations, the Keystone XL pipeline and immigration 
policy reform in the US are important, politically consequential issues. They matter 
for the ‚real world‛ of Canadian and American politics and policy. There are also 
contributions to be made to the scholarly literature by adding to the existing body of 
knowledge on policy attitudes on these topics. Each of the articles is also motivated 
by the tradition of spatial approaches to social science (Porter and Howell 2012) and 
the contemporary literature on spatially integrated social science (Goodchild et al. 
2000; Goodchild and Janelle 2004; Goodchild and Janelle 2010; Stimson 2014), and 
also the recognition that ‚spatial and contextual modeling constitutes something of 
a growth area in political research‛ (Eagles 1995, 499). Confirmation of the growing 
interest in spatial approaches to political behaviour is further evidenced by recent 
work by Nall (2015).  
The remit of spatial context (and proximity–distance) is admittedly wide. It 
does not refer to a single dynamic in all instances. As Logan and colleagues (2010, 
16) explain, proximity might capture contact (i.e., to a particular group); it might 
imply exposure to a risk or hazard; it might also reflect access to a benefit or a good 
of some kind. Consequently, the articles develop the argument that spatial 
proximity is an indirect (or proxy) measure for intergroup contact, localized 
knowledge or awareness of a policy issue, and issue salience. Spatial proximity thus 
provides environmental or contextual cues. The argument that proximity acts as a 
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proxy for contact between groups (e.g., Canadians and Americans in the case of 
chapters 2 and 3) finds support in the theories of the Chicago School of sociology 
(discussed in section 1.2.2 below), theories of intergroup contact and intergroup 
competition (discussed in the substantive articles in sections 2.4, 3.4 and 5.4) and 
transactionalist theories of international integration (discussed in section 2.4 and 
3.4). For empirical confirmation of the point that proximity leads to contact (at least 
in the Canada–US case), chapter 2 draws on travel survey data to demonstrate that 
Canadian residents closer to the Canada–US border are more likely to visit the US; 
American residents closer to the border are similarly more likely to visit Canada. 
Further confirmation is provided by research on social networks informed by 
statistical physics, which provides evidence of a ‚gravitational law of social 
interaction‛ – specifically, an inverse relationship between social ties and spatial 
distance (Levy 2010; Levy and Goldenberg 2014). In other words, our social 
interactions are most frequently with those near us; we interact less frequently with 
those further away. This pattern maintains even though modern communication 
technologies make long-distance interactions (e.g., via email or online video 
conferencing applications) across vast distances virtually costless (Goldenberg and 
Levy 2009).  
The related argument that proximity to relevant geographic features acts as a 
proxy for issue salience is motivated by research on environmental attitudes and 
energy siting controversies (on the one hand) and research on public attitudes 
toward immigration issues (on the other). A common thread in these literatures is 
that proximity to relevant, context-specific geographic features (such as oil 
pipelines, offshore oil drilling rigs, nuclear power generating stations, and 
international borders) serves to introduce considerations such as perceptions of risk 
(Ansolabehere and Konisky 2012; Ansolabehere and Konisky 2014; Branton et al. 
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2007) while also introducing perceptions of prospective economic and employment 
gains (E. R. A. N. Smith 2002; Michaud, Carlisle, and Smith 2008). Proximate 
geographic features also shape the media environment in which individuals reside, 
thus raising the level of awareness and salience of particular policy issues 
(Dunaway, Branton, and Abrajano 2010). 
The theoretical motivation for the interaction between proximity and 
political predispositions (developed at length in the articles) is that proximity to 
relevant geographic features instigates one of two possible processes. On one hand, 
proximity may render a particular policy area more salient – for example, proximity 
to the Canada–US border or the US–Mexico border make more salient (respectively) 
Canada–US relations and immigration policy. By making an issue more prominent 
in individuals’ minds, proximity amplifies the partisan or ideological cleavage in 
issue attitudes among the mass public – that is, proximity may widen the gap in 
average opinion between partisans or ideological adherents of different stripes. On 
the other hand, proximity may mute the effect of partisanship or ideology – that is, 
narrow the gap in positions between different partisans or ideological adherents – 
through higher levels of issue awareness or knowledge, or by bringing other 
considerations to the fore, such as localized economic benefits. In this way, other 
considerations induced by proximity ‚crowd out‛ the effects of party identification 
or ideology. (The specific theoretical expectations relating to, alternatively, attitudes 
toward Canadian–American affairs, the Keystone XL pipeline, and immigration 
policy reform are laid out in sections 1.3.2–1.3.4 below.) 
The survey data used in this thesis are taken from existing sources. 
Specifically, I draw on data from nationally representative, probability-based 
surveys conducted by the Canadian Elections Study (chapters 2 and 3), the Gallup 
Poll (chapter 2), and the Pew Research Center (chapters 4 and 5). The individual 
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articles (and the thesis as a whole) thus consist entirely of secondary data analyses. 
What further distinguishes these data from other survey data sources are that 
reasonably granular, small-area geographic indicators – such as census 
dissemination areas, Canadian federal electoral districts, Canadian postal codes, US 
ZIP codes, or US Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) county codes – 
were retained in the publicly-available data sets (or in the case of the Pew Research 
Center, these were obtained from Pew Research Center staff by special 
arrangement). This allows me to augment these data by geocoding (appending 
latitude–longitude coordinates to) individual survey respondents and calculating 
their distance to relevant geographic features. To do so, I draw on various publicly-
available data sources such as Google Earth maps of the Keystone XL pipeline route 
or digital map shapefiles for international borders. In the cases of chapters 2 and 3, I 
manually locate all Canada–US border crossings in order to perform the distance 
calculations. In the case of chapter 5, I also use FIPS county codes to append data 
that describe the local ethnic (Hispanic) context from the 2000 and 2010 decennial 
censes.  
It should be noted that at the present time, the material comprising chapters 
2 and 3 has been published as Gravelle (2014b) and Gravelle (2014a), respectively. 
Chapter 4 is collaborative work (with equal authorship) with Erick Lachapelle of the 
Université de Montréal, and has been published as Gravelle and Lachapelle (2015). 
Chapter 5 is a single-authored work, and is forthcoming as Gravelle (2016). The 
content of the published articles has been revised to include extensions of the 
theoretical discussions motivating the hypotheses, additional discussion of 
empirical results, alternative model specifications, and to make spelling and 
citations consistent throughout the thesis. Material such as additional plots 
originally relegated to online appendices on account of limited journal space has 
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also been included in the thesis. Figures, tables and regression models are also 
renumbered sequentially. 
In light of the article-based structure of this thesis and the fact that the 
articles engage with a number of distinct literatures – public opinion toward 
Canada–US relations, foreign perceptions of the US, energy project siting, and 
immigration policy – the relevant literatures are reviewed in each of the individual 
articles. I rather use this overarching introduction as an opportunity to, first, engage 
with the related concepts of space and proximity as they have been developed and 
deployed in various social science literatures from classical social theory to the 
current-day research programme on spatially integrated social science. I then 
motivate my research hypotheses relating to the effects of political variables (party 
identification and ideology), spatial proximity, and the interaction of political 
variables with proximity (the individual articles also restate these hypotheses), and 
present the theoretical model underpinning all four articles in a general 
mathematical form, highlighting the interaction between political factors and spatial 
proximity that marks the originality of this work. Given the importance of 
interactive (or moderated) relationships in the articles, I then provide an extensive 
review of the statistical theory and methods for specifying, testing and probing 
interaction effects in linear and generalized linear models. Drawing on landmark 
work in political methodology, I then articulate my perspective on overall model fit. 
Finally, I discuss the technical aspects of geocoding survey data, the validity of 
appended latitude–longitude coordinates based on geographic indicators such as 
ZIP codes, postal codes, counties, and electoral districts, and alternative methods for 
calculating geodetic distances – topics that fall under the remit of geographic 
information science and that are discussed only briefly in the individual articles. 
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1.2 Spatial Social Science: Origins and Development 
Within political science, the use of spatial models and the tools of geographic 
information science have been established in the study of international conflict for 
some time (O’Loughlin and Anselin 1991; Ward and Gleditsch 2008; Gleditsch and 
Weidmann 2012). By contrast, such methods are relatively new to the study of 
political behaviour (Tam Cho and Gimpel 2012). Similarly, research in political 
behaviour integrating a spatial aspect by including geographic distance to relevant 
features as an explanatory variable is a new development from the past decade 
(Berezin and Díez Medrano 2008; Branton et al. 2007; Dyck and Gimpel 2005; Kuhn 
2011). Nevertheless, there is an extensive history of spatially-oriented theory and 
research in the social sciences. This line of research which might be termed spatial 
social science is a synthetic tradition on account of its fragmentation across the 
traditional disciplines of geography, sociology, and political science, and also the 
wide variation in the substantive foci of the authors contributing to it, including 
processes of urbanization, population growth, racial prejudice, and voting 
behaviour. This tradition of spatial thinking can be traced from the classical social 
theory of Émile Durkheim (1893; 1897; 1899) through the ‚Chicago School‛ of 
sociology (Park, Burgess, and McKenzie 1925), the human ecology of Amos Hawley 
(1950; 1986), analyses by V.O. Key (1949) of race and voting behaviour in the 
American South, and Waldo Tobler’s (1970) ‚First Law‛ of geography. In many 
ways, these authors served as precursors to the more recent literature on ‚spatially 
integrated social science‛ (Goodchild et al. 2000; Goodchild and Janelle 2004; 
Goodchild and Janelle 2010; Janelle and Goodchild 2011) bringing spatial data 
analysis and geographic information science techniques to bear on social scientific 
research (Porter 2011; Porter and Howell 2012). This section thus serves as a review 
of landmark scholarship in spatial thinking in the social sciences with an emphasis 
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on the analytical concepts of space and distance in explanations of social phenomena. 
By drawing attention to this tradition of spatial social science and explicating space 
and distance as analytical concepts, this section also serves to motivate the 
argument for accounting for proximity and distance in individual-level models of 
public opinion and political behaviour. 
1.2.1 Émile Durkheim 
Given the prominent place accorded to Durkheim in the history of 
sociological thought, it is perhaps unsurprising to find a contribution to spatial 
thinking in his sociology. Specifically, his contribution is found in his discussion of 
the concept of ‚social morphology.‛ According to Durkheim, all social phenomena 
bear the imprint of the spatial and demographic contexts in which they occur. 
Writing in an introductory note in the second volume of his Année sociologique 
(1899), Durkheim describes the domain of social morphology in the following way. 
Social life rests upon a substratum which is determinate both in extent 
and in its form. It is composed of the mass of individuals who 
comprise the society, the manner in which they are disposed upon the 
earth, and the nature and configuration of objects of all sorts which 
affect collective relations. Depending on whether the population is 
more or less sizeable, more or less dense; depending on whether it is 
concentrated in cities or dispersed in the countryside; depending on 
the way in which the cities and houses are constructed; depending on 
whether the space occupied by the society is more or less extensive; 
depending on the borders which define its limits, the avenues of 
communication which traverse it, and so forth, this social substratum 
will differ. From another point of view, the constitution of this 
substratum directly or indirectly affects all social phenomena, just as 
all psychic phenomena are placed in mediate or immediate 
relationship with the brain. Thus, we have a whole collection of 
problems which are of obvious interest to sociology and which, 
because they all refer to a single and identical object, must come 
within the jurisdiction of a single science. It is this science which we 
propose to call social morphology (Durkheim 1978a, 88). 
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Writing a decade later in a programmatic essay on sociology and the social sciences 
(1909), Durkheim would use similar language in describing the aims and scope of 
the study of social morphology: 
First of all, there is reason to study society in its external aspect. From 
this angle, it appears to be formed by a mass of population of a certain 
density, disposed on the face of the earth in a certain fashion, 
dispersed in the countryside or concentrated in cities, and so on. It 
occupies a more or less extensive territory, situated in a certain way 
relative to the seas and to the territories of neighboring peoples, more 
or less furrowed with waterways and paths of communications of all 
sorts which place the inhabitants in more or less intimate relationship. 
This territory, its dimension, its configuration, and the composition of 
the population which moves upon its surface are natural important 
factors of social life; they are its substratum and, just as psychic life in 
the individual varies with the anatomical composition of the brain 
which supports it, collective phenomena vary with the constitution of 
the social substratum. There is, therefore, room for a social science 
which traces its anatomy; and since this science has as its object the 
external and material form of society, we propose to call it social 
morphology 
*<T+he makeup of this substratum directly or indirectly affects 
all social phenomena, in the same way as all psychic phenomena are 
in mediate or immediate relation to the state of the brain. So these are 
all problems which are patently concerned with sociology and which, 
as they all refer to the same object, must be part of one science. It is 
this science we propose to call social morphology (Durkheim 1978b, 
79). 
In Durkheim’s writings, one finds explanations of social phenomena 
grounded in the facts of social morphology in both De la division du travail social 
(1893) and Le suicide (1897). In the former, Durkheim’s attempt to understand the 
transitions from pre-industrial to industrial societies centres on the roles of increase 
in population density (especially concentrated in cities) and greater population size 
as causing the occupational division of labour that characterizes industrial society 
(cf. Lukes 1973, 167–172; Poggi 1972, 185–189). In the latter, morphological 
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characteristics such as birth rates (and hence household size) and population 
density factor into his account of suicide alongside religion. 
 Summarizing Durkheim’s writings on social morphology, Andrews (1993, 
115) writes that ‚social morphological characteristics – population size, territorial 
extent, population density *<+ and socio-spatial interaction *<+ – are all presented 
as independent variables, seen as explaining a wide variety of institutional 
outcomes of social organization, occupational differentiation and patterns of 
regulation of distinct areas of social activities.‛ One therefore finds in Durkheim’s 
sociology motivation for the argument that social phenomena are at least in part 
determined by spatial context. Durkheim’s advice to consider the external aspect or 
substratum of social life – which is in part constituted by ‚the borders which define 
its limits‛ and a society’s location vis-à-vis ‚the territories of neighboring peoples‛ – 
is thus deserving of serious consideration. 
1.2.2 The Chicago School 
 Another focal point in the history of spatial thought in the social sciences is 
found in the work of the Chicago School of sociology – so called because of the 
association of its major figures – Robert Park, Ernest Burgess and Roderick 
McKenzie – with the Department of Sociology at the University of Chicago in the 
early twentieth century. The overarching project of the Chicago School was to 
document in detail the social implications of rapid urbanization and population 
growth in American cities using both quantitative and qualitative evidence, and 
taking Chicago as the archetypal (and close-at-hand) case (Porter and Howell 2012; 
Snell 2010). While the body of work produced by the Chicago School has been 
labelled as ‚descriptive to an extreme, at times leaving the underlying intellectual 
commitments of the scholars uncertain for the reader‛ (Merriman 2014), its major 
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contribution to urban sociology, The City (Park, Burgess, and McKenzie 1925), 
nevertheless yields a number of theoretical insights, chief among them that ‚no 
social fact makes any sense abstracted from its context in social (and often 
geographic) space and social time. Social facts are located‛ (Abbott 1997, 1152). 
 In the introductory chapter of The City, Park notes that the grid-like 
organization of the modern city suggests a certain artificial or synthetic character, 
contrasting as it does the winding, serpentine paths of natural features such as 
rivers, coastlines and valleys. Nothing, in the perspective of the Chicago School, 
could be further from the truth. In a discussion demonstrating a clear debt to 
Durkheim’s concept of social morphology (Schnore 1958), Park writes that ‚the city 
is rooted in the habits and customs of the people who inhabit it. The consequence is 
that the city possesses a moral as well as a physical organization and these two 
mutually interact in characteristic ways to mold and modify one another‛ (Park, 
Burgess, and McKenzie 1925, 4). This view of the mutual effects of city space on 
social phenomena – including crime, economic activity, social class – and vice versa 
are further explicated by McKenzie as being grounded in a human ecology 
approach. While ecology has been defined as the study of plants and animals in 
nature and their interdependence, human ecology can be defined ‚as a study of the 
spatial and temporal relations of human beings as affected by the selective, 
distributive, and accommodative forces of the environment.‛ What is more, human 
ecology ‚is fundamentally interested in the effect of position, in both time and space, 
upon human institutions and human behavior‛ (Park, Burgess, and McKenzie 1925, 
63–64). 
 The enduring contribution of the Chicago School is the theory of the 
concentric zonal structure of the organization of the modern city. Urban growth 
follows a pattern of radial expansion from the central business district: ‚The typical 
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processes of the expansion of the city can best be illustrated, perhaps, by a series of 
concentric circles, which may be numbered to designate both the successive zones of 
urban extension and the types of areas differentiated in the process of expansion‛ 
(Park, Burgess, and McKenzie 1925, 50). These zones are: the central business 
district (I, using Chicago as the archetypal case, this area is ‚the Loop‛), the zone in 
transition (II), the workingmen’s zone (III), the (higher-status) residential zone (IV), 
and the commuter’s zone (V) (Park, Burgess, and McKenzie 1925, 50–51). The 
Chicago School’s inductively-derived model of the spatial organization of the city 
thus accounts for land use in terms of its proximity to the centre of economic 
activity. Proximity is also consequential in the formation of neighbourhood 
communities. One can also see an early (and underdeveloped) articulation of the 
intergroup contact hypothesis (Allport 1954; Pettigrew 1998) in Park’s statement 
that ‚*p+roximity and neighborly contact are the basis for the simplest and most 
elementary form of association with which we have to do in the organization of city 
life. Local interests and associations breed local sentiment...‛ (Park, Burgess, and 
McKenzie 1925, 7). 
1.2.3 Amos Hawley 
 The spatially- and ecologically-oriented approach of the Chicago School was 
extended by Amos Hawley (a student of Roderick McKenzie) who similarly 
adopted the term ‚human ecology‛ to describe his approach to the study of society, 
and social phenomena such as population growth and migration. Hawley’s starting 
point is that human beings exist in an environment, and are dependent upon their 
environment for their existence. Further, human beings are interdependent: they 
necessarily exist as a member of a population. Human behaviour, then, must be 
understood in the context of the physical and social environment in which it occurs 
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(A. H. Hawley 1950, 68–74; A. H. Hawley 1986, 4–7). The definition of 
‚environment‛ is both flexible and open-ended. ‚It includes all that is external to 
and potentially or actually influential upon an object of investigation‛ (A. H. 
Hawley 1986, 10–11). Still, one can distinguish between biophysical aspects of the 
environment (land forms, plant and animal life), and ‚ecumenic‛ aspects 
(comprising both social and economic aspects of the environment, including 
intergroup relations, exchange relations, migration and information flows). At the 
same time, ecumenic aspects of the environment tend to exhibit greater variation 
than the biophysical aspects, which tend to be more constant (A. H. Hawley 1986, 
14–17). This suggests greater potential explanatory power for ecumenic aspects. 
 Again recalling Durkheim’s concept of social morphology and referencing 
the work of the Chicago School that showed how physical features of the city 
influenced crime, area demographic compositions, and birth rates, Hawley writes 
that ‚there is a tendency for human behavior to reflect in one way or another the 
physical characteristics of the area in which it occurs. [...] Man lives close to the 
ground and must of necessity relate his activities to his physical milieu‛ (A. H. 
Hawley 1950, 90). The human ecology theoretical framework thus assigns causal 
force to the environment: ‚In general, the position adopted on this issue is that 
environment is an independent variable, or rather a set of independent variables‛ 
(A. H. Hawley 1986, 12).  
 A key independent variable in Hawley’s human ecology framework used to 
explain the spatial organization of social phenomena – how populations grow, 
disperse across territory, concentrate particular activities in particular locations, and 
how different populations relate to one another – is what he terms the ‚friction of 
space.‛ Hawley writes that: ‚Human relationships, occurring as they do in a 
physical universe, involve the overcoming of a number of resistances which are 
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generalized in the phrase friction of space. Space itself is something to be passed 
over and thus it calls for an expenditure of time and energy. [...] In other words, the 
friction of space is small or great as distance is short or long...‛ (A. H. Hawley 1950, 
237). Hawley points to the spatial distribution of different business types as an 
example of the friction of space: specialized types of services (e.g., legal services) 
tend to concentrate in central areas (‚downtown‛); less specialized goods and 
services (e.g., grocery stores, gas/petrol stations, schools), tend to be more dispersed, 
and generally follow the spatial distribution of the population (A. H. Hawley 1950, 
276–278). 
 Hawley’s human ecology framework thus points to proximity and distance 
(by way of the ‚friction of space‛) as an important element of the spatial context for 
human relations. As a general theoretical precept, then, Hawley points us to 
consider (and test) the effects of the friction of space on the relations between 
individuals and groups. 
1.2.4 V.O. Key 
While many of the early contributions to spatial thinking in the social 
sciences originate in sociology, this is not exclusively the case. For example, nearly 
contemporaneously with Hawley’s work on human ecology, political scientist V.O. 
Key (1949) advanced explanations of various aspects of American political 
behaviour grounded in spatial context and proximity to salient locations. Raised 
and educated in Texas, the focus of Key’s seminal work Southern Politics in State and 
Nation (1949) was on explaining the regional political dynamics of the American 
South. An essential part of his analytical strategy was to use spatial displays – for 
example juxtaposing maps of county-level election results with maps of the 
proportions of the black population. This analytical approach led Key to argue that 
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at its core, ‚the politics of the South revolves around the position of the Negro‛ – 
even though immediate issues present themselves as pertaining to textiles, trade, or 
inequality (1949, 5). This is to say that southern politics in the late-nineteenth to 
mid-twentieth centuries was driven largely by whites in the so-called agricultural 
‚black belt‛ – those parts of the southern states that are ‚black both in soil and in a 
majority of their people‛ (Key 1949, 43). White residents of these areas were often 
able to wield a disproportionate political influence in state politics because of their 
heightened levels of political participation and consistently high levels of support 
for racially conservative policies. State-level political outcomes were thus a function 
of the prevalence of such black belt areas within a state. For Key, this is seen most 
clearly by contrasting the political dynamics of Mississippi, with a high proportion 
of whites in black belt counties, and Florida, with a very small proportion of 
similarly-situated whites. Racial politics were significantly more conservative in the 
former than in the latter (Key 1949, 5–6). Further, voting in Democratic primaries in 
Alabama tended to be highest in counties with the highest concentration of blacks 
(Key 1949, 513–517). Similarly, in North Carolina and Alabama, support for 
amendments to state constitutions restricting voting rights (that is, policies designed 
to restrict black voting rights) was highest in black belt counties (Key 1949, 544–547). 
Key thus observed an aggregate-level correlation between local (county-level) 
proportions of the black population and support among whites for racially 
conservative policies. 
Key also notes a pervasive localism in political behaviour in many southern 
states, which he dubs the ‚friends-and-neighbors‛ effect. Here, Key operationalizes 
the concept of distance by mapping the home towns of candidates for political 
office, overlaid with areas of high candidate support at the county level, in order to 
demonstrate the effect of the ‚friends-and-neighbors‛ effect on voting behaviour. In 
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Alabama, for example, candidates for state office frequently received majority 
support in their home counties, as well as strong support in adjacent counties (Key 
1949, 36–38). A similar localism is also a feature of Florida politics, which, according 
to Key, is a consequence of the large distances between urban population centres, 
which make the formation of state-wide political organizations difficult, while 
facilitating the formation of local political bases for candidates (Key 1949, 82–92). In 
South Carolina, localism is again seen to prevail, with candidate support 
concentrated in their home counties and those adjacent (Key 1949, 132–134). These 
local dynamics are all the more notable because of its absence in other states, such as 
Virginia. The strength of state-level party machinery, weak in many states but 
strong in Virginia, accounts for the difference (Key 1949, 37). 
 Key’s analyses of the politics and political behaviour of the American South 
thus accord an important explanatory role to spatial and contextual factors. Racial 
context (specifically the concentration of blacks in the local area) is linked to support 
among whites for candidates endorsing and policies designed to maintain a 
privileged position for whites. Also, proximity to a candidate’s home town is linked 
to increased support for that candidate. Still, it is important to note that Key’s 
analyses were comprised of aggregate data analyses owing to difficulties in 
analyzing spatially-referenced data at the time; they are thus properly understood 
as ecological and not individual-level relationships. Nevertheless, Key’s work has 
been highly influential in charting a path toward analyses of spatial context and 
individual-level racial attitudes (Baybeck 2008; Blalock 1957; Kinder and 
Mendelberg 1995; Glaser 1994).  
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1.2.5 Waldo Tobler 
While many of the contributions to spatial thinking in social science have 
come from sociology, and to a lesser extent political science, it is not surprising that 
geography has also made a contribution. Geography’s contribution has been less 
central, however, on account of that discipline’s historical focus on physical 
geography (Porter and Howell 2012). Nevertheless, it is important to draw attention 
to the work of Waldo Tobler and his so-called ‚first law‛ of geography. Tobler’s first 
law is an idea that runs through geographic thought and research, even if it is not 
always acknowledged (Sui 2004). 
Discussing population growth, Tobler notes that growth in a given place is a 
function of many more factors than simply the previous (baseline) level of 
population in that place (and a rate of growth), implying a simple bivariate 
relationship – population at time 2 is a function of population at time 1. A more 
realistic and theoretically satisfactory model, according to Tobler, would model 
population growth as a function of the previous level of population and also the 
populations of all other places – in keeping with the notion that ‚everything is 
related to everything else. [...] More concretely, population growth in Ann Arbor 
from 1930 to 1940 depends not only on the 1930 population of Ann Arbor, but also 
on the 1930 population of Vancouver, Singapore, Cape Town, Berlin, and so on‛ 
(Tobler 1970, 236). This is problematic from a statistical modelling perspective, as it 
implies an unrealistic number of independent variables – several thousand by 
Tobler’s estimation. Greater realism in modelling and model parsimony are 
balanced by noting that growth in population in a given place is affected much 
more by population levels in near places than in distant places. It is in this context 
that one finds Tobler’s famous invocation of ‚the first law of geography: everything 
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is related to everything else, but near things are more related than distant things‛ 
(Tobler 1970, 236). 
 Though seemingly little more than common sense, Tobler’s first law served 
as an initial expression of what would later be formalized as spatial autocorrelation, 
and also underpins methods for spatial interpolation (Goodchild 2004; Miller 2004). 
It also focuses attention on nearness – specifically that what is consequential to the 
explanation of social and geographic phenomena is typically near; what is distant is 
typically of less explanatory importance (Miller 2004). This is to say that local factors 
and circumstances offer greater explanatory power than more distant factors (Sui 
2004). In this way, Tobler’s first law points toward taking seriously dynamics of 
proximity and distance just as Hawley’s ‚friction of space‛ and Key’s ‚friend-and-
neighbors‛ effects do. 
1.2.6 Spatially Integrated Social Science 
Despite the long lineage of spatial thought from Durkheim to Tobler, the 
authors constituting this tradition of thought did not have the advantage of present-
day computing and the analytical capabilities afforded by geographic information 
system (GIS) tools. Both the increasing availability of spatially located data and the 
increasing power and ease of use of GIS tools since the 1980s and 1990s have seen 
the use of GIS expand well beyond its traditional bases in physical geography, 
regional science, and civil engineering into the remit of the social sciences 
(Goodchild 2004; Janelle and Goodchild 2011; Logan, Zhang, and Xu 2010). The 
spread of spatial concepts and methods across disciplines has meant that one can 
now speak of a ‚spatial turn‛ in the social sciences (Goodchild, Janelle, and 
Grossner 2014), and further that spatial analysis is one of the distinctive aspects of 
social science in the past decade (Logan 2012). Demonstrating the promise of such 
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spatial analytical tools (when joined with appropriate spatial concepts) for social 
research has been the goal of the literature on spatially integrated social science. The 
term ‚spatially integrated social science‛ (often abbreviated ‚SISS‛) is most closely 
associated with a group of geographers with links to the Center for Spatially 
Integrated Social Science (now the Center for Spatial Studies) at the University of 
California, Santa Barbara, but the term has come to be applied more widely to 
describe any kind of social scientific research that explicitly accounts for space in 
both theory and modelling (Goodchild and Janelle 2004). More specifically, a 
spatially integrated approach to social science ‚explicitly recognizes the key role 
that geographical (or spatial) concepts – such as distance, distribution, location, 
proximity, connectivity, place, neighbourhood and region – play in human society 
and the behaviour of individuals, groups and organizations‛ (Stimson 2014, 13). 
A central element of the SISS perspective is that space serves an integrative 
function with respect to theory and methods. In terms of theory, the SISS literature 
follows in the long tradition of spatial social science in acknowledging that all 
human activity and behaviour occurs in a spatial context. ‚Everything happens 
somewhere, which means that all action is embedded in place and may be affected 
by its placement‛ (Logan 2012, 508). Thus, SISS endeavours to integrate spatial 
analysis and substantive theories and problems in the social sciences. It also 
advances ‚the proposition that many social processes and problems are better 
understood through the mapping of phenomena and the analysis of spatiotemporal 
patterns‛ (Janelle and Goodchild 2011, 28). While economic, political, and social 
processes have historically been studied in separate disciplines, ‚these separate 
processes interact in a spatiotemporal context‛ (Goodchild et al. 2000, 142). Space 
can therefore ‚provide an integrating mechanism for the social sciences.‛ More 
concretely, space serves as an integrating mechanism in that different data sources 
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can be integrated – that is, linked together in rectangular datasets – based on 
geographic location (Goodchild and Janelle 2004, 13). 
Another contribution of the SISS literature is a sharper distinction between 
place and space – two concepts that had not always been clearly distinguished in 
previous geographic work (Agnew 2011; Sack 1993). Place refers to a unique 
location in the universe; place is ‚here‛ (and by extension, not anywhere else) 
(Gieryn 2000). Though political sociology has examined processes of place-making, 
in which particular locales are invested with specific meanings, and how 
individuals have come to hold affective attachments to particular places (e.g., 
Agnew 1987), place as an analytical construct does not factor prominently in the 
SISS approach. While place refers to what is unique and fixed, space is a relational, 
relative concept: ‚Concepts that are critical to spatial thinking – distance, proximity, 
exposure, and access – are all rooted in relative locations‛ (Logan 2012, 508–509). In 
this way, space is more abstract, or more specifically, abstracted away from 
particular locales. This understanding of space relates back to the geometric 
conception of space that underlies geographic information science which defines 
space as a mathematical relation between a set of objects (Gatrell 1991, 119–120). 
The notion of space as relational ties directly to the concept of distance. For 
the proponents of SISS, distance (or its obverse, proximity) is a central concept. ‚It is 
defined as relative position. This is distinct from both location (as in point location), 
and neighbourhood or region (understood as spatial context), and spatial 
dependence (the idea that near places are more similar than places further apart)‛ 
(Janelle and Goodchild 2011). Further, distance can be approached ‚as an indicator 
of access to other people or resources or exposure to harm, as a feature of social 
networks, and as a basis for identifying and interpreting clusters of related things‛ 
(Logan 2012, 511). 
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A final key contribution of the SISS literature is the development and 
extension of methods for dealing with spatial dependence (or spatial 
autocorrelation). Analogous to the concept of serial autocorrelation from time series 
analysis (the idea that observations close to one another in time tend to be more 
similar than those further apart in time), methods for spatial autocorrelation relax 
the assumption that observations are randomly distributed (across space). Such 
methods make adjustments for the clustering of observations and outcomes in space 
– that is, the tendency (as per Tobler’s first law) for proximate observations to be 
more similar to one another – often by incorporating ‚spatial lags‛ in the modelling 
(see, e.g., Ward and Gleditsch 2008). 
1.2.7 Key Themes in Spatial Social Science 
To summarize, spatial thinking in the social sciences has a long lineage. This 
line of thought, however, has elements of both continuity and discontinuity. For 
example, one can point to continuity in the concepts and language used by 
sociologists from Durkheim, through the Chicago School, and Hawley. Similarly, 
within geography, one can locate the influence of Tobler’s first law on the major 
proponents of the SISS literature. Given his background in political science and his 
focus on voting behaviour, Key stands apart from both the sociologists and 
geographers. Taken in sum, what the broad, multi-disciplinary tradition of spatial 
social science lacks in theoretical continuity and substantive focus is balanced 
against the intellectual resources it offers. While not providing a template, it is 
nevertheless richly suggestive as to the kinds of spatially-oriented research 
questions one might pursue. To be certain, previous spatial thought does not 
directly prescribe particular fully-developed hypotheses pertaining to the spatial 
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dynamics of public opinion or political behaviour, but extensions of this tradition 
keeping with its key themes do suggest themselves. 
The first theme apparent in the tradition of spatial thought is a focus on 
contextual explanations of human behaviour, and the notion that that the 
environment exerts causal effects on social phenomena. The importance of context is 
seen in Durkheim’s discussion of social morphology, pointing to factors such as 
population density, geographic area, and proximity to other populations as 
providing contextual explanations for human behaviour. Its importance is similarly 
seen in Hawley’s human ecology approach to studying societies (by way of the 
Chicago School) with its emphasis on understanding social processes such as 
population growth and migration as the outcomes of the physical and social 
environment. As for understanding specifically political behaviour, Key’s work 
assigns a central role to racial context, linking the proportion of the county-level 
black population to support for racially conservative policies among southern 
whites. This focus on the explanatory power of contextual variables is most explicit 
in the SISS literature. A common thread drawing these authors together, then, is a 
methodological orientation toward explaining human behaviour with reference to 
spatial or demographic contextual factors. 
Another theme running through the work of these authors is the notion of 
proximity and distance as a key spatial dynamic. Proximity–distance is referenced 
in Durkheim’s discussion of how societies bear the imprint of their location ‚relative 
to the seas and to the territories of neighboring peoples‛ (Durkheim 1978b, 79). 
Distance also appears at core of the Chicago School’s concentric zonal model of the 
spatial organization of the modern city (Park, Burgess, and McKenzie 1925). 
Proximity is similarly the dynamic at work in Key’s friends-and-neighbours model 
of candidate support in the American South, grounding its explanation of vote 
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choice in proximity to candidates’ home towns (1949, 36–38, 82–92, 132–134). A 
focus on distance (as relative position and as a spatial relation, distinct from local 
context) is also apparent in the delineation of space and place in the SISS literature. 
All of these strands of thought when brought to bear on public opinion and policy 
attitudes point toward the following research expectation: proximity to (or conversely 
distance from) salient geographic features will influence policy attitudes. 
Even in the absence of explicit acknowledgements, it is easy to read current 
research finding ‚proximity effects‛ as extensions of the tradition of spatial social 
science. Examples include research examining voting behaviour and proximity to 
voting locations (Dyck and Gimpel 2005), public opinion toward the European 
Union and proximity to Brussels (its symbolic centre) and other EU member states 
(Berezin and Díez Medrano 2008; Díez Medrano 2003; Kuhn 2011), and American 
attitudes toward immigration policy and proximity to the US-Mexico border 
(Branton et al. 2007). This focus on proximity–distance as a spatial relation draws 
attention to its character as a spatial dynamic distinct from those implied by local 
context (as containment – that is, being contained within a particular context) as 
well as the effects of spatial clustering (as adjacency – or the effects due to 
observations being adjacent to one another) (Porter and Howell 2012). 
1.3 The Politics–Proximity Interaction 
Building on the insight from spatial approaches to social science that 
proximity – conceived as a spatial relation – is consequential for human behaviour, 
the argument that unifies the four articles comprising this thesis is that the effects of 
political factors (party identification and ideology) on policy attitudes are 
contingent upon proximity (or conversely distance) to salient geographic features. 
Put differently, the relationship between political variables and proximity (or 
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distance) is interactive. The expectation for finding such interactive relationships at 
work in mass public opinion is motivated by findings from recent empirical 
research on policy attitudes in different domains. This research, along with the 
longer tradition of spatial approaches to social science, serves as the basis for 
specific hypotheses relating to public opinion toward the Canada–US relationship, 
support for the Keystone XL pipeline, and immigration and naturalization policy 
reform. 
The reason behind the primary focus on the interaction of political factors 
and spatial proximity is a pragmatic one: a clear focus helps in the pursuit of 
theoretical advancement and the collection empirical results in support of specific 
causal claims. As Gerring (2005, 174) has argued, social scientists ‚need to bring 
knowledge together in reasonably compact form in order for that knowledge to 
serve a useful purpose. Reduction is useful‛ (cf. King, Keohane, and Verba 1994, 29–
31).  Still, the analyses in the substantive chapters acknowledge alternative (though 
not necessarily rival) explanations of public opinion in the domains under study, 
including (but not limited to) the effects of demographic factors such as sex, age and 
educational attainment, geographic region (as distinct from proximity), and other 
attitudinal variables, such as perceptions of the national economy, attitudes toward 
trade, and environmental attitudes. These variables are included in the models as 
appropriate, and according to the availability of data. The challenge here, of course, 
is ‚to capture some of the complexity of the political world without altogether 
forsaking the parsimony on which good social science depends‛ (P. A. Hall 1997, 
189). Thus, part – but still an interesting part – of an explanation of public opinion 
toward Canada–US relations, the Keystone XL pipeline, and illegal immigration is 
found in the interaction of politics and spatial proximity to salient geographic 
features.  
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1.3.1 Proximity Effects in Recent Research 
A review of recent literature on policy attitudes among mass publics finds 
that distance to salient (and necessarily context-specific) geographic features exerts 
significant effects on policy attitudes in a variety of domains – including attitudes 
toward European integration, immigration policy, social policy, and energy policy. 
These not only serve as an extension of the tradition of spatial social science, but 
also as a basis for further research in different domains of public opinion and 
political behaviour. 
Examining attitudes toward European integration, Berezin and Díez 
Medrano advance an argument congruent with the tradition of spatial social science 
in stating that distance matters to individual attitudes toward the European Union 
(EU) ‚because it takes time to get there, but also because our visualization, our 
perception, of the space in between‛ exert effects on ‚our emotions, our beliefs, our 
attitudes, and, eventually, our behaviour‛ (2008, 22–23). Specifically, they find that 
EU nationals residing closer to Brussels (which serves as the seat of EU governance 
and the symbolic ‚centre‛ of the EU) increases the likelihood of expressing regret at 
the (hypothetical) dissolution of the EU (2008, 18–22). Consistent with these 
findings, Díez Medrano (2003, 243–246) finds that those residing closer to Brussels 
are more likely to favour EU membership. Those residing in a border region (and 
thus more proximate to another EU member state) are similarly more likely to 
favour EU membership. More nuanced findings are presented by Kuhn, who finds 
that that residing in a border district has a positive effect on public attitudes toward 
European integration in Germany, but no effect in France. The proximity effect 
observed in Germany is further mediated by having transnational ties such as 
having engaged in cross-border shopping and socializing with nationals of other EU 
countries (2011, 103–109). Kuhn’s findings are noteworthy for two reasons. Firstly, 
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they point to some of the likely mechanisms through which proximity exerts its 
effects on individual attitudes, namely interpersonal contact and economic 
exchange. Secondly, the presence of a proximity effect in Germany and its absence 
in France leaves it as an open question (one for empirical investigation) as to 
whether proximity effects exist in other national contexts or in other policy areas. 
Recent research on American policy attitudes toward immigration issues has 
also found proximity effects. Dunaway and colleagues (2010) find that residing in a 
US–Mexico border state increases the likelihood of identifying illegal immigration 
as the ‚most important problem‛ facing the US. Also, Branton and colleagues (2007) 
find that proximity to the US–Mexico border affects voting behaviour on ‚nativist‛ 
state ballot initiatives in California to deny social services and education to 
undocumented immigrants, but only among those on the political left: support for 
Propositions 187 and 227 among California Democrats increases as the US–Mexico 
border becomes more proximate while remaining consistently high among 
Republicans. Here, it is worth noting that the relationship between party 
identification and border proximity is interactive: the effect of partisanship depends 
on proximity to the US–Mexico border. Further, Hawley (2011) finds that 
Republican Party identification is a stronger predictor of restrictionist immigration 
attitudes when the county-level foreign-born population is large than when it is 
small. Again, the effect of party identification on immigration policy attitudes is 
moderated by demographic context. 
Turning to research on energy sites and environmental attitudes, as one 
might expect, proximity to energy infrastructure such as oil or gas wells, offshore 
platforms, pipelines, or nuclear power plants increases the likelihood of having 
contact with their negative aspects (such as sights or sounds), or the likelihood of 
facing health or environmental risks (D. P. Aldrich 2013). The intuition, then, is that 
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proximity to such energy infrastructure (or proposed energy infrastructure) will 
decrease support – following the logic of ‚NIMBY‛ (not-in-my-backyard). Research 
in this area, however, is mixed. Some work finds such NIMBY effects, for example, 
where proximity to nuclear power generating stations reduces support for nuclear 
power (Kraft and Clary 1991), or where proximity raises the level of concern for 
environmental contamination (Weiner, MacKinnon, and Greenberg 2013). Research 
more typically, though, finds an ‚inverse NIMBY‛ dynamic at work, where 
proximity to energy sites increases support (Greenberg 2009; E. R. A. N. Smith 2002; 
Michaud, Carlisle, and Smith 2008; D. P. Aldrich 2013; Warren et al. 2005). Yet other 
work suggests that proximity to energy infrastructure moderates the effect of 
political ideology – a dynamic similar to that seen in the case of American 
immigration attitudes. Franchino (2014) finds that proximity to nuclear power 
plants increases the ideological cleavage between left and right in many EU member 
states. With increasing proximity to a nuclear plant, those on the right tend to have 
more favourable attitudes toward nuclear energy; those on the left become less 
favourable. Thus, ‚proximity operates as a wedge separating left- from right-wing 
respondents. It appears indeed to bring into sharper focus the affective evaluation of 
nuclear power‛ (Franchino 2014, 221). 
Two key insights emerge from these recent contributions to the policy 
attitudes literature. First, there needs to be congruence between the proximity 
measure employed – i.e., distance to what – and the underlying attitudinal 
dimension being modelled – i.e., attitude toward what. These contributions to the 
literature each begin by advancing a prima facie case for examining, for example, 
attitudes toward European integration and proximity to other EU member states, 
immigration policy attitudes and proximity to the US–Mexico border, or proximity 
to energy infrastructure and attitudes toward that energy source, arguing that 
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proximity to these geographic features measures by proxy contact, interaction, 
awareness, or issue salience. (We would not, for example, expect that proximity to 
the nearest hospital would have any bearing on attitudes toward military spending, 
but it may be relevant to perceptions of one’s health care system, or attitudes 
toward health care spending.) In short, extensions of the spatial social science 
literature drawing on measures of spatial proximity need to establish the theoretical 
link between the specific proximity measures used – distance to what – and the 
specific policy attitudes under investigation – attitudes toward what. The nature of 
these theoretical links will obviously be contingent upon the policy attitude under 
study, and in keeping with the tradition of human ecology (A. H. Hawley 1950; A. 
H. Hawley 1986), there is no reason to expect that spatial proximity to a particular 
geographic feature (as an aspect of the environment) captures any one process in all 
cases. 
The second is that the effect of proximity on attitudes may be heterogeneous 
– specifically, proximity may exert different effects among different political groups, 
such as individuals with different partisan identifications, or individuals on the left 
versus the right. Indeed, some of the more interesting and nuanced findings relating 
proximity (or distance) to policy attitudes are those of Branton and colleagues (2007) 
showing that the effect of party identification on immigration policy attitudes is 
contingent on distance to the US–Mexico border, and also those of Franchino (2014) 
showing that the effect of left–right ideology on attitudes toward nuclear energy is 
contingent upon distance to the nearest nuclear plant. It is therefore worthwhile to 
theorize and test similar interactive hypotheses in other contexts. 
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1.3.2 The Mutual Perceptions of Canadians and Americans, and Attitudes toward 
Canada–US Relations 
To preview the hypotheses relating to party identification and proximity to 
the Canada–US border fully developed in chapters 2 and 3, there are well-founded 
reasons for expecting proximity to the Canada–US border to moderate the effect of 
party identification on Canadians’ attitudes toward the US, Americans’ attitudes 
toward Canada, and both publics’ attitudes toward Canada–US relations. In the 
Canadian context, recent federal elections have demonstrated that parties of the 
centre and left have shown less affinity for American values and culture, have often 
staked out policy positions less inclined toward greater Canada–US co-operation, 
and have occasionally invoked anti-American sentiment for political gain. Parties of 
the right have been more pro-American and more ‚continentalist‛ in their stances, 
seeking to strengthen Canada–US ties (Granatstein 1996; Inwood 2005; Nossal 2008). 
What follows from this is that the Canadian mass public ought to interpret such 
‚elite cues‛ through the lenses of their pre-existing partisan and ideological 
attachments (Zaller 1992). I expect the Canadian public to structure its attitudes 
toward the US accordingly; Canadians who identify with the Conservative Party 
ought to hold the most positive feelings toward the US and desire closer Canada–US 
ties. NDP and Bloc Québécois identifiers should have the least positive feelings 
toward the US and desire more distant Canada–US ties. Liberal Party identifiers 
should hold an intermediate position between Conservative Party identifiers (on the 
one hand) and NDP and Bloc Québécois identifiers (on the other hand). 
There is reason to expect the same dynamic in the American context. 
American political discourse contains both positive and negative images of Canada 
which tend to follow partisan and ideological cleavages. The positive view of 
Canada held by American liberals dates from the 1970s, when Canada came to be 
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seen as ‚a sort of nirvana north‛ – an example of the type of social democratic 
society some aspired the US to become (Brooks 2008, 38). More recently, a 
competing negative image has been put forward by Republican elites in Congress 
and the conservative-leaning news media. It stems from an aversion to 
developments in Canadian society such as same-sex marriage, as well as 
perceptions that Canada is a security free-rider and a security risk in terms of its 
border with the US (Brooks 2008). It is reasonable to expect that such elite attitudes 
about Canada will carry over to mass public opinion. Consequently, I expect than 
Democrats will be more favourable toward Canada than Republicans. 
With respect to proximity to the Canada–US border, given existing theory 
and empirical research, a first-order expectation is that closer proximity to the 
Canada–US border implies more positive perceptions among Canadians and 
Americans; increasing distance from the border implies less positive perceptions. 
Similarly, closer proximity to the Canada–US border should increase support 
among the Canadian public for closer ties with the United States; increasing 
distance from the border should increase support for more distant ties. These 
expectations are grounded in the cultural similarities of Canadians and Americans 
residing in border regions, long histories of cross-border migration, and enduring 
social and economic ties between border communities in Canada and the United 
States (Laxer 2003; Stuart 2007). Border regions may also have greater exposure to 
print, radio, and television news media from the United States (Payne and Caron 
1982). News media tend to give greater coverage to events occurring locally or 
nearby, and less coverage to events occurring further away (Branton and Dunaway 
2009a; S. R. Martin 1988).1 It is therefore credible to suggest that proximity to the 
                                                                                             
1. Ideally, one would measure these mediating factors – local-area cross-border trade, 
personal travel and personal interactions, and cross-border media consumption. Unfortunately, 
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Canada–US border increases the salience of ties between Canada and the US, 
increases the likelihood of interaction (and frequency of interaction) with citizens of 
the neighbouring country, and thus leads to more positive perceptions of the other 
country and increased support for closer Canada–US ties. On the other hand, 
increasing distance to the border diminishes the salience of Canadian–American 
ties, decreases the likelihood (and frequency) of interaction with citizens of the other 
country, thus leading to less positive perceptions of the other country and decreased 
support for closer ties. 
An alternative to this first-order expectation is that the relationship between 
partisanship and proximity may be interactive, resembling the findings of Branton 
and colleagues (2007) and Hawley (2011). That is, border proximity may amplify the 
effects of political attitudes on Canada–US ties, either positive or negative. A more 
nuanced interactive hypothesis holds that among Conservative and Liberal 
identifiers, closer proximity to the border ought to create more positive attitudes 
toward the other country and stronger preferences for closer Canada–US ties, as 
suggested above. Among those who identify with the NDP, closer proximity to the 
United States creates heightened perceptions of threat (that is, fears of the 
‚Americanization of Canada‛) and thus less positive attitudes toward the US and 
stronger preferences for more distant Canada–US ties. It is less clear if (or whether) 
Bloc Québécois support and border proximity will interact. Attitudes toward the US 
in Quebec have typically entailed stronger support for economic ties but less 
support for security cooperation (Haglund 2006; P. Martin 2011). Therefore, I do not 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
neither Canadian nor American trade statistics are compiled at a level of aggregation below the 
province or state. Similarly, measures of cross-border travel, interaction with individuals of other 
nationalities, and cross-border media consumption rarely appear in social surveys. Available 
Canada–US cross-border travel data are discussed in chapter 2. 
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advance any explicit expectations regarding border proximity and Bloc Québécois 
support. 
Similar dynamics ought to be seen in the American case. Specifically, 
proximity to the border (and greater familiarity with Canada and its comparatively 
more progressive public policies) should amplify favourable impressions of Canada 
among Democrats – those who identify with the progressive end of the American 
political spectrum. 
1.3.3 Attitudes toward the Keystone XL Pipeline in the United States 
The interactive relationship between ideology and proximity in shaping 
attitudes toward the Keystone XL pipeline is the central focus of chapter 4. As 
discussed above, party identification acts as a cognitive shortcut among mass 
publics, allowing individuals to form policy attitudes with minimal cognitive effort. 
Zaller (1992) has shown that mass public opinion across a range of policy issues 
tends to follow elite opinion. Within the ambit of energy policy, including the issues 
of offshore oil drilling and nuclear power, research has found that Republicans 
more likely to be in favour than Democrats (E. R. A. N. Smith 2002). As is the case 
with partisanship, ideology – understood as a set of deeply held value orientations – 
also can serve as a cognitive shortcut, helping to form opinions in the absence of 
detailed knowledge or deliberation. Right-leaning and conservative members of the 
public can be expected to support pipelines because they represent individual 
rights, free enterprise, and the promise of jobs, or things conservatives value. 
Similarly, liberals’ or progressives’ values for collective goods (such as clean air and 
water) and equality might make them less likely to support pipeline projects that 
may concentrate benefits in the hands of large corporations while imposing the bulk 
of risks on local communities and the environment (E. R. A. N. Smith 2002). 
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When theorizing the role of proximity in energy siting controversies such as 
the proposed Keystone XL pipeline, a key consideration is the geographic 
distribution of costs and benefits. These can either be broad and diffuse or local and 
concentrated. As far as localized costs and benefits are concerned, Ansolabehere and 
Konisky have argued that the American public devotes attention to energy issues 
‚when the issues hit home, when they become localized and personalized. *<+ 
Americans are pragmatic and think about local, immediate consequences‛ (2014, 
15). Diffuse risks or far-away energy developments are (literally) distant 
considerations. Depending on the distribution of localized benefits and risks, local 
populations may support a proposed energy project when economic benefits 
outweigh environmental risks, or oppose it when the environmental risks outweigh 
the economic benefits. 
In the case of the Keystone XL pipeline proposal, nearly all of the potential 
economic benefits accrue at the local level, where the pipeline is expected to create 
2,500 to 4,650 construction jobs (Skinner and Sweeney 2012). Given that the risk of 
pipeline spills is likely to affect a small number of people who live especially close 
to the proposed route, such risks are unlikely alter the balance of opinion at the 
community level. Conversely, the opposite is true at the national level, where the 
Keystone XL pipeline offers few economic benefits for the US as a whole, since its 
primary purpose is to move Canadian bitumen closer to export markets offshore. 
Meanwhile, this new infrastructure will allow for the continued expansion of oil 
sands production, thus contributing to an increase in greenhouse gas emissions. 
This latter risk has made Keystone XL a salient issue in American politics at the 
national level, as environmental groups have framed the pipeline as an example of 
American inaction on climate change. On balance, the Keystone XL pipeline 
proposal thus presents economic benefits that are locally concentrated and 
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environmental risks that are largely diffuse. This leads to an expectation of an 
inverse NIMBY dynamic, where support for the Keystone XL energy pipeline is 
higher among Americans living closer to the proposed route; support is expected to 
be lower among those living further away. 
The relationship between proximity and support for pipelines, however, is 
likely to be more complex than a straightforward additive effect. It is reasonable to 
assume that residents living closer to a proposed energy project are more likely to 
be attentive to the issue, and aware of the potentially significant economic benefits 
accruing at the local level (E. R. A. N. Smith 2002, 145), thus diminishing the need 
for cognitive shortcuts (such as party identification and ideology). To the extent that 
proximity to the pipeline increases the awareness one has of net economic gains for 
the local community, we might expect such considerations to crowd out the role of 
political factors in shaping opinions on this issue. This is especially true in the case 
of Keystone XL, where the discourse around its risks are primarily framed as being 
global and diffuse, while its benefits are concentrated at the local level. Political 
polarization can therefore be expected to decrease (be attenuated) with proximity to 
the proposed Keystone XL pipeline route, while political polarization can be 
expected to increase (be amplified) with distance to the proposed route.  
1.3.4 Attitudes toward Illegal Immigration in the United States 
The interaction between party identification and proximity to the US–Mexico 
as factors explaining American attitudes toward undocumented immigrants is 
central to the analysis in chapter 5. Attempts at immigration reform at the federal 
level in 2005–2006 and again in 2013–2015, as well as state-level political 
developments such as Propositions 187 and 227 in California and SB-1070 in 
Arizona produced a partisan sort among political elites. As previously discussed, 
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partisan polarization at the level of elites translates into greater cue-taking among 
the mass public and thus sharpens partisan cleavages in mass opinion on 
immigration issues (Zaller 1992). Not surprisingly, then, research has typically 
found that Republicans favour ‚restrictionist‛ immigration policies more frequently 
than Democrats (Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014; G. Hawley 2011; Schildkraut 
2011). Further, research on different conceptions of American national identity has 
found that the ascriptive, ethno-cultural definition of American identity – where it is 
defined as being white, Protestant, of northern European descent, and English 
speaking – resonates most strongly with Republicans (Schildkraut 2005; Schildkraut 
2011). By contrast, Democrats are more likely to endorse ‚incorporationism‛ – a 
conception of American identity that acknowledges the role of immigration in 
shaping the country, and that values pluralism and tolerance of difference (Hajnal 
and Rivera 2014; Schildkraut 2007). Expectations regarding the effect of party 
identification on attitudes toward illegal immigration and undocumented 
immigrants, then, are clear: Democrats are more likely to favour allowing 
undocumented immigrants to remain in the US; Republicans are more likely to 
favour requiring undocumented immigrants to leave. 
As for spatial context and immigration policy attitudes, there is now a large 
literature on the American case linking local demographic context – measured as the 
proportion of foreign-born or Hispanic residents, or as the change in the proportion 
of Hispanic residents over time – and individual-level immigration attitudes. The 
results of this literature have been mixed. Some research finds that the proportion of 
foreign-born residents or Hispanics in the local area increases the likelihood of 
expressing restrictionist immigration attitudes (A. L. Campbell, Wong, and Citrin 
2006; Hero and Tolbert 1996; Tolbert and Hero 1996). Other research finds the 
opposite – larger proportions of foreign born residents or Hispanics decrease 
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restrictionist attitudes toward immigration (Hood and Morris 1997; Hood and 
Morris 1998). Some other studies report inconsistent or null results (Citrin, 
Reingold, and Green 1990; Fetzer 2000; Hood and Morris 2000). Others argue that it 
is not the ethnic context per se that influences immigration attitudes; it is rather 
change in the context over time: areas experiencing rapid growth in the Hispanic 
population exhibit higher levels of restrictionist immigration attitudes (Hopkins 
2010; Newman and Velez 2014).  
An alternative approach to the literature focused on local demographic 
context – the effect of ‚containment‛ in Porter and Howell’s (2012) theoretical 
schema – focuses instead on proximity as a spatial dynamic, specifically, proximity to 
the US–Mexico border. A focus on proximity to Mexico is warranted in discussing 
American immigration policy attitudes because Mexico provides the largest number 
of immigrants to the US, and also because the issue of illegal immigration has been 
repeatedly tied to Mexicans in public debate (A. L. Campbell, Wong, and Citrin 
2006). Further, proximity to the US–Mexico border provides cues through border 
checkpoints, fences and warning signs and thus heightens perceptions of threat 
(Branton et al. 2007). Border proximity also influences the media environment in 
which individuals reside. Media content analysis has shown that newspapers closer 
to the US–Mexico border publish negative stories about immigration (both 
authorized and unauthorized) more frequently than those further away (Branton 
and Dunaway 2009a; Branton and Dunaway 2009b). Media coverage of immigration 
in turn raises both the salience of the issue among the public and engenders more 
restrictionist immigration attitudes (Dunaway, Branton, and Abrajano 2010). 
At the same time, there is a solid basis for expecting proximity to Mexico to 
affect different segments of the American public differently. Recent work shows that 
Democrats and Republicans are influenced by spatial context (variously measured) 
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in different ways, with those on the political right more likely to react defensively to 
perceived local threats (Fischhoff et al. 2003). More to the point, Branton and 
colleagues (2007) find that support for Propositions 187 and 227 (state ballot 
initiatives intended to deny social services to undocumented immigrants) among 
California Democrats increases as the US–Mexico border becomes more proximate 
while again remaining consistently high among Republicans regardless of distance 
to Mexico. Using nationally-representative survey data, Hawley (2011) finds a 
different pattern: Republicans are consistent in their support of more restrictionist 
immigration policies regardless of spatial or demographic context, but Democrats 
become less (not more) restrictionist as the county-level proportion of foreign born 
residents increases. 
Motivated by existing research on the moderating effects of spatial context 
on Americans’ immigration policy attitudes, a working hypothesis is that with 
increasing proximity to the US–Mexico border, Republicans will become 
increasingly less likely to favour allowing undocumented immigrants to stay in the 
US; Democrats will become increasingly more likely to favour such a policy. 
1.3.5 Formalizing the Politics–Proximity Interaction 
The terms ‚interaction effect‛ or an ‚interactive relationship‛ both describe a 
situation in which the effect of an independent variable on the dependent variable is 
conditional upon the value of another variable, usually termed a moderator variable 
(Ai and Norton 2003; Aiken and West 1991; Hayes, Glynn, and Huge 2012; Jaccard 
and Turrisi 2003; Jaccard and Dodge 2004). In other words, ‚interactive 
relationships imply that the impact of X1 on Y varies depending on the level of X2‛ 
(Braumoeller 2004, 809). The theoretical model that underpins each interactive 
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hypothesis (discussed above) may be reduced to the right-hand side of the 
following equation: 
 ,ˆ 43210 CPDDPY    (1) 
that is, the expected value of the dependent variable (Ŷ) is a function of a matrix of 
political factors (denoted by P – e.g., PREPUBLICAN, PINDEPENDENT; PMODERATE, PCONSERVATIVE), 
a vector of geodetic distances (denoted by D), the interaction of political factors and 
distance (PD), and a matrix of covariates, or control variables (denoted by C). 
The precise form of the model linking Ŷ to the independent variables and 
controls will obviously differ depending on how Y is measured. Where Y is 
assumed to be a continuous, interval-level variable (as is the case with the Canadian 
Election Study ‚thermometer‛ rating scale used in chapter 2), linear regression is the 
appropriate statistical model. Here, the conditional mean response of Y is modelled 
as in equation 1 above (Fox 2008, chap. 5–7). Where the assumption of continuous, 
interval-level data is not plausible (as is the case with many of the survey measures 
analysed in this thesis), other statistical models are used. Where the dependent 
variable is dichotomous, as is the case with the Pew Research Center data on 
support for the Keystone XL pipeline and support for allowing unauthorized 
immigrants to remain in the US modelled in chapters 4 and 5, respectively, binary 
logistic regression is the appropriate statistical model. This may be written as: 
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or equivalently: 
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This is to say that rather than model Y directly, logistic regression models the log-
odds of Y = 1 (Fox 2008, chap. 14).  
 Where the dependent variable is a set of ordered categories, as is the case 
with the Gallup Poll Canada favourability survey item modelled in chapter 2 and 
the Canadian Election Studies Canada–US ties survey item modelled in chapter 3, a 
generalization of binary logistic regression – ordinal logistic regression – is used. 
This may be written as: 
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or equivalently: 
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where j represents the number of intercepts (or thresholds) in the model. The 
ordinal logit model thus models the ordered nature of the response using 
cumulative log-odds – that is, the log-odds of the survey response being in or above 
category j versus below category j (Fox 2008, chap. 14). 
 It is important to highlight that in equations 1, 2.1 and 3.1 above, the major 
differences relate only to the statistical forms of the models – that is, the link 
functions on the left-hand side, either the identity link or logit link. The quantities of 
theoretical interest on the right-hand side – namely the coefficient matrices or 
vectors denoted by β1, β2 and β3 – do not differ. The central object of the empirical 
analysis of the thesis, then, is the estimation of these three quantities across country 
contexts and policy issues. 
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1.4 The Specification, Testing and Probing of Interaction Effects 
The application of modern regression methods in social science research 
often entails the use of interaction effects of the type described above.2 Yet despite 
their regular use, more than one author has noted that such effects are often not 
properly implemented or are misinterpreted in applied research (Ai and Norton 
2003; Braumoeller 2004; Edwards 2009; Hayes, Glynn, and Huge 2012; Kam and 
Franzese 2007). Part of the challenge in interpreting interaction effects is that a set of 
regression coefficients often fails to communicate plainly the substantive meaning of 
an interaction effect. What is more, the correct methods for testing interaction in 
generalized linear models with limited (categorical) dependent variables (as 
opposed to conventional linear models) have been a topic of considerable discussion 
in the econometrics and political methodology literatures (Ai and Norton 2003; 
Berry, DeMeritt, and Esarey 2010; Berry, DeMeritt, and Esarey 2015; Greene 2010; 
Jaccard 2001; Rainey 2016). Given that the focus of the articles comprising this thesis 
is on testing a particular hypothesized interaction effect in both linear and 
generalized linear models (and more often than not, using generalized linear 
models), it is worth explicating in detail the theory and testing of such interactions, 
as well as the strategies quantitative social scientists have developed to 
communicate their substantive meaning. 
1.4.1 Interaction as a Three-Variable System 
Conceptualizing an interaction effect is often aided by thinking in terms of a 
system comprising three variables: the dependent variable, the ‚focal‛ independent 
variable and the moderator variable. The effect of the focal independent variable on 
the dependent variable is said to be moderated by the moderator variable (Jaccard 
                                                                                             
2. This section is a revision and extension of material from Gravelle (2012). 
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and Turrisi 2003; Jaccard and Dodge 2004). Applying this framework to Canadian 
and American policy attitudes on the aforementioned topics, one can say that the 
relationships between policy attitudes (the dependent variables) and political 
factors such as party identification and ideology (the focal independent variables) 
are contingent upon (or moderated by) spatial proximity (the moderator variable). 
Thus, political variables and proximity interact. 
It is worth noting that the distinction between the focal independent variable 
and the moderator variable is a theoretical – not a statistical – one. The statistical 
specification and testing of an interaction is ‚symmetrical‛ in the sense that it does 
not differ on account of which variable is accorded which role (Jaccard and Dodge 
2004, 237–238; Kam and Franzese 2007, 15). From the perspective of an analyst of 
political behaviour, though, the relationship of interest is between party 
identification (and ideology) and its effect on policy attitudes, and how this 
relationship is moderated by proximity or distance to relevant geographic features. 
A geographer might alternatively conceptualize the research question in terms of 
how spatial proximity shapes individuals’ attitudes, and how this relationship is 
moderated by individual-level political factors, but this is not the theoretical 
orientation I adopt. 
1.4.2 Interaction (Moderation) versus Indirect Effects (Mediation) 
It is also important to distinguish interaction effects (also termed moderated 
effects) from mediated effects (also termed indirect effects). The classic statement on 
moderation versus mediation comes from Baron and Kenny, who write that a 
moderator variable is one ‚that affects the direction and/or strength of the relation 
between an independent or predictor variable and a dependent or criterion 
variable‛ (1986, 1174). Conversely, a variable ‚may be said to function as a mediator 
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to the extent that it accounts for the relation between the predictor and the 
criterion.‛ This is to say that when one controls for the effect of the mediator 
variable on the dependent variable, the effect of the (hypothesized) independent 
variable is zero (Baron and Kenny 1986, 1176). These are two distinct patterns of 
effects at both the level of theory and their statistical specification and testing. A 
graphical depiction of these two patterns is shown in Figure 1.1. In the case of 
moderation (panel a), D influences the path between P and Y. In the case of 
mediation (panel b), the theory would be something like D influences Y only 
through P (implying that proximity/distance influences political variables, which in 
turn influence policy attitudes). Again, the theoretical and empirical focus of this 
thesis relate to moderation (panel a), and not mediation (panel b) thus defined. 
1.4.3 Interactive Models Do Not Provide ‚Average‛ or ‚Main‛ Effects  
At this point, some statistical observations about the model presented in 
equation 1 above are necessary. First, when hypothesizing an interaction effect, the 
parameters comprising the lower-order terms of the interaction (β1 and β2) must still 
be present in the model. Otherwise, the model is not ‚hierarchically well-
formulated‛ and is not of general application (Jaccard and Dodge 2004, 240). 
Second, even when lower-order terms are included in the model, they are not of 
primary interest. Given an interactive hypothesis, Kam and Franzese further 
suggest not testing or interpreting the coefficients for the lower-order terms β1 and 
β2 in a model excluding the product term β3 (2007, 46, 99). What follows from this is 
that significant effects for β1 and β2 in an additive model are neither a prerequisite 
nor consequential for testing β3 in an interactive model. Moreover, as numerous 
authors have stressed, they are not interpretable as the ‚main effects‛ of β1 and β2 or 
the ‚effects of β1 and β2 in general‛ or the ‚average effects‛ of β1 and β2; models 
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including interaction terms do not allow for such an interpretation. Unlike strictly 
additive models, there is no equivalence of coefficient and effect in interactive models 
(Kam and Franzese 2007, 19). Strictly speaking, the lower-order terms in an 
interactive model indicate (to use the proximity-politics example) the effect of P on 
Y when D is 0, and similarly the effect of D on Y when P is 0 (Brambor, Clark, and 
Golder 2006, 71–73; Braumoeller 2004, 809; Edwards 2009, 146–148; Fox 2008, 133–
134; Friedrich 1982, 821; Kam and Franzese 2007, 43–44). 
While P = 0 is plausible in many of the model specifications (it simply 
reflects, say, the reference category for party identification or ideology), D = 0, 
meaning zero distance to the geographic feature of interest, is less plausible. As an 
empirical matter, zero distance does not appear in any of the data employed in this 
thesis, so such a result is of little substantive interest. This point on zero values has 
been made repeatedly in the methodological literature on interaction effects, though 
often followed with the observation that the value zero can be made meaningful by 
additive transformations of the data (Allison 1977, 145–148; Edwards 2009, 145–146; 
Jaccard 2001, 11–12). One such commonly used transformation is the mean-centring 
of continuous independent variables. This simply involves subtracting the 
arithmetic mean from the original scores, resulting in new scores with a mean of 
zero. Jaccard and Turrisi recommend this strategy as a way to ‚force the coefficients 
to reflect parameters that are of theoretical interest‛ (Jaccard and Turrisi 2003, 15). 
Mean centring thus gives the value zero the interpretation of a variable’s pre-
transformation mean. In addition to these theoretical considerations, Robinson and 
Schumacker (2009) also recommend mean-centring the independent variables to 
reduce collinearity between the lower-order and higher-order regressors comprising 
the interaction effect, though Edwards (2009) and Kam and Franzese (2007, 94–99) 
note that mean-centring otherwise has no impact on the estimation. I thus employ 
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this strategy in all four articles so that the reported regression results indicate the 
effects of party identification (and ideology) when distance measures (e.g., logged 
distance to the Canada–US border, the Keystone XL pipeline, or the US–Mexico 
border) are set to their mean values. Thus parameterized, the regression results also 
indicate the effect of distance when political factors are set to zero (e.g., when party 
identification or ideology is set to its reference category). 
1.4.4 Interaction Effects in Linear versus Generalized Linear Models 
In the past decade, the testing of interactions in models with dichotomous 
and limited dependent variables (such as logit models) has received a substantial 
amount of attention in econometrics and political methodology. This literature has 
been anything but unequivocal, resulting in sometimes competing prescriptions to 
applied researchers. Given that logit models (both binary logit and ordinal logit) 
factor prominently in the articles of the thesis, it is worth explicating at some length 
the two contrasting theoretical perspectives on logit models – one which conceives 
of logit models as non-linear probability models, and one which sees logit models as a 
case of the generalized linear model, and thus within the same framework as linear 
models – since the choice between these two perspectives on the same underlying 
statistical model has implications for how one tests interaction effects in such 
models. To state my perspective at the outset, I adopt the generalized linear model 
approach to logit models over the non-linear probability model approach. 
A widely cited perspective originating in econometrics emphasizes the 
differences between linear and logit models, especially as it relates to testing 
interaction effects. While technically complex, the key claims of Norton and 
colleagues is that the logic of interaction from linear models does not carry over to 
logit models, and the statistical significance of an interaction effect cannot be 
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assessed using the coefficient and standard error of a product term. The reasons for 
this is that, as a ‚nonlinear model‛ where the dependent variable is constrained to 
the interval [0, 1], the value of the interaction effect depends on the values of all of 
the independent variables in the model, not simply the values of the variables 
involved in the specified interaction (Ai and Norton 2003; Norton, Wang, and Ai 
2004). This is because the values of the other independent variables contribute to the 
predicted probability of the outcome, which can approach 0 or 1, reducing the effect 
of the interaction term. This phenomenon is known as ‚compression‛ (Berry, 
DeMeritt, and Esarey 2010; Berry, Golder, and Milton 2012; Tsai and Gill 2013). 
Further, compression is not accounted for in the coefficient or standard error of the 
product term typically reported by statistical software. The solution, from this 
perspective, is to calculate cross-derivatives to estimate the interaction and its 
statistical significance using specialized statistical procedures (Ai and Norton 2003; 
Norton, Wang, and Ai 2004). 
An alternative perspective, more at home within social statistics and political 
methodology, emphasizes the underlying continuity between linear and logit 
models, and argues for an extension of the logic of linear models (and interactions in 
the case of linear models) to logit models. This approach follows the seminal work 
of McCullagh and Nelder, who argue that there is continuity between linear models 
and other regression models, such as logit, probit, and Poisson models, because they 
‚share a number of properties such as linearity and have a common method for 
computing parameter estimates. These common properties enable us to study 
generalized linear models as a single class rather than as an unrelated collection of 
special topics‛ (1983, 1). McCullagh and Nelder explain that generalized linear 
models do not differ from linear models in their ‚systematic component‛ – the 
linear predictor (denoted by η, or eta). They differ only in their ‚random 
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component‛ – the measurement of the dependent variable – and in the link between 
the random and systematic components. That is, they employ different link 
functions – the identity link (for linear models) versus the logit, probit, Poisson, and 
other link functions (for generalized linear models) (McCullagh and Nelder 1983, 
18–24). 
Following the logic of McCullagh and Nelder’s argument, Jaccard’s widely 
cited treatment of interaction effects in logit models emphasizes the log-odds 
interpretation of logistic regression over the non-linear probability interpretation. 
He argues that focusing on log-odds ‚permits us to stay in the familiar terrain of the 
general linear model with the traditional interpretation of slopes and intercepts. For 
interaction models, it permits us to take the same general principles for analyzing 
interactions in traditional [that is, linear] regression analysis and apply them 
directly to log odds based models‛ (Jaccard 2001, 10–11). Also following directly 
from McCullagh and Nelder, Fox (2008), presents the latent-variable formulation of 
the binary logit model. This formulation posits an unobserved continuous variable 
denoted by ξ (or xi), where Y = 0 when ξ is at or below a threshold given by α; Y = 1 
when ξ is above α. So while the observed outcome Y is dichotomous, the 
unobserved outcome ξ, which is the variable of theoretical interest, is continuous. 
The latent variable ξ can thus be assumed to be a linear function of the independent 
variables (Fox 2008, 343). This unobserved-variable formulation extends to the case 
of multiple ordered categories. This latent variable approach to ordinal logit models 
similarly posits an unobserved continuous variable ξ and expands the model to 
include multiple thresholds, given by α1, α2, < αm – 1, where m is the number of 
observed categories of Y. In this formulation, Y = 1 when ξ ≤ α1, Y = 2 when α1 < ξ ≤ 
α2, < Y = m when ξ > αm – 1. Importantly, ξ remains a linear function of the 
independent variables (Fox 2008, 363–366). 
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Stepping back from the statistical theory and mathematical notation, it is 
worth drawing attention to the differences in terminology employed by the two 
competing perspectives, namely the characterization of logit models as non-linear 
models versus generalized linear models. Part of the reason for the difference in 
terminology is the two perspectives’ focus on different quantities of interest despite 
of their use of a common statistical model. The difference is between a focus on the 
probability of an outcome, P(Y), versus the value of a hypothetical continuous latent 
variable, ξ, given an observed categorical measurement. As Rainey (2016) notes, the 
existing statistical literature has often not been clear which is the quantity of 
interest, even though the appropriate methods for testing interaction depend on the 
choice to focus on P(Y) or ξ. If opting for the generalized linear model (log-odds or 
latent variable) approach, the specification and testing of interactions in binary and 
ordinal logit models are no different from the case of linear models. Berry, 
DeMerritt and Esarey (2010, 250) are clear on this point: ‚If one’s hypotheses are 
about the effects of X1 and X2 on the unbounded latent dependent variable, the 
situation is fully analogous to the case of a continuous dependent variable model 
estimated with [linear] regression, and a [significant] nonzero product term 
coefficient is necessary for interaction.‛ Tsai and Gill (2013, 97–98) are similarly clear 
in stating that where the researcher’s interest is centred on an unbounded latent 
variable and not the probability of an event, then a model specification including a 
product term, following directly from conventional linear models, is both 
appropriate and sufficient for testing interaction. 
 Further, I contend that the latter perspective – focused on ξ, not P(Y) – is 
more appropriate given my substantive focus on mass public opinion and the 
attitudinal survey data I rely upon. To be certain, political data provide a number of 
examples of dichotomous data that are naturally conceived and measured as 
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dichotomous – e.g., voting (voted versus did not vote), policy adoption (adopted or 
not), and conflict data (hostilities exist or do not). These are examples where 
modelling the probability of the occurrence of an event makes most sense. Focusing 
on P(Y) in such instances accords with the presentation of limited dependent 
variable models in standard econometrics texts such as Wooldridge (2010).3 In many 
cases, though – attitudinal survey data being a case in point – the dichotomous or 
ordered categorical coding of the dependent variables merely reflects the coarseness 
of measurement using survey-based measures of what remain best conceived as 
underlying continuous latent constructs – for example, preferences for closer (or 
more distant) Canada–US relations, support for (or opposition to) the Keystone XL 
pipeline, and preferences for more accommodating (or more restrictionist) 
immigration and naturalization policies. It is these unobserved, underlying 
constructs that remain the focus of theoretical interest, and not the observed 
categorical measures. For these reasons, I identify with the generalized linear model 
perspective represented by McCullagh and Nelder (1983), Jaccard (2001), and Fox 
(2008), and not the competing nonlinear probability model approach of Norton and 
colleagues (Ai and Norton 2003; Norton, Wang, and Ai 2004). My approach to 
specifying and testing interaction effects in logit models thus follows from the 
former approach, not the latter. 
1.4.5 Testing Interaction Effects for Statistical Significance 
As for testing the statistical significance of interaction effects, it is important 
to emphasize the need to examine omnibus tests of the interactions, and not rely 
solely on the coefficients and standard errors of individual interaction terms. This is 
                                                                                             
3. The more concrete orientation of the econometric approach focusing on P(Y) is seen 
clearly in Wooldridge’s contention that ξ (given as Y* in Wooldridge’s notation) as ‚an abstract 
construct‛ is therefore ‚of limited interest‛ (2010, 656). 
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because the interactions tested in each of the articles of the thesis involve 
polytomous (multicategory) variables. To illustrate, party identification is measured 
with two dummy regressors (for Independents and Republicans, contrasted to 
Democrats, the reference category) in the American case and with five dummy 
regressors (for Conservative Party, New Democratic Party, Bloc Québécois, other 
party and no party, contrasted to Liberal Party, the reference category) in the 
Canadian case. Tests of the party identification × distance interactions thus involve 
two and five degrees of freedom, respectively. In the case of linear models, the 
correct test of the statistical significance of such interactions involving multiple 
degrees of freedom is an F-test of hierarchical models (or incremental F-test). This 
involves comparing the R2 statistics for the models excluding the interaction and 
including the interaction. A significant increase in R2 (as determined by the F-test) is 
evidence of a significant interaction effect (Fox 2008, 135–140; Jaccard and Turrisi 
2003, 11–12, 39–40; Knoke, Bohrnstedt, and Potter Mee 2002, 277). In the case of 
generalized linear models such as binary and ordinal logistic regression, the proper 
test of the significance of an interaction effect is a similar hierarchical (or 
incremental) likelihood ratio chi-square test. A significant increase in the model chi-
square between the models excluding and including the interaction terms indicates 
a significant interaction effect (Fox 2008, 348–349). 
1.4.6 Probing Interaction Effects 
Even after identifying a significant interaction – as each article does – it must 
be further probed to clarify its substantive meaning. Different strategies exist to 
depict graphically the moderated relationship between the focal independent 
variable and dependent variable. The first strategy involves producing an effect plot 
highlighting the strength and direction of the relationship between the focal 
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independent variable and dependent variable at different levels of the moderator 
variable. The second complementary strategy involves producing a plot displaying 
the estimated coefficient for the focal independent variable (and its confidence 
interval) with the scores for the moderator variable centred at different values. This 
serves to highlight the regions of significance of the focal independent variable – 
that is, the range of values of the moderator variable over which the focal 
independent variable exerts a significant effect on the dependent variable. I shall 
refer to this type of plot as a coefficient plot. I discuss each in turn below. 
The principle underlying effect plots (or effect displays) is to allow the 
variables comprising the interaction effect to range over their values while holding 
other variables constant at some typical value (such as their means) and then to use 
the regression equation to calculate the predicted value of the dependent variable. 
These predicted values are then graphed (Aiken and West 1991, 12–15; Fox 2008, 
136–137). Some authors have sought to describe interaction effects by producing 
tables of the coefficients, standard errors and confidence intervals for the focal 
independent variable with the moderator variable set to a finite number of values; 
these might be the mean and one standard deviation above and below the mean, or 
other values that meaningfully correspond to ‚low,‛ ‚medium‛ and ‚high‛ values 
of the moderator variable (Cohen et al. 2003; Jaccard and Turrisi 2003). This so-
called ‚pick-a-point‛ approach (Rogosa 1980) has been criticized by proponents of 
more mathematically involved approaches (such as Johnson–Neyman techniques) 
for being somewhat arbitrary in the values of the moderator variable chosen, for 
choosing relatively few values to describe an interaction effect, and also for failing 
to determine precisely the range of values of the moderator variable over which the 
focal independent variable exerts a significant effect (Hayes and Matthes 2009). 
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The approach I favour draws on the intuitiveness of the ‚pick-a-point‛ 
approach while automating the process of calculating coefficients and confidence 
intervals for the focal independent variable using a large number of values of the 
moderator variable. Indeed, the macro capabilities of enterprise-grade statistical 
software such as SAS (SAS Institute 2014a) makes this quite feasible. In a sense, I use 
computer automation to pick many points covering the full range of values of the 
moderator variable. Full technical details of the implementation of this approach 
appear in Gravelle (2012). This approach also avoids the limitations of available 
tools implementing Johnson–Neyman techniques, which (at present) do not have 
the ability to accommodate data collected using complex sample designs – e.g., 
designs with sample stratification and poststratification weights. It is also motivated 
by the work of authors who have sought to use graphical techniques to depict the 
strength and direction of a moderated relationship while also representing the 
confidence intervals associated with model coefficients (Brambor, Clark, and Golder 
2006; Braumoeller 2004). 
In sum, linear and generalized linear models containing interactive 
relationships certainly require greater care and nuance in their interpretation than 
simply additive (or main effects-only) models, but they nevertheless remain 
interpretable when properly specified and tested, and also complemented with 
graphical displays such as effect plots and coefficient plots to assist in elucidating 
their substantive meaning. 
1.5 A Note on Model Fit 
 It is also worth noting in advance the relative lack of discussion of overall 
model fit in the chapters to follow. This is to say that references to model R2 
statistics, or more frequently pseudo-R2 statistics for generalized linear models, are 
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relatively brief (if referenced at all) and are reported mainly in keeping with the 
convention to report such measures as part of the results of regression analyses. 
There are well-founded reasons for not emphasizing (pseudo-) R2 measures. First, 
there is no consensus within the statistics literature as to what pseudo-R2 (or ‚R2 
analogue‛) measure ought to be used in the case of logit models (Lemeshow and 
Hosmer 1982; Hagle and Mitchell 1992; Menard 2000; DeMaris 2002; Tjur 2009). 
Second, and more importantly, there is a strong argument that overall model fit as 
assessed by R2 in least squares regression (or a pseudo-R2 measure in the case of 
logit models) is not an especially important criterion. Landmark statements in the 
political methodology literature have been especially clear in stating that values of 
R2 are not the primary quantities of interest in assessing statistical models (King 
1986; Achen 1982; Achen 1990). Following closely this literature, I take the position 
that overall model fit has little bearing on the validity of the inferences relating to 
the politics–proximity interactions tested in the substantive chapters of the thesis (or 
for that matter, any other hypothesis-driven quantitative study). 
 Misuse of model R2 statistics is by no means restricted to political science (see 
Kvålseth 1985). Within political science, though, King has taken applied researchers 
to task for (among other transgressions) investing meaning into model R2 statistics 
that they do not possess – for example, as a summary measure of the influence of all 
of the Xs on Y, as the proportion of ‚variance explained,‛ or as the fit between the 
specified model and the true model. On these understandings, a high model R2 is 
taken as an indicator of the correctness of the hypotheses being tested – and by 
extension, a low R2 signals that one’s hypotheses are not supported. In short, a high 
R2 indicates a ‚good‛ model and a low R2 indicates a ‚poor‛ model. King’s rejoinder 
is direct: ‚All these interpretations are wrong‛ (1986, 677). Achen’s is equally direct: 
‚Nothing about R2 supports these claims‛ (1982, 60). In linear models, R2 measures 
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the spread of points around a regression line (or plane), but ‚[t]here is nothing 
intrinsically or politically interesting in the spread of points around a regression 
line‛ (King 1986, 676). In making this argument, King parallels Achen (1982, 58–61), 
who provides an example highlighting how the point clouds around a regression 
line from two samples can yield very different R2 values depending on the variances 
of Y. This leads Achen to similarly view R2 as used in much quantitative social 
science research as a ‚meaningless accident of the sample‛ and ‚useless for drawing 
inferences about causal strength or substantively meaningful goodness of fit‛ (1990, 
180, 183). What matters for hypothesis testing and statistical inference are the 
unstandardized regression coefficients and their standard errors, not R2. Thus, ‚it 
makes little sense to base decisions on a statistic that, for most social science 
applications, measures nothing of serious importance. ‘Explaining variance’ is not 
what social science is about‛ (Achen 1982, 61). King is equally clear on this point: ‚If 
your goal is to get a big R2, then your goal is not the same as that for which 
regression analysis was designed. The purpose of regression analysis and all of 
parametric statistical analyses is to estimate interesting population parameters 
(regression coefficients in this case)‛ (1986, 677).4 
These critiques of the uses of R2 have less to do with its statistical properties 
than with some applied researchers’ ‚fixation on fit‛ to the detriment of testing 
specific hypotheses (Luskin 1991, 1041). According to King (and others), political 
scientists ought to pursue the estimation of specific causal effects, rather than 
attempt to uncover the ‚true‛ model or ‚full‛ explanation for some phenomenon. 
(King 1991). Rather, in keeping with the principle of Occam’s razor, a good model 
ought to be a parsimonious one. A ‚model is necessarily (and preferably) an 
                                                                                             
4. King, however, fully recognizes the use of R2 in testing nested models (1986, 677), as 
discussed above in section 1.4.5. 
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abstraction and thus a drastic simplification‛ of a given social process, and a good 
research design ought to ‚focus on a small number of particularly important 
research questions‛ (King 1991, 1048). As both King (1986) and Luskin (1991) have 
noted, model fit can always be increased by adding additional independent 
variables, particularly those closely conceptually related to the dependent variable, 
though such a strategy is unlikely to advance substantive theory. Such a strategy 
also runs the risk of becoming what Achen has derisively labelled a ‚garbage can‛ 
approach to regression modelling: ‚we treat the independent variable list as a 
garbage can: Any variable with some claim to relevance can be tossed in. *<+ It is 
certainly easy: We just drop variables into our mindless linear functions, start up 
our computing routines, and let ’er rip‛ (2005, 329). The alternative is to keep the 
number of explanatory factors short (Achen 2002, 445–447). 
Berry and Feldman also note that some might contend that low R2 values are 
clear evidence of specification error, and that important independent variables have 
been excluded from the model. However, ‚a low R2 does not necessarily indicate 
that theoretically relevant independent variables have been excluded.‛ Other 
potential causes of low R2 values include measurement error (Berry and Feldman 
1985, 25). Acknowledging measurement error is particularly important when 
working with survey data (as this thesis does), and particularly when relying on 
single survey items to measure concepts of interest. 
There is therefore a tension between approaches to modelling political data 
that seek to maximize model fit by including many potential explanatory variables 
and those that choose to focus on a small number of independent variables and their 
parameter estimates, setting aside issues of overall model fit. This contrast is 
usefully described by Hagquist and Stenbeck (1998) as the difference between a 
‚factor orientation‛ and a ‚model orientation‛ to regression analysis. While model-
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oriented approaches are framed in terms of ‚what explains Y?‛ and endeavour to 
include as many independent variables as needed to explain the dependent 
variable, factor-oriented approaches are framed in terms of ‚what is the effect of X 
on Y?‛ or ‚how does Z modify the effect of X on Y?‛ and often involve testing a 
small number of model parameters while also possibly including potentially 
confounding effects (Hagquist and Stenbeck 1998). Given such a factor orientation, 
measures of model fit are not centrally important. Hagquist and Stenbeck are clear 
on this point: ‚In factor oriented linear or logistic regression on individual data 
goodness of fit is not applicable. The fit of the model must be evaluated only against 
the specific part of the variation which is relevant to the subset of effects of interest. 
An overall test of the model fit is too general for this purpose and does not answer 
the right question‛ (1998, 231). 
The preceding discussion of this chapter makes clear my factor orientation 
(as opposed to a model orientation) in Hagquist and Stenbeck’s terms. My focus on 
the politics–proximity interaction can be expressed as ‚how does spatial proximity 
to relevant geographic features modify the effects of political variables on policy 
attitudes?‛ The relevant tests, then, are tests of P, D, and particularly PD (as 
discussed above in section 1.3.5). Overall model fit – whether R2 for linear models or 
pseudo-R2 measures for generalized linear models – are neither the focus of my 
analysis nor a relevant criterion for evaluating the results. What matters are the 
coefficients and standard errors for P, D, and PD.  
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1.6 Geocoding Survey Data and Distance Calculations 
Given the theoretical importance attached to proximity and distance in this 
thesis, and given that spatial data do not commonly appear in political behaviour 
research, it is worth expanding on the brief discussions of the geocoding and 
distance calculation methods contained in the articles. Here, I describe in greater 
detail how the survey data are geocoded and why the appended latitude–longitude 
ought to be accepted as valid approximations of survey respondents’ true locations. 
I similarly expand on how distance calculations are performed, and further why the 
type of straight-line distances used in all of the articles is a valid measure of true 
distance. 
Geocoding is defined as the process of assigning geographic coordinates 
(typically latitude–longitude coordinates) to locations (Karimi, Durcik, and Rasdorf 
2004). In this case, the locations of interest are survey respondents’ places of 
residence, and the spatially-referenced data associated with their places of residence 
– their ZIP code or postal code, county, etc. – are used to characterize their locale in 
terms of their distance to relevant geographic features (and in chapter 5, also their 
demographic context). The ease of geocoding various data has been increasing in 
recent years, and is largely due to expanded and continually-improving features in 
both industry-standard geographic information systems (GIS) software such as 
ArcGIS as well as statistical packages such as SAS (SAS Institute 2014b). 
While ease of use of such geocoding tools is one consideration, the accuracy 
of the appended latitude–longitude coordinates is another. Several studies of 
geocoding results from the fields of epidemiology and public health find high 
location accuracy and precision when full street addresses are available (Krieger et 
al. 2001; McElroy et al. 2003; Whitsel et al. 2004). This provides little assurance, 
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however, to those conducting secondary analyses of survey data where the best 
available, most granular geographic codes are typically larger geographies such as 
US ZIP codes, US county FIPS codes, or Canadian postal codes or postal code 
forward sortation areas (FSAs, the first three characters of a six-character postal 
code). More precise spatially-referenced data are often not obtainable, owing to the 
need to protect respondent confidentiality. Using such codes to assign latitude–
longitude coordinates in the absence of full street addresses are referred to as 
‚approximation methods‛ of geocoding; such methods are also called ‚areal 
geocoding‛ since the assigned coordinates are based on a larger area (Armstrong 
and Tiwari 2010, 18–19; Gutmann et al. 2007, 52). The extant research indicates that 
such areal geocoding methods still provide reasonably accurate results. Empirical 
research has found that the distances between true (address-geocoded) locations 
and ZIP code-based geocodes were modest: the median error was 3.5 kilometres (2.2 
miles) (Hurley et al. 2003). Further, simulation research has found that the 
differences (mean absolute error) between address-geocoded and ZIP code-
geocoded locations used in calculating distances are similarly modest, with urban 
areas exhibiting smaller error errors than rural areas (Berke and Shi 2009). In short, 
the areal geocoding methods relied upon in the articles comprising this thesis 
produce coordinates containing an element of error, but these are nevertheless 
usable measures of location, and further fit the purpose for which they are used. 
The task of calculating distances between survey respondents’ geocoded 
locations and geographic features of interest (such as the nearest border crossing, 
the frontier line or an oil pipeline route) for each survey respondent can be 
accomplished in one of two equivalent ways. First, one can iteratively calculate the 
distance to each point comprising the geographic feature (e.g., each Canada–US 
border crossing) and take the minimum of these distances. This method quickly 
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becomes cumbersome when, for example, the route of the Keystone XL pipeline is 
represented by several thousand quarter-mile markers. A more efficient method is 
to use a common database language SQL (Structured Query Language) to create a 
Cartesian join between the individual-level survey data and the geographic feature 
data set where every respondent record is joined to each point in the geographic 
feature data set. This procedure ‚expands‛ the survey data set – for example, 
assuming a survey data set of 1,000 geocoded respondents and 1,000 latitude–
longitude coordinates in the geographic feature data set, the Cartesian join between 
the two will create a new table of 1 million (1,000 × 1,000) rows, one for each 
respondent–feature coordinate combination. This new table can be re-aggregated by 
respondent identifier, selecting the minimum distance value for each respondent. A 
dialect of SQL is implemented in SAS software (SAS Institute 2013). 
It is worth noting briefly that the pairwise distance calculations performed in 
this process rely on the Vincenty (1975) algorithm. This algorithm is the most 
appropriate method for calculating geodetic distances potentially spanning several 
hundred (or perhaps a thousand or more) kilometres, since it accounts for the 
curvature of the surface of the earth, whereas simple two-dimensional Euclidean 
distances do not. The Vincenty algorithm is also built in to the function for geodetic 
distances in SAS (SAS Institute 2014c, 532–534). 
Finally, it is important to acknowledge that distances based on the Vincenty 
algorithm remain a type of straight-line (or ‚as the crow flies‛) distance, which is 
invariably an underestimate of travel distances over road networks. Road travel 
distances could also be argued to better reflect how individuals experience distance. 
There are two principal reasons for continuing to use straight-line distances. As 
noted briefly in the first and second articles, straight-line distances have been shown 
to be a near perfect substitute for actual road travel distances: Boscoe and colleagues 
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(2012) report a bivariate r2 statistic of 0.94 for the two distance measures. 
Additionally, as a practical matter, calculating distance to the border as a straight-
line distance is also infinitely simpler and faster in terms of computing: it is the 
difference between executing a Cartesian join (as described above) versus making 
repeated calls to a Google Maps or Mapquest application programming interface 
(API), once for each respondent and each border crossing – that is, several million 
API calls in total for all of the data sets employed in this thesis. In essence, the choice 
between straight-line distance and road distance is a choice between seconds of 
computing time versus hours (possibly even days) for little marginal benefit. 
Straight-line methods have the further benefit of being easily replicable: given the 
same survey data, geocoding procedures and feature data, one will reproduce the 
distance calculations exactly. This cannot be assumed with API-based methods, 
since most commercial APIs undergo periodic updates. 
1.7 Conclusion 
This introductory chapter has thus laid the foundation for the four 
substantive chapters that follow. It has articulated the core hypothesis of the thesis – 
the expectation that the effect of political variables (party identification, ideology) 
on policy attitudes is moderated by proximity to relevant geographic features. This 
interactive relationship may operate according to one of two dynamics. Proximity to 
relevant features (e.g., the Canada–US border or the US–Mexico border) may 
amplify partisan differences by making a given policy issue (e.g., Canada–US 
relations or immigration policy reform) more salient, or proximity may mute such 
political differences, where issue awareness, knowledge, or local economic benefits 
act to dampen ideological effects. Which dynamic prevails is a matter for careful, 
context-specific theorizing. 
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This introduction has also rooted the politics–proximity interaction in the 
tradition of spatial social science – a tradition that can be traced from classical social 
theory, specifically, in Durkheim’s (1899; 1978a) concept of social morphology, to 
the current literature on spatially integrated social science within geography 
(Goodchild et al. 2000; Goodchild and Janelle 2004; Goodchild and Janelle 2010). In 
outlining this synthetic, multidisciplinary tradition, I have positioned the project of 
this thesis as one that endeavours to advance spatial social science within the fields 
of public opinion and political behaviour. Specifically, I adopt its orientation toward 
contextual explanations of human behaviour, and draw on the concepts of space (as 
an abstract relation between two objects) and the related concepts of proximity and 
distance in articulating my hypotheses. I also take inspiration from figures such as 
Key (1949) who sought to depict the spatial dynamics at work in political behaviour 
through maps. I similarly borrow tools from geographic information science, 
namely geocoding, calculating geodetic distances, and mapping techniques. 
In articulating the politics–proximity interaction, this introduction has shown 
how it is motivated by not only the tradition of spatial social science, but also by 
current empirical social science that has found ‚proximity effects‛ on policy 
attitudes in variety of substantive domains, including attitudes European 
integration (Berezin and Díez Medrano 2008; Díez Medrano 2003; Kuhn 2011), 
US–Mexico border issues (Branton et al. 2007; Branton and Dunaway 2009a; Branton 
et al. 2011), and attitudes toward the siting of energy infrastructure – sites which 
carry with them both potential benefits and risks (Ansolabehere and Konisky 2014; 
Franchino 2014; Greenberg 2009; Michaud, Carlisle, and Smith 2008; E. R. A. N. 
Smith 2002). The chapters of this thesis thus aim to contribute to this contemporary 
literature by examining attitudes in three policy areas of real-world political 
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relevance: Canada–US relations, the Keystone XL pipeline, and immigration reform 
in the US. 
This introduction has also discussed at length a number of theoretical and 
statistical topics that recur throughout the thesis, namely the specification, testing, 
and probing of interactive (moderated) relationships in linear and generalized linear 
models, and the interpretation given to measures of overall model fit. To restate 
briefly some of the key positions taken, when working with public opinion survey 
data, the political methodology and social statistics literatures point to an essential 
continuity between interactive relationships in linear models and in generalized 
linear models (such as binary logit and ordinal logit). When opting for limited 
dependent variable (or categorical) modelling approaches due to no other reason 
than the coarseness of the survey-based measurement of the dependent variables (as 
opposed to an interest in the probability of a specific observed outcome), the testing 
of interactions is no different from the case of linear models (Berry, DeMeritt, and 
Esarey 2015; Fox 2008; Jaccard 2001; Tsai and Gill 2013). Also, assessments of overall 
model fit, whether R2 with linear models or pseudo-R2 measures with logit models, 
are not a central consideration, as these are not statistics with substantive 
importance. Rather, what matter for the purpose of advancing social science are the 
unstandardized regression coefficients and their standard errors (Achen 1982; 
Achen 1990; King 1986). 
With these preliminaries in place, I can turn to the project of explicating what 
blue-furred Grover from Sesame Street always knew – that there is an important 
difference between near and far. 
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Figure 1.1: Moderation versus Mediation 
(a) Moderation  (b) Mediation 
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2. Love Thy Neighbo(u)r? Political Attitudes, Proximity and the 
Mutual Perceptions of the Canadian and American Publics1 
 
2.1 Abstract 
There has been renewed interest in recent years in both the foreign 
perceptions of the United States as well as the foreign policy attitudes of the 
American public. In this light, it is interesting to observe that there is a substantial 
body of research on Canadian public opinion toward the United States but 
relatively little on American public opinion toward Canada. Further, most literature 
neglects the effect of spatial proximity to the other country on perceptions. This 
article addresses both shortcomings in the literature. It investigates the mutual 
perceptions of the Canadian and American publics drawing on public opinion data 
from both Canada and the US. The explanation of attitudes toward the other 
country has three main foci: the roles of political party identification and political 
ideology; the role of spatial proximity to the Canada–US border; and the interactive 
relationship between political attitudes and border proximity. 
2.2 Introduction 
One of the best-known (and most often recited) quotes in the study of 
Canada–United States relations is that ‚Americans are benevolently ignorant about 
Canada‛ while ‚Canadians are malevolently well informed about the United States‛ 
(Brebner 1945, 3). Though now verging on cliché, this nevertheless serves as a useful 
starting point for considering the mutual perceptions of the Canadian and American 
publics, since it draws our attention to the positive (or benevolent) and negative (or 
malevolent) dispositions at play. To be sure, the reciprocal perceptions of Canadians 
and Americans reported in the news media vary widely. Consider, for example, the 
                                                                                             
1. Originally published as Gravelle (2014b). 
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contrast between the March 2003 Wall Street Journal letter by then-Canadian Alliance 
opposition leader Stephen Harper criticizing the Liberal government’s refusal to join 
the invasion of Iraq, writing ‚in our hearts and minds, we will be with our allies and 
friends‛ and former Liberal Member of Parliament Carolyn Parrish’s infamous 
‚Damn Americans‛ comment in February 2003. Consider also the contrast between 
US President Barack Obama’s statement ‚I love this country‛ in Ottawa in February 
2009 and cable news pundit Pat Buchanan’s pejorative ‚Soviet Canuckistan‛ remark 
in 2002. Given such declarations of both benevolence and malevolence, the question 
remains – what factors shape Canadians’ views of the United States and Americans’ 
views of Canada?  
The answer to this question is consequential. Canada–US trade represents 
the largest bilateral trading relationship in the world. The two countries’ shared 
geography also implies shared threats to their security and common environmental 
challenges. By the same token, foreign policy is developed and implemented within 
a context (in part) shaped and constrained by public opinion (J. H. Aldrich et al. 
2006; Soroka 2003). Put another way, analysts of Canada–US relations ought to pay 
attention to public opinion (and its causes) because policy makers do in formulating 
policy. 
In spite of the importance of the topic, there are substantial gaps in our 
knowledge of Canadian and American perceptions. A corollary to the asymmetries 
in power and mutual dependence between the US and Canada noted by numerous 
authors (Hale 2012; Keohane and Nye 1974; Lennox 2009; Von Riekhoff and 
Neuhold 1993) is the asymmetry that exists at the level of mass public opinion. 
Sigler and Goresky (1974, 637) observed forty years ago that Canadian public 
opinion polls routinely feature questions about Canadian–American affairs. On the 
other hand, Canada rarely appears as a topic in American polls. Arguably, this 
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remains the case today, and reflects a tendency toward ‚cognitive isolationism‛ on 
the part of the American public and news media (Brooks 2006, 15). In sum, we know 
more about what the Canadian public thinks of the US than we know about what 
the American public thinks of Canada. 
The existing public opinion research literature dealing with Canadian– 
American affairs is further limited in that it has not accounted for space. It is widely 
acknowledged that the trade, travel and personal ties that constitute the day-to-day 
reality of Canada–US relations are spatially concentrated near the Canada–US 
border. As Clarkson notes, cross-border interactions in the Canada–US context ‚are 
so intense that the notion of ‘borderlands’ has been coined‛ to describe those cross-
border communities ‚that have more in common with each other in certain respects 
that they have with other parts of their national jurisdiction‛ (2008, 134). Tight 
bonds persist in binational communities as diverse and far-flung as Stanstead, 
Quebec–Derby Line, Vermont, and Hyder, Alaska–Stewart, British Columbia (Peritz 
2009; J. O’Connor 2013). These observations support the expectation that border 
proximity matters. Nevertheless, spatial proximity to the other country has not 
factored into analyses of mass public opinion on this topic. This omission is even 
more conspicuous in light of the place of proximity as an analytical concept in 
spatial approaches to social science (reviewed in chapter 1). Are such spatial 
dynamics at work in the Canadian–American context? 
In this article, I aim to contribute to the research literatures on both themes 
by exploring the mutual perceptions of the Canadian and American publics, paying 
particular attention to the effects of proximity to the Canada–US border (on one 
hand) and political party identification and political ideology (on the other) on 
attitudes toward the other country. My focus in this article is on the general 
impressions of the two publics toward the other country as opposed to attitudes 
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toward Canada–US relations or more specific policy attitudes such as trade or 
security co-operation. (Canadian attitudes toward Canada–US ties is the focus of 
chapter 3.) The remainder of the article is structured as follows. I first review the 
existing research on Canadian public opinion toward the US and American public 
opinion toward Canada while pointing out some of its limitations. I then motivate 
my hypotheses relating to, first, political party identification and political ideology, 
second, proximity to the Canada–US border, and third, the interaction between 
border proximity and political variables. Next, I present the survey data employed 
in this study, namely the Canadian Election Studies (1997–2011) and data drawn 
from the Gallup Poll (2001–2011), and discuss relevant aspects of the methodology, 
including the measurement of border proximity. I then present the results from a 
series of regression models before offering some concluding remarks on potential 
avenues of inquiry for future studies. 
2.3 Canadian Public Opinion toward the US and American Public Opinion toward 
Canada 
Views of the US – both positive and negative, and the competition between 
the two – have held a central place in Canadian politics dating back to the pre-
Confederation era.2 As Inwood notes, ‚Positions on the United States – both pro and 
con – are fundamental to Canadian discourse‛ (2005, 23). Indeed, as a function of 
geography and the circumstances of its historical development, anti-American and 
pro-American sentiments have both a longer lineage in Canada than anywhere else 
                                                                                             
2. This review of Canadian views of the US and American views of Canada focuses on 
mass public opinion. For studies focusing on elite opinion, see Alper (1980), Doran and Sewell 
(1988), and Kirton and Bothwell (1983; 1985; 1986). There is also a rich literature in the field of 
political culture comparing Canada and the US (Adams 2003; Grabb and Curtis 2005; Lipset 
1990; Nevitte 1996). The central questions of this literature, namely, how the values and patterns 
of political behaviour of the Canadian and American publics differ and whether they are 
converging, are different from the one taken up here, that is, what the Canadian and American 
publics think of each other. 
70 
  
in the world (Granatstein 1996; Nossal 2008).3 Still, research on Canadian mass 
public opinion toward the US has tended to focus on policy issues, such as 
investment and trade, rather than general impressions of the US. Rising concern 
about American investment in Canada in the 1970s led to research showing that the 
Canadian public was divided on the questions of investment from and closer ties 
with the US (Munton and Poel 1977; Murray and Gerace 1972; Murray and Leduc 
1976; Sigler and Goresky 1974). With the shift in the policy agenda in the 1980s and 
1990s from foreign investment to free trade, public opinion research followed suit. 
Polls reporting Canadians’ attitudes toward, first, the Canada–US Free Trade 
Agreement and, later, the North American Free Trade Agreement, demonstrated 
that Canadian public opinion on the trade agreements was volatile, with support 
decreasing as an agreement drew nearer (Dasko 1986; Mendelsohn and Wolfe 2001). 
While the study of Canadian attitudes toward the US during the 1970s, 1980s 
and 1990s was a largely Canadian endeavour, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 
2001 created a renewed (and broader) interest in the attitudes of foreign publics 
toward the US. The years since the 9/11 attacks have seen a number of important 
studies of attitudes toward the US, and with many of them presenting Canadian 
data (Brooks 2006; Chiozza 2009; Holsti 2008; Katzenstein and Keohane 2007a; 
Kohut and Stokes 2006). Based mainly on aggregate survey data, these studies 
generally paint the picture of a Canadian public with favourable views of the US 
and a strong affinity for American democratic ideas and popular culture, but with 
less attraction to American business practices. Considered in cross-national 
perspective, the Canadian public is often shown to be among the most positive in its 
                                                                                             
3. Different definitions of ‚anti-Americanism‛ have been proposed (see Doran and Sewell 
1988, 106–108; Granatstein 1996, 4; Nossal 2008, 130). Here, I follow the minimal definition 
offered by Katzenstein and Keohane who define anti-Americanism as ‚a psychological tendency 
to hold negative views of the United States and of American society in general‛ (2007b, 12) or 
even more simply as ‚the expression of negative attitudes toward the United States‛ (2007b, 12). 
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attitudes toward the US. These studies do repeatedly note, however, that Canadian 
attitudes became more negative in the mid-2000s, coinciding with the Iraq War. 
Given the volume and long lineage of research on Canadian attitudes toward 
the US, the literature on American attitudes toward Canada is relatively thin. A 
series of studies conducted by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations during the 
1980s and 1990s found that 90 to 96 percent of American policy elites thought that 
the U.S. had a vital interest in Canada, a view shared by 70 to 78 percent of the 
American public.4 It is worth noting that the Canada–US Free Trade Agreement did 
not generate the level of political debate in the US that it did in Canada and so did 
not generate the same kind of public opinion polling. Polls did, however, proliferate 
in the 1990–1992 period with the contemplated extension of the free trade zone to 
Mexico under NAFTA, especially in the lead-up to the 1992 Presidential election. 
Most analyses of American attitudes toward NAFTA during this period have been 
oriented toward Mexico and not Canada owing to the survey data available 
(Bennett 2004; Rankin 2004; Warf and Kull 2002). One exception is the study by 
Inglehart and colleagues (1996) of the social values among the three North 
American publics (Canada, the US and Mexico) that found that majorities in Canada 
and the US expressed trust in and desired closer ties with the other country. 
Research on American public opinion toward Canada in the post-9/11 time frame is 
equally scarce. A notable exception is Katzenstein and Keohane’s discussion of 
American attitudes toward allied countries in the years immediately before and 
after 9/11. They note that a majority of the American public consistently viewed 
Canada as ‚a close ally‛ or ‚a friend‛ between 1999 and 2004, though the proportion 
who held this view declined in the 2002–2004 period, which Katzenstein and 
                                                                                             
4. Archived reports are taken from www.thechicagocouncil.org. 
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Keohane plausibly attribute to the decision of the Canadian government not to send 
troops to Iraq (2007a, 17–18). 
To summarize, the literature on Canadian and American public opinion 
toward the other country – much like the substance of Canada–US relations 
themselves – is asymmetrical. Much more attention is paid to the topic on the 
Canadian side of the border. Another gap in the literature is the neglect of the role 
of proximity to (or distance from) the other country in shaping attitudes toward that 
country. The existing literature proceeds as though Canadian and American 
attitudes come from ‚nowhere.‛ This maintains even though the previously noted 
networks of trade, personal and business travel, and the social ties of family and 
friendship that constitute the everyday reality of Canada–US relations are 
concentrated near the border. This points to the need for a spatially informed 
approach to Canadian and American mass public opinion. 
2.4 Hypotheses: Political Attitudes, Border Proximity and Their Interaction 
It is a well-established finding that mass public opinion on a range of 
subjects is shaped by political party identification and political ideology. As Zaller 
(1992) has argued, partisan cleavages in mass public opinion are often a function of 
cleavages in elite opinion: when a partisan or ideological cleavage exists at the elite 
level, the politically attentive segments of the mass public mirror the opinions of 
those elites with whom they have a partisan or ideological affinity. There are good 
reasons to expect Canadian and American mutual perceptions to be congruent with 
this research and to exhibit such partisan and ideological cleavages. 
In the Canadian context, public attitudes toward the US are influenced by the 
‚filtered image of the United States provided by interpreters of that country‛ with 
political leaders among the primary interpreters (Brooks 2008, 31–32). Ample 
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evidence of this is found in Canadian electoral politics. Though the partisan 
dynamics have not been constant over time, in federal elections over the past 25 
years, parties of the centre and left have shown less affinity for American values and 
culture, have often staked out policy positions less inclined toward greater Canada–
US co-operation, and have occasionally invoked anti-American sentiment for 
political gain. Parties of the right have been more pro-American and more 
‚continentalist‛ in their stances, seeking to strengthen Canada–US ties (Granatstein 
1996; Inwood 2005; Nossal 2008). The theoretical expectations that follow from this 
are that the Canadian mass public ought to interpret such ‚elite cues‛ through the 
lenses of their pre-existing partisan and ideological attachments (Zaller 1992). I 
expect the Canadian public to structure its attitudes toward the US accordingly; 
Canadians who identify with the Conservative party ought to hold the most 
positive feelings toward the US, followed by Liberal party identifiers, and NDP and 
Bloc Québécois identifiers should have the least positive feelings toward the US. 
Similarly, Canadians who identify as left wing should tend to have less positive 
feelings toward the US than those who identify as right wing. A number of previous 
studies have found research on Canadian public opinion toward Canada–US 
relations has found precisely these types of effects of political factors (Bennett 2004; 
Munton and Poel 1977; Nevitte, Anderson, and Brym 2002; Sigler and Goresky 
1974). 
In the American context, there is reason to expect the same dynamic. Brooks 
writes that there are both positive and negative images of Canada current in 
American political discourse, and that they similarly divide along partisan and 
ideological lines. The positive view of Canada held by American liberals began to 
form in the 1970s in which Canada was perceived as ‚a social democratic refuge, a 
model of what the United States could and should be. Canada acquired the role of a 
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sort of nirvana north‛ (Brooks 2008, 38). This positive image of Canada has been 
joined more recently by a competing negative image advanced by Republican elites 
in Congress and the conservative-leaning news media. It stems from an aversion to 
developments in Canadian society such as same-sex marriage, as well as 
perceptions that Canada is a security free-rider and a security risk in terms of its 
border with the US (Brooks 2008; Gecelovsky 2006). I contend that it is reasonable to 
expect that such elite attitudes about Canada will carry over to mass public opinion. 
Consequently, I expect than Democrats (and self-reported liberals) will be more 
favourable toward Canada than Republicans (and self-reported conservatives). 
It is less apparent that public opinion in the Canadian–American context 
ought to show effects of proximity. This hypothesis, however, can be advanced by 
pointing to strands of social scientific inquiry that highlight how proximity shapes 
political phenomena. Surveying these different strands of thought, it becomes clear 
that proximity serves to encapsulate or perhaps act as a proxy for a range of social 
processes including interpersonal contact, cross-cultural interaction and economic 
exchange. As Eagles (2002, 206) argues, such spatial or contextual measures usefully 
‚stand as proxies for other social or political processes hypothesized to have 
political consequences.‛ One such strand of inquiry is found in the seminal work of 
Allport (1954), in particular his intergroup contact hypothesis, which has become a 
cornerstone of social-psychological research on group relations (see Pettigrew 1998). 
Though primarily concerned with race relations in the US, Allport’s work 
nonetheless offers insight into the dynamics of group relations more generally, 
including perceptions of other nationalities. In discussing the effect of contact on 
attitudes and beliefs toward another group, Allport concludes that the available 
evidence points to a positive correlation between greater interaction with members 
of a group and positive attitudes toward that group. Some forms of contact, 
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however, are likely to shift attitudes in a negative direction, for example, when a 
particular resource (such as housing) is scarce (1954, 268–276). Allport nevertheless 
concludes that the likelihood of intergroup contact reducing prejudice is high. 
The implication of the intergroup contact hypothesis, then, is that proximity 
to a group (since contact can only occur in close proximity) is likely to lead to more 
positive impressions of that group. Dealing with much of the same subject matter as 
Allport, Blalock (1966) similarly concludes that prejudice is often a function of 
intergroup competition. In articulating his intergroup competition hypothesis, 
Blalock argues that increased contact between groups may lead to heightened 
perceptions of competition for resources and thus more negative other-group 
impressions (Blalock 1966, 72–108). The intergroup contact and intergroup 
competition hypotheses thus generate opposing predictions best adjudicated 
through empirical research. Still, they stand on common ground insofar as both 
predict that contact (and by implication proximity) will exert an effect on other-
group attitudes; they differ with respect to the predicted direction of the relationship 
between contact and other-group attitudes. 
Another relevant strand of inquiry from the study of international politics is 
offered by Karl Deutsch. In his seminal works on international integration, Deutsch 
and colleagues are concerned with nothing less than ‚possible ways in which men 
some day might abolish war‛ (1957, 3). It is in this context that he develops his 
transactionalist theory and the related concept of security community. Deutsch 
defines a security community as a group that has become integrated, meaning that 
they have attained a sense of community and have, as a minimum, agreed that 
common problems ought to be resolved through peaceful means (1954, 33; Deutsch 
et al. 1957, 5). In studying the formation of security communities, Deutsch argues 
that transactions, contact and communication – often at the individual level – hold 
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the key to the successful creation of a security community and a type of ‚we 
feeling.‛ For example, Deutsch and colleagues observe that the development of 
security communities is aided by the existence of a wide range of mutual 
transactions, evidenced by ‚all sorts of interactions – written and spoken messages, 
face-to-face contact, and dealings such as trade‛ (1957, 144). Also important are 
strong links of social communication, the mobility of persons and strong economic 
ties between the respective political units (Deutsch et al. 1957, 149–152, 157–158). 
What is more, these phenomena were seen as being a function of distance: ‚The 
density of transactions – visits, messages, interactions, general human contact – 
diminishes with distance‛ (Deutsch 1966, 98; also see Deutsch 1954, 59). In this way, 
Deutsch presages later work on social networks using methods originating in 
statistical physics, and which finds a ‚gravitational law of social interaction‛ – 
specifically, an inverse relationship between social interactions and spatial distance 
(Levy 2010; Levy and Goldenberg 2014). 
Beyond such classic works in psychology and international politics, one also 
finds a number of recent empirical studies of public opinion that adopt a spatial 
perspective and conclude that public attitudes are shaped by proximity and distance 
to relevant geographic features. This recent research has had two distinct foci: 
attitudes toward European integration, and – somewhat fortuitously – attitudes 
toward US–Mexico border issues. Examining attitudes toward European 
integration, Díez Medrano (2003, 243–246) finds significant effects of residing in a 
region bordering another European Union member state and the distance to 
Brussels (the symbolic ‚centre‛ of the EU) on support for EU membership: those 
residing in a border region are more likely to favour EU membership as are those 
residing in closer proximity to Brussels. Berezin and Díez Medrano (2008, 18–22) 
similarly find those residing closer to Brussels are more likely to say they would 
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experience regret were the EU to dissolve. Recalling the theoretical strands 
discussed above, Berezin and Díez Medrano conclude that distance matters 
‚because it takes time to get there, but also because our visualization, our 
perception, of the space in between‛ exert effects on ‚our emotions, our beliefs, our 
attitudes, and, eventually, our behaviour‛ (2008, 22–23). Drawing explicitly on 
Allport and Deutsch for her theoretical framework, Kuhn finds that residing in a 
border district has a significant effect on public attitudes toward European 
integration in Germany, but not in France. Further, Kuhn finds that this border 
effect is mediated by having transnational ties such as having engaged in cross-
border shopping and socializing with nationals of other EU countries (2011, 103–
109). Kuhn’s findings are noteworthy in two respects. First, they provide 
confirmation of some of the mechanisms through which proximity exerts its effects 
on political behaviour, namely interpersonal contact and economic exchange. 
Second, they demonstrate that the effect of proximity varies across national contexts 
(present in Germany but absent in France). It is therefore an open question as to 
whether the effect of proximity can be found (or not) in other national contexts. 
Recent scholarship has also found ‚border effects‛ at work in American 
public opinion on immigration. Motivating their research by referencing the 
intergroup contact and competition theories, Branton and colleagues (2007) find that 
proximity to the US–Mexico border affects voting behaviour on state ballot 
initiatives in California to deny social services and education to illegal immigrants 
(so-called ‚nativist‛ ballot initiatives). This research is notable in that it identifies an 
interaction effect between political party identification and border proximity; the 
effect of partisanship is only observed in places distant from the US–Mexico border, 
where Democrats are less likely to vote for nativist ballot initiatives than 
Republicans; Democrats and Republicans in close proximity to the US–Mexico 
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border are equally likely to vote for nativist ballot initiatives. Dunaway and 
colleagues (2010) find that identifying illegal immigration as the ‚most important 
problem‛ facing the US is partly shaped by residing in a US–Mexico border state. 
This research similarly finds an interaction involving border state residence; the 
effect of media coverage of immigration issues on immigration attitudes is stronger 
among residents of non-border states than border states. 
 But does it in fact hold that proximity serves as a proxy for contact? A test of 
the plausibility of this assumption might comprise an analysis of the cross-border 
travel of Canadians and Americans with particular attention to their places of 
residence and their travel destinations. If proximity to the Canada–US border acts as 
a proxy for contact, one ought to find that Canadians (and Americans) residing 
closer to the Canada–US border are more likely to travel to the other country. In 
keeping with Hawley’s notion of the ‚friction of space‛ (1950), an additional 
expectation is that Canadians are more likely to visit areas of the US close to the 
border – that is, within easy travel distances (and vice versa). 
 These expectations are readily tested using data from the Statistics Canada 
International Travel Survey (ITS), a large-scale, ongoing, probability survey of 
Canadians travelling abroad and international travellers to Canada (including 
travellers from the US).5 Inspired by the work of V.O. Key (1949) who used maps to 
visually depict spatial relationships, maps of the 2013 ITS data (the most recent data 
                                                                                             
5. Interestingly, there is no American equivalent to the ITS produced by Statistics Canada 
measuring Canada–US travel flows. Rather, the US International Trade Administration, an 
agency of the US Department of Commerce, relies upon ITS data provided by Statistics Canada. 
 A similar analysis might also be undertaken with export and import data, following 
Deutsch’s (1957) claim that trade relations are an important form of interaction between groups 
(or states). Unfortunately, trade data for US exports to Canada are available only for the top 15 
exporting MSAs (J. Hall 2015). Data for all MSAs are not made publicly available due to 
confidentiality considerations (personal communication with Jeffrey Hall, International Trade 
Administration, US Department of Commerce, 9 July 2015). Data on Canadian exports to the US 
are not publicly released at the CMA/CA level. These data limitations preclude an analysis of the 
correlation between trade (export) volumes and proximity to the Canada–US border. 
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available) allow for a visual confirmation that areas more proximate to the Canada–
US border have greater cross-border travel (and thus cross-border contact). The map 
presented in Figure 2.1 demonstrates that in 2013, large absolute numbers of 
Canadian visitors originated from Canada’s largest population centres – namely, the 
Toronto, Vancouver and Montreal census metropolitan areas (CMAs) – but smaller 
population centres such as the CMAs and census agglomerations (CAs) of St. 
Catharines–Niagara, Windsor, Sarnia, and Sault Ste. Marie (in Ontario), 
Abbotsford–Mission and Victoria (in British Columbia), and Edmundston (in New 
Brunswick) – all areas in close proximity (or adjacent) to the Canada–US border – 
also generated large aggregate numbers of cross-border travellers.6 Cross-border 
visits and distance to the Canada–US border also show a strong inverse relationship 
when measured statistically: the aggregate (CMA/CA-level) correlation between 
total cross-border visits and distance to the Canada–US border (using the CMA/CA 
centroid) in logged kilometres is –0.49 (p < 0.001).7 
Examining visits per capita (allowing for a more direct comparison between 
less-populated and more-populated areas) of the concentration of cross-border 
travel mapped in Figure 2.2, one finds an even clearer pattern. Within Canada, 
places closer to the Canada–US border generated more cross-border visits per capita 
than those further away in 2013. Indeed, places located close to or directly on the 
Canada–US border – such as Edmundston (in New Brunswick), St. Catharines–
Niagara, Windsor, Sarnia, and Sault Ste. Marie (in Ontario), Cowansville (in 
Quebec), Estevan (in Saskatchewan) and Vancouver (in British Columbia, whose 
                                                                                             
6. It should be noted that the areas with no data in Figures 2.1 and 2.2 reflect areas outside 
Canada’s CMAs (with populations of 100,000 or more) and CAs (with populations between 
10,000 and 100,000). Owing to the fact that no geographic indicators are available in the ITS 
public use microdata file for Canadian respondents residing outside a CMA or CA, values for 
these less densely populated areas cannot be mapped. 
7. Data are weighted by population from the 2011 census at the census metropolitan area 
(CMA)/census agglomeration (CA) level for the purposes of calculating these correlations. 
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census metropolitan area stretches to the border) – have the greatest number of 
visits to the US per capita. Cross-border visits per capita and distance to the 
Canada–US border show an even stronger inverse relationship than total visits: the 
CMA/CA-level correlation between cross-border visits to the US per capita and 
distance to the Canada–US border in logged kilometres is –0.62 (p < 0.001). 
As for where Canadians travelled to in the US in 2013, the map presented 
Figure 2.3 does not suggest a distinct spatial pattern. The states of Washington, 
Michigan, New York and Maine (all bordering Canada) received large numbers of 
Canadian visitors, as did the border states of Montana, North Dakota, Minnesota 
and Vermont to a lesser extent. At the same time, Florida, which is far removed 
from the Canada–US border, received a large number of Canadian visitors, as did 
California and Nevada to a lesser extent. These states, however, are widely 
recognized as popular vacation destinations for Canadians. Despite these varied 
spatial patterns, the aggregate (state-level) correlation between total cross-border 
visits and distance to the Canada–US border (using the state centroid) in logged 
kilometres is –0.51 (p < 0.001).8 
Again examining visits per capita (allowing for a more direct comparison 
between states of widely varying population bases), in the map presented in Figure 
2.4, one finds a clearer spatial pattern. Washington, Idaho, Montana, North Dakota, 
Michigan, New York, Vermont and Maine (all of which border Canada) have the 
highest number of Canadian visitors per capita. These states are followed by Alaska, 
Nevada, Wyoming, Minnesota, Florida and New Hampshire – states which either 
border Canada, or are common vacation and recreation destinations. The state-level 
                                                                                             
8. Data are weighted using 2013 state population estimates for the purposes of calculating 
these correlations. 
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correlation between total cross-border visits and distance to the Canada–US border 
in logged kilometres is –0.52 (p < 0.001). 
Turning to American visits to Canada, the 2013 ITS data for total visits 
mapped in Figure 2.5 indicate that the largest absolute numbers of American 
visitors resided in Washington, Michigan and New York – all border states. The 
states of California, Minnesota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, Maine and 
Florida also provided large numbers of visitors to Canada. These states are either 
proximate to Canada (being either a border state or bordering a border state) or 
have a large population base (e.g., California and Florida), perhaps accounting in 
part to the large number of visits. The state-level correlation between total cross-
border visits and distance to the Canada–US border in logged kilometres is –0.53 (p 
< 0.001). 
As seen previously with the 2013 ITS data for Canadian visits to the US, total 
visit figures can obscure the spatial relationship between visits and proximity to the 
Canada–US border. Examining visits per capita state by state provides a clearer 
comparison. Mapping American visits to Canada on a per capita basis in Figure 2.6 
confirms that states closer to the Canada–US border provide more visitors to 
Canada per capita. Washington, Michigan, Vermont and Maine – all states 
bordering Canada – have the highest numbers of visitors to Canada per capita. 
These states are followed by Alaska, Montana, North Dakota, Minnesota, New York 
and New Hampshire – again, all states on the Canada–US border. The state-level 
correlation between cross-border visits to Canada per capita and distance to the 
Canada–US border in logged kilometres is –0.68 (p < 0.001).9 
                                                                                             
9. The ITS public use microdata files from Statistics Canada unfortunately do not contain 
information on the destinations of American travellers within Canada. Maps and analyses of the 
Canadian travel destinations of American visitors are therefore not possible. 
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In light of existing theory and research, then, the expectations for the 
Canadian–American context are as follows. In accordance with intergroup contact 
theory and transactionalist theory, a first-order expectation is that closer proximity 
to the Canada–US border implies more positive perceptions among Canadians and 
Americans; increasing distance from the border implies less positive perceptions. 
This hypothesis finds support in observations of the cultural similarities of 
Canadians and Americans residing in border regions, long histories of cross-border 
migration and social ties between border communities in Canada and the US that 
persist to the present day (Laxer 2003). It is also plausible that border regions have 
greater exposure to print, radio and television news media from the other country 
(Payne 1978; Payne and Caron 1982). Consequently, it is credible to suggest that 
proximity to the Canada–US border serves to increase awareness of the other 
country, increases the likelihood (and frequency) of both social and economic 
interaction with nationals of the other country, and thereby promotes more positive 
perceptions of the other country. Conversely, increasing distance to the Canada–US 
border serves to decrease awareness of the other country and interactions with 
nationals of the other country, thereby promoting less positive perceptions of the 
other country. 
At the same time, it is arguably too simple to posit a constant effect of 
proximity for all segments of the Canadian and American publics. In the Canadian 
context, a reasonable expectation is for proximity to the border to amplify the effects 
of political attitudes, either positive or negative. The expectations of the intergroup 
contact and transactionalist theories arguably hold among those segments of the 
Canadian public who identify with the political centre and right; closer proximity to 
the border creates greater pro-American sentiments. In keeping with intergroup 
competition theory, those who identify with the NDP and the political left, with 
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closer proximity to (and thus greater awareness of) the US, may experience 
heightened perceptions of threat (that is, fears of the ‚Americanization of Canada‛) 
and thus exhibit more anti-American sentiments. It is less clear how and whether 
Bloc Québécois support and border proximity will interact, if at all. It is possible 
that the Bloc’s recent efforts to align itself with Quebec’s tradition of anti-militarism 
and anti-interventionism and its open criticism of aggressive American foreign 
policy actions will affect public opinion toward the US (Haglund 2006). The 
expectation for Bloc Québécois supporters, then, is for closer proximity to the US to 
produce more anti-American sentiments. It is reasonable to expect similar dynamics 
in the American context. Specifically, proximity to the border (and greater 
familiarity with Canada and its comparatively more progressive public policies) 
should amplify favourable impressions of Canada among those who identify with 
the progressive end of the American political spectrum, that is, Democrats and self-
described liberals. This is to say that the effect of proximity should be greater among 
those on the left than on the right. 
2.5 Data and Methods 
The data for this study are drawn from the Canadian Elections Studies from 
1997 to 2011 and the Gallup Poll from 2001 to 2011. While a number of cross-
national survey research projects contain items measuring attitudes toward the US 
and Canada (including the World Values Survey and the International Social Survey 
Programme), recent data from the CES and the Gallup Poll are noteworthy in that 
they not only provide relevant attitudinal measures, but they also contain 
sufficiently precise geographic indicators to permit geocoding (the appending of 
latitude and longitude co-ordinates) of the survey data. 
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The key survey item measuring Canadian attitudes toward the US from the 
Canadian Election Studies is a ‚thermometer‛-style scale which reads as follows: 
‚How do you feel about the United States? Zero means you really dislike the United 
States and one hundred means you really like the United States.‛ This item has been 
asked consistently in the CES post-election surveys since 1997.10 Given the framing 
of the question in terms of ‚like‛ and ‚dislike,‛ it taps respondents’ broad 
orientations toward the US instead of more specific policy attitudes. These data 
indicate that Canadian feelings toward the US are, in the aggregate, more positive 
than negative. Still, they also display variability over time in line with political 
events (in particular the US invasion of Iraq in 2004 and Barack Obama holding the 
presidency in 2011; see Figure 2.1).  
The key survey item measuring American attitudes toward Canada from the 
Gallup Poll, taken from a series of questions probing attitudes toward a number of 
countries included in its annual world affairs polls, is a four-point survey scale and 
reads as follows: ‚I’d like your overall opinion of some foreign countries. First, is 
your overall opinion very favourable, mostly favourable, mostly unfavourable, or 
very unfavourable? How about Canada?‛ Similar to the CES thermometer item, the 
Gallup Poll item taps overall impressions toward Canada. Mirroring the CES data, 
the Gallup data reveal an American public positively inclined toward Canada, 
though the intensity of that positive view has varied in line with events (see Figure 
2.2). Although a minority view, the percentage of ‚not very favourable‛ and ‚not at 
all favourable‛ responses did increase in the 2003–2006 time period. These results 
suggest that at least part of the American public took note of actions (or non-actions) 
of the Canadian government with respect to the invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the 
                                                                                             
10. Though the 2004, 2006, 2008 and 2011 CES datasets contain a panel component, these 
panel respondents are removed from the 2006, 2008 and 2011 data in the analyses presented here 
and the appropriate weight variables are used. These analyses of the 1997–2011 data therefore 
represent independent repeated cross-sections. 
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ballistic missile defence program in 2006. They are also consistent with results from 
other polls cited by Katzenstein and Keohane (2007b, 18). 
In order to explain individual-level Canadian attitudes toward the US and 
American attitudes toward Canada, I test the hypotheses articulated above in a 
series of regression models. Given the 0–100 dislike−like scale and roughly normal 
distribution of the US feelings item from the CES, linear models are appropriate. In 
the case of the Gallup Poll data, with only four categories in the Canada 
favourability scale, and few ‚very unfavourable‛ and ‚somewhat unfavourable‛ 
responses, I combine the last two responses to create a synthetic ‚unfavourable‛ 
category and employ ordinal logit models (Fox 2008). This approach models the 
probabilities of a lower-ordered response as cumulative over the probabilities of 
higher-ordered responses. The response categories are therefore ordered ‚very 
favourable‛ (3), ‚somewhat favourable‛ (2) and ‚unfavourable‛ (1) so that 
coefficients have an interpretation analogous to those from the CES linear models: 
independent variables with positive coefficients produce more pro-American (or 
pro-Canadian) sentiments; those with negative coefficients produce more anti-
American (or anti-Canadian) sentiments. 
The CES and Gallup Poll survey data themselves contain the attitudinal 
variables of interest, yet a measure of border proximity is still needed. I create such 
a measure by first geocoding both the survey data and a list of land and sea ports of 
entry published by US Customs and Border Protection (www.cbp.gov). In the case 
of the CES data, I use indicators in the survey datasets for census dissemination 
areas, federal electoral districts and postal code forward sortation areas to append 
representative latitude–longitude co-ordinates. In the case of the Gallup Poll data, I 
use ZIP codes and telephone area code-exchanges (the first six digits of a ten-digit 
telephone number) to geocode the data. Geocoding of border crossings was done 
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manually using Google Earth (earth.google.com). Next, I calculate the geodetic 
distances between the two sets of data to find the closest Canada–US border 
crossing for each survey respondent.11 In keeping with previous research (Berezin 
and Díez Medrano 2008; Díez Medrano 2003; Kuhn 2011), I use a logarithmic 
transformation of my distance measure. Using logged distance in kilometres also 
accords with the theoretical expectation of a diminishing effect of proximity as 
distance to the border increases. 
Here, it is also worth addressing directly the belief that nearly all Canadians 
are proximate to the Canada–US border. An often-repeated claim is that 75 percent 
of the Canadian population resides within 100 miles (or roughly 160 kilometres) of 
the Canada–US border. While factually accurate, it is overly simplistic to claim as a 
corollary that border proximity in the Canadian case is a constant, not a variable. 
Such a perspective further implies that it is linear distance to the border that is 
consequential. Neither claim is valid. As the histogram presented is Figure 2.9 
indicates, proximity to the Canada–US border exhibits significant positive (right) 
skew, with the bulk of the data found below the sample mean of 174 kilometres. 
Importantly, though, the data still exhibit variation, especially when log-transformed, 
where the data are roughly normally distributed (see Figure 2.10). Implicit in such a 
transformation of distance measures is the expectation that an increase in distance 
from, say, 10 kilometres to 20 kilometres, is larger than the nominally identical 
increase from 100 to 110 kilometres. Log-transforming distances to the Canada–US 
border captures this intuition, and thus operationalizes the non-linear expectations 
                                                                                             
11. Distances to Canada–US border crossings are calculated using the Vincenty (1975) 
formula (implemented in the SAS GEODIST function). This type of straight-line distance 
measure might be criticized on the basis that it differs from travel distance (and travel time) over 
road networks. Research comparing straight-line and driving distances has found that the two 
measures are very highly correlated (r2 = 0.94); the two are therefore practically interchangeable 
measures (Boscoe, Henry, and Zdeb 2012). 
87 
  
contained in the concepts of the friction of space (A. H. Hawley 1950) and the 
distance decay function (Taylor 1971). (See Figures 2.9–2.12.) 
The regression analyses of the CES and Gallup Poll data are conducted using 
pooled datasets with controls for time implemented by using a series of dummy 
variables where the earliest time periods serve as the reference categories 
(Wooldridge 2009, 444–445). In addition to the key independent variables – political 
party identification, political ideology and distance from the Canada–US border – 
the regression models include controls for demographic variables: sex, age, 
education, income and province (Canada) or census division (US).12 
2.6 Results: Canadian Perceptions of the US 
The regression analyses of the CES data yield several key findings (see Table 
2.1). The effects of both party identification and left−right placement on feelings 
toward the US are highly significant and in the theoretically expected directions. 
Models 2.1.1 and 2.1.2 confirm that Conservative supporters tend to have more 
positive feelings toward the US compared to Liberal supporters (the reference 
group), while NDP and Bloc Québécois supporters have significantly lower scores. 
Also, moving from the left to the right on the ideology scale produces more positive 
feelings toward the US. These effects remain robust even after controlling for time 
(year), demographics and province. There is also a significant negative effect of the 
distance to the Canada–US border (in logged kilometres). This has the interpretation 
that Canadians who are proximate to the Canada–US border are predicted to have 
more positive feelings toward the US; Canadians who are distant from the Canada–
                                                                                             
12. The Conservative Party of Canada, formed in 2003 by the merger of the Canadian 
Alliance and Progressive Conservative parties, obviously did not contest the 1997 and 2000 
federal elections. The Conservative dummy variables for these years are created by coding 
Progressive Conservative, Reform Party (1997) and Canadian Alliance (2000) support as 
Conservative. 
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US border are predicted to have more negative feelings toward the US. These results 
confirm the hypotheses relating to the political variables and border proximity. 
These findings, however, relate only to the ‚main effects‛ of party 
identification, ideology and border proximity – that is, these model specifications 
assume that their effects are not contingent upon one another. The results from 
model 2.1.3, however, reveal a significant interaction between political party 
identification and border proximity (additional analyses testing an interaction 
between border proximity and left−right placement showed no significant 
interaction effect). Specifically, there is a significant F-test of the party identification 
× border distance interaction. Also, the interaction terms for the NDP and Bloc 
Québécois dummy variables and logged distance to the Canada–US border are 
significant. These results indicate that the slopes for the effect of distance to the 
Canada–US border among NDP and Bloc supporters are significantly different from 
the slope for Liberal supporters (these effects are also positive, not negative). By 
contrast, the interaction term for Conservative supporters is not significant. This 
result does not indicate that there is no effect of distance to the Canada–US border 
among Conservative supporters, but rather that the effect of distance to the border 
is not significantly different from the effect among Liberal supporters, which is 
captured in the lower-order term for logged distance to the Canada–US border – i.e., 
the slopes for Liberal supporters (–0.90) and Conservative supporters (–0.90 + (–0.18) 
= –1.08) are not significantly different. With model 2.1.3 respecified with 
Conservative supporters as the reference category for party identification (see Table 
2.2), it is clear that logged distance to the Canada–US border has a significant and 
negative effect among Conservative supporters (–1.08); further, the slope for Liberal 
supporters (–1.08 + 0.18) = –0.90) is not significantly different. These results therefore 
indicate that Conservative supporters have higher expected scores (and more 
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positive feelings toward the US) than Liberal supporters, but they do not differ in 
terms the effect of proximity to the Canada–US border on their attitudes. 
By contrast, when model 2.1.3 is respecified to have NDP supporters as the 
reference category (see Table 2.3), the lower-order coefficient for logged distance to 
the the Canada–US border is not statistically significant despite being correctly 
(positively) signed (0.47). The conclusion to be drawn from the CES data, then, is 
that NDP supporters’ feelings toward the US are not moderated by proximity to the 
border in the way that Liberal and Conservative supporters’ feelings are; they are 
rather consistent across space (that is, across distances to the border). When Bloc 
Québécois supporters are specified as the reference category for model 2.1.3 (see 
Table 2.4), there is weak evidence that proximity to the Canada–US border produces 
more negative feelings among Bloc supporters: the lower-order coefficient for 
logged distance to the Canada–US border is positive (1.60) and nearly significant at 
conventional levels (p = 0.058). This provides partial confirmation of the party 
identification × border distance hypothesis. 
Overall, the analyses of the CES data indicate that the strength of the 
relationship between party identification and feelings toward the US is a conditional 
one: it depends on proximity to the Canada–US border. Making sense of the 
different patterns of such conditional effects from tables of regression coefficients, 
however, is difficult. Effect plots can further aid in clarifying the patterns of 
relationships at work (Fox 1987). From Figure 2.13, it is clear that proximity to the 
Canada–US border serves to amplify positive feelings toward the US – but only for 
Conservative and Liberal supporters. For NDP supporters, there is effectively no 
relationship. For Bloc Québécois supporters, border proximity serves to slightly 
amplify negative feelings. To illustrate, a Conservative identifier 5 kilometres from 
the Canada–US border (roughly the distance from many locations in either Niagara 
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Falls, Ontario and Abbotsford, British Columbia to the Canada–US border), has a 
predicted 0–100 feelings thermometer score of 67.35; at the sample mean of 174 
kilometres, the predicted score is 63.52; at 500 kilometres from the border, the 
predicted score is 62.38.13 (If there were no interaction between party identification 
and border proximity, the predicted scores would be the same at all distances from 
the Canada–US border, and the lines in the plot would be horizontal.) A Liberal 
identifier 5 kilometres from the Canada–US border has a predicted score of 64.38; at 
the sample mean of 174 kilometres, the predicted score is 61.19; at 500 kilometres 
from the border, the predicted score is 60.24. These patterns differ from those for 
NDP supporters. An NDP identifier 5 kilometres from the Canada–US border has a 
predicted score of 54.49; at the sample mean of 174 kilometres, the predicted score is 
56.15; at 500 kilometres from the border, the predicted score is 56.65. Again, the 
results from model 2.1.3 indicate that these small differences are not statistically 
significant, and the prediction line in Figure 2.13 for NDP supporters is (as 
expected) nearly horizontal. The pattern for Bloc Québécois supporters differs still. 
A Bloc identifier at the sample mean of 174 kilometres, the predicted score is 54.79; 
at 500 kilometres from the border, the predicted score is little different at 56.48. 
Taken in sum, these results are mostly congruent with expectations. They are also 
theoretically interesting in that they suggest the processes highlighted by intergroup 
contact theory and transactionalist theory (on one hand) and intergroup competition 
theory (on the other) may operate concurrently, producing alternatively positive or 
negative affect among different segments of the public. 
The interaction between party identification and distance to the Canada–US 
border can also be probed further to determine the range of values of logged 
                                                                                             
13. The predicted scores plotted in Figure 2.13 and predicted probabilities plotted in Figure 
2.14 and also discussed here set categorical control variables at their reference values and 
continuous controls at their means. 
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distance to the border over which party identification exerts significant effects. This 
involves repeatedly running the regression analysis with distance to the border 
centred at different values to obtain the coefficients for the party identification 
variables and their 95 percent confidence intervals. Techniques for probing of 
interactive relationships in this way are discussed in Braumoeller (2004) and Hayes 
and Matthes (2009) and were introduced above in section 1.4.6. The plots generated 
by performing these analyses indicate that the effects of political party identification 
hold over most of the range of distances to the Canada–US border observed in the 
CES data (see Figures 2.15–2.17). The effect of Conservative identification on 
feelings toward the US holds for border distance values between 7 and 716 
kilometres. This is to say that at very close proximity to the Canada–US border and 
when the border is very distant, Conservative and Liberal supporters are 
statistically indistinguishable in their feelings toward the US (see Figure 2.15). NDP 
supporters, on the other hand, are significantly different from Liberal supporters at 
distances to the border of 1,004 kilometres or less (see Figure 2.16). Bloc Québecois 
supporters are significantly different from Liberal supporters at distances to the 
border of 562 kilometres or less (see Figure 2.17). Thus, it is only when the US is 
literally a distant consideration (and also where the CES data are particularly thin) 
that differences between partisans of different stripes dissolve as it pertains to 
feelings toward the US, except in the case of differences between Liberals and 
Conservatives very near the Canada–US border. 
The CES regression models also show effects of different provincial contexts 
on feelings toward the US. Feelings are more negative in Quebec and all of the 
provinces of Western Canada (with the exception of Manitoba) than in Ontario (the 
reference category), though the differences between the western Canadian 
provinces and Ontario are not large. There are no consistent significant differences 
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between Ontario and the provinces of Atlantic Canada. It is notable that these 
effects persist even after the inclusion of party identification, left−right placement 
and border proximity in the model. The results for Quebec are arguably not 
attributable to the cultural and linguistic differences between Québécois and 
American society. In the past, Quebec has been notably more pro-American than 
other parts of Canada. Rather, the more negative feelings observed in Quebec are 
more plausibly explained as a recent ‚mood swing‛ prompted by objections to the 
wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the ballistic missile defence plan and particular 
antipathy toward former President George W. Bush (Haglund 2006; P. Martin 2011). 
The results for Western Canada – and British Columbia in particular – are less 
readily explained, though they may be attributed to two factors. First, they may be a 
function of the longer standing historical ties between Ontario and the Atlantic 
Canadian provinces to the United States (Grabb and Curtis 2005). Second, there is a 
history of antagonistic relations between British Columbia and the US over trade 
and natural resource issues stretching back decades to the Trans-Alaska Pipeline 
dispute in 1970s (Groen 1994). Similarly, the trade dispute over softwood lumber 
has festered since the mid-1980s due to different American and Canadian 
approaches to the taxation of timber (stumpage fees) on US public and Canadian 
Crown lands (Cashore 1997). As Bernstein and Cashore (2001) and Gagné (2003) 
note, the softwood lumber dispute has primarily engaged British Columbia, where 
Canada’s softwood lumber industry is concentrated. The slightly more negative 
views of British Columbians, even after controlling for other political, demographic 
and spatial factors, may be something of a softwood lumber hangover. Brunet-Jailly 
(2006) also notes that British Columbia’s level of economic integration with the US 
does not approach that of Ontario; there is also a history of cooperation between 
Ontario and Michigan, particularly in the automotive sector, whereas the 
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Vancouver, Seattle, and Portland metropolitan areas compete more directly with 
one another for business investment. Still, it is worth pointing out that the difference 
between a Conservative supporter and an NDP supporter (at the mean distance 
from the border) is 8.17 points on the 0–100 thermometer scale (based on the results 
from model 2.1.3), a difference more than double the largest significant differences 
between the provinces – 3.79 points between Ontario and Quebec, and 3.35 points 
between Ontario and British Columbia. Thus, one should be cautious to not 
overstate the importance of regional variation in shaping Canadian attitudes toward 
the US. Nevertheless, these results underline the importance of considering multiple 
spatial contexts and the possibility of effects operating at different levels (Cochrane 
and Perrella 2012). Such regional dynamics are an area that ought to be pursued in 
future research. 
In addition to bearing the imprint of spatial context, the CES results also 
show effects of time. As previously observed from the summary statistics, feelings 
toward the US were notably more negative in 2004 (early in the Iraq War) and more 
positive in 2011 (with Barack Obama as president). Canadian feelings toward the US 
are thus responsive to events in the current political context, though the effects of 
political and spatial factors remain key.14 
2.7 Results: American Perceptions of Canada 
In many respects – but not all – the dynamics of American public opinion 
toward Canada are similar to those found in Canadian public opinion toward the 
                                                                                             
14. It is worth also noting that the key results from model 2.1.3 are robust to the inclusion of 
numerous other variables that potentially influence feelings toward the US. Adding interest in 
politics, attitudes toward international trade, national identity (identifying with Canada), 
perceptions of the national economy, perceptions of one’s financial situation, employment status, 
area unemployment rate and area median family income have no appreciable effects on the 
parameter estimates for party identification, logged distance to the Canada–US border, and the 
party identification × border distance interaction. See Table 2.5. 
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US (see Table 2.6). Models 2.2.1 and 2.2.2 confirm that Republicans (and those who 
lean Republican) are less likely to express favourable views of Canada compared to 
Democrats (and those who lean Democrat). Also, moving from conservative to 
liberal on the ideology scale produces more favourable attitudes toward Canada. 
These effects are similarly robust when controlling for time (year), demographics 
and census division. Also similar to the results obtained with the CES data, the 
Gallup data exhibit a significant negative effect of the distance to the Canada–US 
border (in logged kilometres). Thus, Americans who are proximate to the Canada– 
US border are predicted to hold more favourable attitudes toward Canada; those 
who are farther away from the border are predicted to have less favourable 
attitudes toward Canada. 
Again, these results from models 2.2.1 and 2.2.2 assume that the relationship 
between the political variables and border proximity is not interactive. Model 2.2.3, 
however, reveals a significant interaction between party identification and border 
proximity (additional analyses testing an interaction between border proximity and 
liberal−conservative placement showed no significant interaction effect). A 
likelihood ratio chi-square test of the party identification × border distance 
interaction is significant. The interaction term for Republican Party identification 
and logged distance to the Canada–US border is positive and significant. Thus, the 
slopes for the effect of logged distance to the Canada–US border is significantly 
different between Democrats and Republicans: while it is negative and significant 
among Democrats (–0.19), it is substantially weaker (–0.19 + 0.13 = –0.06) among 
Republicans. Setting Republicans as the reference category for party identification 
also reveals that this weaker effect is not significant (see Tables 2.6 and 2.7). 
Consequently, the Gallup Poll data indicate that proximity to the Canada–US border 
amplifies favourable impressions among Democrats, but there is no discernible 
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effect among Republicans. The larger finding is that the American context is similar 
to the Canadian context in that the relationship between political party 
identification and feelings toward Canada are moderated by proximity to the 
Canada–US border. 
The form of this moderated effect of party identification on perceptions of 
Canada nevertheless differs from the pattern found in the CES data. An effect plot is 
once more useful in showing how. Figure 2.14 makes clear that Democrats are more 
likely than Republicans to hold a ‚very favourable‛ or ‚somewhat favourable‛ view 
of Canada irrespective of distance to the Canada–US border, but the effect of 
partisanship is amplified for Democrats in close proximity to the Canada–US 
border. To illustrate, a Democrat residing 5 kilometres from the Canada–US border 
(roughly the distance from downtown Detroit, Michigan, Buffalo, New York, or 
Blaine, Washington to the Canada–US border) has a predicted probability of 
providing a ‚very favourable‛ response (P(Y) = 3) of 0.78; at the sample mean of 799 
kilometres from the border, the predicted probably is 0.57; at 2,000 kilometres from 
the border, the predicted probability is 0.53. By comparison, a Republican residing 5 
kilometres from the Canada–US border has a predicted probability of providing a 
‚very favourable‛ response of 0.55; at the sample mean of 799 kilometres from the 
border, the predicted probably is 0.47; at 2,000 kilometres from the border, the 
predicted probability is 0.46. Still, one should discount the differences between these 
predicted probabilities on account of the absence of a statistically significant slope 
for logged distance to the Canada–US border for Republican identifiers in model 
2.2.3-R (see Table 2.7). 
Addition probing of the party identification × border distance interaction 
from model 2.2.3 reveals that the effect of Republican Party identification is 
significant for all distances observed in the sample data (see Figure 2.18). By 
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contrast, the effect of identifying as an Independent is significant for distance values 
of 1,138 kilometres or less (see Figure 2.19). 
In sum, proximity to the Canada–US border leads to more favourable 
attitudes toward Canada, but this effect is only observed among Democrats. Among 
Republicans, there is no effect. This pattern of effects differs from what is observed 
in the Canadian case where the effect of distance to the Canada–US border is 
positive for Conservative and Liberal supporters but is reversed (becomes negative) 
for Bloc Québécois supporters, with no effect among NDP supporters. The 
American case therefore fits partly the expectations of intergroup contact theory and 
transactionalist theory, but not those of intergroup competition theory. 
While the Canadian data exhibited some regional variation in attitudes, this 
is noticeably absent in the American context. None of the census division dummy 
variables are significant, implying that the lone spatial dimension of consequence in 
the American case is proximity to the border. The temporal dynamic in the US, 
however, is similar to that in Canada: the dummy variables for the years 2003 to 
2011 are all significant and negative. Attitudes became less favourable during the 
lead-up to the invasion of Iraq and remained so for an extended period, even into 
the Obama presidency. American attitudes toward Canada are thus similarly 
responsive to current political events.15 
  
                                                                                             
15. As with the case of Canadian attitudes toward the US, the key results from model 2.2.3 
are robust to the inclusion of several other variables that potentially influence attitudes toward 
Canada. Adding following news about international relations, attitudes about the role of the US 
in the world, attitudes toward foreign trade, perceptions of the national economy, perceptions of 
the job market, employment status, county unemployment rate, and county median family 
income to the model have no appreciable effects on the parameter estimates for party 
identification, logged distance to the Canada–US border, and the party identification × border 
distance interaction. See Table 2.8. 
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2.8 Conclusion 
I have set out to contribute to the literatures on Canadian and American 
mass public opinion in investigating the roles played by two factors in shaping the 
mutual perceptions of the Canadian and American publics: first, political party 
identification and political ideology; and second, proximity to the Canada–US 
border. The analyses of survey data from the CES and the Gallup Poll presented 
here have confirmed that both exert significant effects on Canadian and American 
views of the other country, and further that their effects are contingent upon each 
other. In brief, the more conservative segments of Canadian society express greater 
affinity for the US while the more progressive segments of American society express 
greater affinity for Canada. At the same time, these effects are spatially dependent. 
In the Canadian context, proximity to the Canada–US border tends to produce more 
positive attitudes toward the US, but only among Conservative and Liberal 
supporters; among NDP and Bloc Québécois supporters, the effect of border 
proximity is either not present or negative. In the American context, border 
proximity produces more positive attitudes toward Canada among Democrats, but 
not among Republicans. 
I have advanced an argument in favour of taking a spatially informed 
approach to survey data analysis, one that has been similarly advanced by others 
(Eagles 2002), and that aligns with the tradition of spatial social science (see section 
1.2 above). Still, my conclusions should be considered tentative, in part because of 
the limitations of the CES and Gallup data. Bennett (2004), Nevitte and colleagues 
(2002) and Rankin (2004) have all found that national and continental (that is, pan-
North American) identity constructs shape Canadian and American attitudes 
toward one another. Consistent measures of these identity concepts are not 
available in all waves of the CES data and are absent from the Gallup data 
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altogether. This represents the potential for omitted variable bias.16 It may be the 
case that each of identity-centred variables, political party identification (and 
ideology) and border proximity contribute to a more complete explanation of 
Canadian and American attitudes toward the other country. It may also be the case 
that border proximity serves to moderate the effects of national and continental 
identity constructs. Testing all of these hypotheses concurrently, however, will 
require data from surveys capturing all of these concepts, and that are also 
amenable to geocoding (for calculating distance to the border). Those responsible 
for collecting and disseminating survey data (academic and professional survey 
researchers alike) would do well to record and retain reasonably granular 
geographic indicators. 
It is also important to note that my data are relatively recent (from the late 
1990s onward), and so my results should be understood in the context of the current 
‚continentalized‛ period of Canada–US relations. As Inwood notes, Canadian party 
positions toward the US have evolved over time, with the political left and right 
having switched positions more than once (2005, 18–24). The effects of party 
identification and ideology may thus be contingent on the time period under 
consideration. Also, the salience of border proximity to attitudes might be less in 
earlier, more protectionist periods owing to reduced cross-border interaction. It 
would be valuable to test both possibilities using historical survey data. I have also 
consciously focused my analyses here on general attitudes toward the other 
country. Whether the same dynamics with respect to border proximity are observed 
in Canadian and American public opinion toward Canada–US relations writ large 
or more specific policy areas such as trade and border security are additional 
                                                                                             
16. An attempt to use a four-point scale capturing strength of identification with Canada 
from the 2011 CES – a rather low-fidelity measure of national identity – while using multiple 
imputation to complete the CES data failed to yield a significant effect (see Table 2.5). 
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avenues of inquiry for future research. (I take up the topic of Canadian attitudes 
toward North American integration in chapter 3.) There is likely a wide range of 
equally interesting questions relating to geographic and spatial dynamics at work in 
other areas of political behaviour, such as party identification, voting, 
environmental attitudes, and so on. Future research should also investigate these 
possibilities. 
Lastly, additional research is needed to more precisely specify the 
mechanisms though which proximity exerts its effects on attitudes, and for which 
proximity may serve as a proxy, for example, personal contact, economic exchange 
and media exposure (see Kuhn 2011). The preliminary analyses afforded by the ITS 
data from Statistics Canada points toward cross-border contact as such a 
mechanism, though not the only conceivable one. It may also be the case that the 
effect of proximity may be mediated (or perhaps only partly mediated) by such 
mechanisms. Advancing these lines of inquiry will thus serve to advance our 
understanding of the mutual perceptions of Canadians and Americans. 
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Table 2.1: Canadian Feelings toward the United States (OLS) 
 Model 2.1.1  Model 2.1.2  Model 2.1.3  
 b (SE)  b (SE)  b (SE)  
Intercept 61.95 (0.74)  61.76 (0.75) *** 61.66 (0.75) *** 
Year (ref = 1997)          
 2011 8.07 (0.59) *** 8.06 (0.60) *** 8.08 (0.60) *** 
 2008 -0.21 (0.63)  -0.18 (0.63)  -0.14 (0.63)  
 2006 -0.19 (0.71)  -0.17 (0.71)  -0.08 (0.71)  
 2004 -4.38 (0.58) *** -4.37 (0.58) *** -4.32 (0.58) *** 
 2000 -2.43 (0.59) *** -2.40 (0.59) *** -2.38 (0.59) *** 
Male 1.10 (0.40) ** 1.10 (0.40) ** 1.09 (0.40) ** 
ln Age (Years) 1.47 (0.56) ** 1.49 (0.56) ** 1.48 (0.56) ** 
Education (ref = High school or less)          
 University -0.02 (0.47)  -0.06 (0.47)  -0.08 (0.47)  
 College -1.39 (0.49) ** -1.40 (0.49) ** -1.42 (0.49) ** 
Household income (ref = $60,00-$89,999)          
 < $30,000 -2.95 (0.64) *** -2.95 (0.64) *** -2.99 (0.64) *** 
 $30,00-$59,999 -0.55 (0.52)  -0.54 (0.52)  -0.56 (0.52)  
 $90,000+ 1.03 (0.56)  1.02 (0.56)  1.00 (0.56)  
Province (ref = Ontario)          
 Newfoundland and Labrador 0.73 (0.97)  2.21 (1.16)  2.78 (1.17) * 
 Nova Scotia -0.23 (1.18)  0.74 (1.27)  1.12 (1.28)  
 Prince Edward Island -0.08 (0.99)  0.80 (1.07)  1.05 (1.06)  
 New Brunswick 0.87 (1.03)  1.58 (1.07)  1.86 (1.07)  
 Quebec -3.99 (0.63) *** -3.86 (0.64) *** -3.79 (0.64) *** 
 Manitoba 0.01 (0.92)  0.18 (0.93)  0.22 (0.93)  
 Saskatchewan -3.32 (0.87) *** -2.70 (0.92) ** -2.59 (0.92) ** 
 Alberta -2.37 (0.73) ** -1.57 (0.81)  -1.27 (0.83)  
 British Columbia -3.05 (0.62) *** -3.32 (0.63) *** -3.35 (0.63) *** 
Party identification (ref = Liberal)          
 Conservative 2.34 (0.54) *** 2.36 (0.54) *** 2.42 (0.54) *** 
 NDP -5.81 (0.66) *** -5.79 (0.66) *** -5.75 (0.66) *** 
 Bloc Québécois -7.88 (0.87) *** -7.84 (0.87) *** -7.70 (0.86) *** 
 Other Party -4.44 (1.31) *** -4.38 (1.31) *** -4.35 (1.31) *** 
 No Party -2.28 (0.58) *** -2.25 (0.58) *** -2.22 (0.58) *** 
Ideology: Left (0) vs. Right (10) 0.47 (0.11) *** 0.47 (0.11) *** 0.47 (0.11) *** 
ln Distance to Canada–US Border (km)  —  -0.54 (0.22) * -0.90 (0.34) ** 
ln Distance to Can.-US Border × Conservative  —    —  -0.18 (0.48)  
ln Distance to Can.-US Border × NDP  —   —  1.37 (0.53) ** 
ln Distance to Can.-US Border × BQ  —   —  2.50 (0.91) ** 
ln Distance to Can.-US Border × Other  —   —  0.74 (1.22)  
ln Distance to Can.-US Border × No Party  —   —  0.15 (0.48)  
          
N 17,021   17,021   17,021   
R2 0.08   0.09   0.09   
F-Test for Nested Models  —   6.97 **  4.18 ***  
* p ≤ 0.05, ** p ≤ 0.01, *** p ≤ 0.001 
Source: Canadian Election Studies, 1997–2011 
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Table 2.2: Canadian Feelings toward the United States (OLS), Conservative 
as Reference Category 
 Model 2.1.3-C 
 b (SE)  
Intercept 64.08 (0.79) *** 
Year (ref = 1997)    
 2011 8.08 (0.60) *** 
 2008 -0.14 (0.63  
 2006 -0.08 (0.71)  
 2004 -4.32 (0.58) *** 
 2000 -2.38 (0.59) *** 
Male 1.09 (0.40) ** 
ln Age (Years) 1.48 (0.56) ** 
Education (ref = High school or less)    
 University -0.08 (0.47)  
 College -1.42 (0.49) ** 
Household income (ref = $60,00-$89,999)    
 < $30,000 -2.99 (0.64) *** 
 $30,00-$59,999 -0.56 (0.52)  
 $90,000+ 1.00 (0.56)  
Province (ref = Ontario)    
 Newfoundland and Labrador 2.77 (1.17) * 
 Nova Scotia 1.12 (1.28)  
 Prince Edward Island 1.05 (1.06)  
 New Brunswick 1.85 (1.07)  
 Quebec -3.79 (0.64) *** 
 Manitoba 0.22 (0.93)  
 Saskatchewan -2.59 (0.92) ** 
 Alberta -1.27 (0.83)  
 British Columbia -3.35 (0.63) *** 
Party identification (ref = Conservative)    
 Liberal -2.42 (0.54) *** 
 NDP -8.17 (0.72) *** 
 Bloc Québécois -10.12 (0.90) *** 
 Other Party -6.77 (1.33) *** 
 No Party -4.64 (0.60) *** 
Ideology: Left (0) vs. Right (10) 0.47 (0.11) *** 
ln Distance to Canada–US Border (km) -1.08 (0.38) ** 
ln Distance to Can.-US Border × Liberal 0.18 (0.48)  
ln Distance to Can.-US Border × NDP 1.55 (0.57) ** 
ln Distance to Can.-US Border × BQ 2.68 (0.94) ** 
ln Distance to Can.-US Border × Other 0.92 (1.20)  
ln Distance to Can.-US Border × No Party 0.33 (0.50)  
    
N 17,021   
R2 0.09   
F-Test for Nested Models 4.18 ***  
* p ≤ 0.05, ** p ≤ 0.01, *** p ≤ 0.001 
Source: Canadian Election Studies, 1997–2011 
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Table 2.3: Canadian Feelings toward the United States (OLS), NDP 
as Reference Category 
 Model 2.1.3-NDP 
 b (SE)  
Intercept 55.91 (0.92) *** 
Year (ref = 1997)    
 2011 8.08 (0.60) *** 
 2008 -0.14 (0.63)  
 2006 -0.08 (0.71)  
 2004 -4.32 (0.58) *** 
 2000 -2.38 (0.59) *** 
Male 1.09 (0.40) ** 
ln Age (Years) 1.48 (0.56) ** 
Education (ref = High school or less)    
 University -0.08 (0.47)  
 College -1.42 (0.49) ** 
Household income (ref = $60,00-$89,999)    
 < $30,000 -2.99 (0.64) *** 
 $30,00-$59,999 -0.56 (0.52)  
 $90,000+ 1.00 (0.56)  
Province (ref = Ontario)    
 Newfoundland and Labrador 2.77 (1.17) * 
 Nova Scotia 1.12 (1.28)  
 Prince Edward Island 1.05 (1.06)  
 New Brunswick 1.85 (1.07)  
 Quebec -3.79 (0.64) *** 
 Manitoba 0.22 (0.93)  
 Saskatchewan -2.59 (0.92) ** 
 Alberta -1.27 (0.83)  
 British Columbia -3.35 (0.63) *** 
Party identification (ref = NDP)    
 Liberal 5.75 (0.66) *** 
 Conservative 8.17 (0.72) *** 
 Bloc Québécois -1.96 (1.02)  
 Other Party 1.40 (1.37)  
 No Party 3.53 (0.72) *** 
Ideology: Left (0) vs. Right (10) 0.47 (0.11) *** 
ln Distance to Canada–US Border (km) 0.47 (0.48)  
ln Distance to Can.-US Border × Liberal -1.37 (0.53) ** 
ln Distance to Can.-US Border × Conservative -1.55 (0.57) ** 
ln Distance to Can.-US Border × BQ 1.13 (0.98) † 
ln Distance to Can.-US Border × Other -0.63 (1.28)  
ln Distance to Can.-US Border × No Party -1.22 (0.58) * 
    
N 17,021   
R2 0.09   
F-Test for Nested Models 4.18 ***  
† p ≤ 0.06; * p ≤ 0.05, ** p ≤ 0.01, *** p ≤ 0.001 
Source: Canadian Election Studies, 1997–2011 
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Table 2.4: Canadian Feelings toward the United States (OLS), Bloc Québécois 
as Reference Category 
 Model 2.1.3-BQ 
 b (SE)  
Intercept 53.95 (1.13) *** 
Year (ref = 1997)    
 2011 8.08 (0.60) *** 
 2008 -0.14 (0.63)  
 2006 -0.08 (0.71)  
 2004 -4.32 (0.58) *** 
 2000 -2.38 (0.59) *** 
Male 1.09 (0.40) ** 
ln Age (Years) 1.48 (0.56) ** 
Education (ref = High school or less)    
 University -0.08 (0.47)  
 College -1.42 (0.49) ** 
Household income (ref = $60,00-$89,999)    
 < $30,000 -2.99 (0.64) *** 
 $30,00-$59,999 -0.56 (0.52)  
 $90,000+ 1.00 (0.56)  
Province (ref = Ontario)    
 Newfoundland and Labrador 2.77 (1.17) * 
 Nova Scotia 1.12 (1.28)  
 Prince Edward Island 1.05 (1.06)  
 New Brunswick 1.85 (1.07)  
 Quebec -3.79 (0.64) *** 
 Manitoba 0.22 (0.93)  
 Saskatchewan -2.59 (0.92) ** 
 Alberta -1.27 (0.83)  
 British Columbia -3.35 (0.63) *** 
Party identification (ref = Bloc Québécois)    
 Liberal 7.70 (0.86) *** 
 Conservative 10.12 (0.90) *** 
 NDP 1.96 (1.02) † 
 Other Party 3.35 (1.48) * 
 No Party 5.48 (0.94) *** 
Ideology: Left (0) vs. Right (10) 0.47 (0.11) *** 
ln Distance to Canada–US Border (km) 1.60 (0.84) † 
ln Distance to Can.-US Border × Liberal -2.50 (0.91) ** 
ln Distance to Can.-US Border × Conservative -2.68 (0.94) ** 
ln Distance to Can.-US Border × NDP -1.13 (0.98)  
ln Distance to Can.-US Border × Other -1.76 (1.53)  
ln Distance to Can.-US Border × No Party -2.35 (0.92) ** 
    
N 17,021   
R2 0.09   
F-Test for Nested Models 4.18 ***  
† p ≤ 0.06; * p ≤ 0.05, ** p ≤ 0.01, *** p ≤ 0.001 
Source: Canadian Election Studies, 1997–2011 
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Table 2.5: Canadian Feelings toward the United States (OLS), Expanded Model 
 Model 2.1.4  
 b (SE)  
Intercept 62.20 (0.84) *** 
Year (ref = 1997)    
 2011 7.10 (0.75) *** 
 2008 -0.49 (0.93)  
 2006 -0.86 (0.88)  
 2004 -4.54 (0.72) *** 
 2000 -2.96 (0.78) *** 
Male 0.45 (0.41)  
ln Age (Years) 1.09 (0.62)  
Education (ref = High school or less)    
 University -0.97 (0.47) * 
 College -1.69 (0.49) *** 
Household income (ref = $60,00-$89,999)    
 < $30,000 -2.66 (0.67) *** 
 $30,00-$59,999 -0.37 (0.52)  
 $90,000+ 0.75 (0.56)  
Employment status (ref = Employed)    
 Unemployed 0.40 (1.05)  
 Not in Labour Force -0.03 (0.46)  
Province (ref = Ontario)    
 Newfoundland and Labrador 3.92 (1.57) ** 
 Nova Scotia 2.15 (1.61)  
 Prince Edward Island 2.11 (1.25)  
 New Brunswick 3.38 (1.27) ** 
 Quebec -2.49 (0.85) ** 
 Manitoba 1.04 (1.07)  
 Saskatchewan -1.65 (1.07)  
 Alberta -1.56 (0.87)  
 British Columbia -2.57 (0.72) *** 
Interest in Politics 0.43 (0.08) *** 
International Trade Creates Jobs 1.48 (0.20) *** 
Identify with Canada 0.27 (0.30)  
Economy (ref = stay about the same)    
 Getting Better 0.16 (0.44)  
 Getting Worse -2.00 (0.52) *** 
Personal Financial Status (ref = stay about the same)    
 Getting Better 0.72 (0.49)  
 Getting Worse -0.76 (0.49)  
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Table 2.5: Canadian Feelings toward the United States (OLS), Expanded Model, cont’d. 
 Model 2.1.4  
 b (SE)  
Party identification (ref = Liberal)    
 Conservative 2.44 (0.55) *** 
 NDP -5.35 (0.66) *** 
 Bloc Québécois -7.26 (0.91) *** 
 Other Party -3.76 (1.32) ** 
 No Party -1.30 (0.61) * 
Ideology: Left vs. Right 0.43 (0.11) *** 
ln Distance to Canada–US Border (km) -0.83 (0.34) ** 
ln Distance to Can.-US Border × Conservative -0.22 (0.48)  
ln Distance to Can.-US Border × NDP 1.36 (0.53) ** 
ln Distance to Can.-US Border × BQ 2.46 (0.89) ** 
ln Distance to Can.-US Border × Other 0.67 (1.21)  
ln Distance to Can.-US Border × No Party 0.13 (0.48)  
Area Unemployment Rate (%) 0.04 (0.15)  
Area Median Family Income ($000) 0.09 (0.05) * 
    
N 17,021   
R2 0.10   
F-Test for Nested Models 19.35 ***  
 
* p ≤ 0.05, ** p ≤ 0.01, *** p ≤ 0.001 
Sources: Canadian Election Studies, 1997–2011; Statistics Canada, CANSIM II table 
282-0135 (unemployment rate); Statistics Canada, CANSIM II table 202-0411 
(median family income). 
Notes: Results are ordinary least squares regression estimates with standard errors 
adjusted for the complex sample design (stratification and weighting) and multiple 
imputation. Continuous independent variables (age, left vs. right, distance to the 
Canada–US border, interest in politics, views of international trade, identification 
with Canada, area unemployment rate and area median family income) are mean-
centred. Missing data are multiply imputed 10 times using all available data. 
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Table 2.6: American Favourability Toward Canada (Ordinal Logit) 
 Model 2.2.1  Model 2.2.2  Model 2.2.3  
 b (SE)  b (SE)  b (SE)  
Intercept 3 0.31 (0.14) * 0.34 (0.14) * 0.34 (0.14) * 
Intercept 2 3.85 (0.15) *** 3.89 (0.15) *** 3.88 (0.15) *** 
Year (ref = 2001)          
2011 -0.32 (0.13) * -0.32 (0.13) * -0.32 (0.13) * 
2010 -0.68 (0.13) *** -0.69 (0.13) *** -0.69 (0.13) *** 
2009 -0.76 (0.13) *** -0.76 (0.13) *** -0.76 (0.13) *** 
2008 -0.54 (0.13) *** -0.54 (0.13) *** -0.54 (0.13) *** 
2007 -0.63 (0.13) *** -0.63 (0.13) *** -0.63 (0.13) *** 
2006 -0.77 (0.13) *** -0.77 (0.13) *** -0.77 (0.13) *** 
2005 -0.86 (0.13) *** -0.86 (0.13) *** -0.87 (0.13) *** 
2004 -0.98 (0.13) *** -0.98 (0.13) *** -0.99 (0.13) *** 
2003 -0.55 (0.13) *** -0.55 (0.13) *** -0.56 (0.13) *** 
2002 -0.22 (0.13)  -0.22 (0.13)  -0.22 (0.13)  
Male 0.21 (0.05) *** 0.21 (0.05) *** 0.21 (0.05) *** 
ln Age (Years) 0.06 (0.06)  0.06 (0.06)  0.06 (0.06)  
Education (ref = High school or less)          
College 0.39 (0.06) *** 0.40 (0.06) *** 0.40 (0.06) *** 
Some College 0.21 (0.06) *** 0.22 (0.06) *** 0.22 (0.06) *** 
Race (ref = White)          
Black -0.45 (0.09) *** -0.44 (0.09) *** -0.43 (0.09) *** 
Other -0.08 (0.12)  -0.06 (0.12)  -0.07 (0.12)  
Hispanic -0.33 (0.11) ** -0.29 (0.11) ** -0.29 (0.11) ** 
Household income (ref = $30,00-$49,999)          
< $20,000 -0.04 (0.08)  -0.03 (0.08)  -0.03 (0.08)  
$20,00-$29,999 -0.12 (0.09)  -0.12 (0.09)  -0.12 (0.09)  
$50,000-$74,999 0.05 (0.07)  0.05 (0.07)  0.05 (0.07)  
$75,000+ 0.12 (0.07)  0.13 (0.07)  0.12 (0.07)  
Census Division (ref = South Atlantic)          
New England  0.03 (0.11)  -0.11 (0.12)  -0.11 (0.12)  
Mid-Atlantic 0.11 (0.08)  -0.02 (0.09)  -0.02 (0.09)  
East North Central 0.16 (0.08)  0.01 (0.09)  0.02 (0.09)  
West North Central  0.06 (0.10)  0.03 (0.10)  0.03 (0.10)  
East South Central -0.02 (0.11)  -0.03 (0.11)  -0.03 (0.11)  
West South Central 0.05 (0.09)  0.12 (0.09)  0.12 (0.09)  
Mountain 0.00 (0.10)  0.02 (0.10)  0.02 (0.10)  
Pacific 0.00 (0.08)  -0.02 (0.08)  -0.01 (0.08)   
Party identification (ref = Democrat)          
Republican -0.44 (0.06) *** -0.44 (0.06) *** -0.44 (0.06) *** 
Independent -0.42 (0.09) *** -0.41 (0.09) *** -0.40 (0.09) *** 
Ideology: Conservative vs. Liberal 0.12 (0.03) *** 0.12 (0.03) *** 0.12 (0.03) *** 
ln Distance to Canada–US Border (km)  —  -0.12 (0.03) *** -0.19 (0.04) *** 
ln Distance to Cdn. Border (km) x Republican  —   —  0.13 (0.05) * 
ln Distance to Cdn. Border (km) x Independent  —   —  0.25 (0.10) *** 
          
N 10,282  10,282  10,282   
Model χ2 520.79 ***  536.02 ***  548.89 ***  
Likelihood Ratio χ2 —  15.23 ***  12.87 **  
Nagelkerke pseudo-R2 0.06  0.06  0.06   
* p ≤ 0.05, ** p ≤ 0.01, *** p ≤ 0.001 
Source: Gallup Poll, World Affairs surveys, 2001–2011 
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Table 2.7: American Favourability Toward Canada (Ordinal Logit), Republican 
as Reference Category 
 Model 2.2.3-R  
 b (SE)  
Intercept 3 -0.10 (0.14)  
Intercept 2 3.45 (0.15) *** 
Year (ref = 2001)    
2011 -0.32 (0.13) * 
2010 -0.69 (0.13) *** 
2009 -0.76 (0.13) *** 
2008 -0.54 (0.13) *** 
2007 -0.63 (0.13) *** 
2006 -0.77 (0.13) *** 
2005 -0.87 (0.13) *** 
2004 -0.99 (0.13) *** 
2003 -0.56 (0.13) *** 
2002 -0.22 (0.13)  
Male 0.21 (0.05) *** 
ln Age (Years) 0.06 (0.06)  
Education (ref = High school or less)    
College 0.40 (0.06) *** 
Some College 0.22 (0.06) *** 
Race (ref = White)    
Black -0.43 (0.09) *** 
Other -0.07 (0.12)  
Hispanic -0.29 (0.11) ** 
Household income (ref = $30,00-$49,999)    
< $20,000 -0.03 (0.08)  
$20,00-$29,999 -0.12 (0.09)  
$50,000-$74,999 0.05 (0.07)  
$75,000+ 0.12 (0.07)  
Census Division (ref = South Atlantic)    
New England  -0.11 (0.12)  
Mid-Atlantic -0.02 (0.09)  
East North Central 0.02 (0.09)  
West North Central  0.03 (0.10)  
East South Central -0.03 (0.11)  
West South Central 0.12 (0.09)  
Mountain 0.02 (0.10)  
Pacific -0.01 (0.08)  
Party identification (ref = Republican)    
Democrat 0.44 (0.06) *** 
Independent 0.04 (0.10)  
Ideology: Conservative vs. Liberal 0.12 (0.03) *** 
ln Distance to Canada–US Border (km) -0.06 (0.04)  
ln Distance to Cdn. Border (km) x Democrat -0.13 (0.05) * 
ln Distance to Cdn. Border (km) x Independent 0.12 (0.09)  
    
N 10,282   
Model χ2 548.89 ***  
Likelihood Ratio χ2 12.87 **  
Nagelkerke pseudo-R2 0.06   
* p ≤ 0.05, ** p ≤ 0.01, *** p ≤ 0.001  
Source: Gallup Poll, World Affairs surveys, 2001–2011 
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Table 2.8: American Favourability Toward Canada (Ordinal Logit), Independent 
as Reference Category 
 Model 2.2.3-R  
 b (SE)  
Intercept 3 -0.06 (0.15)  
Intercept 2 3.49 (0.15) *** 
Year (ref = 2001)    
2011 -0.32 (0.13) * 
2010 -0.69 (0.13) *** 
2009 -0.76 (0.13) *** 
2008 -0.54 (0.13) *** 
2007 -0.63 (0.13) *** 
2006 -0.77 (0.13) *** 
2005 -0.87 (0.13) *** 
2004 -0.99 (0.13) *** 
2003 -0.56 (0.13) *** 
2002 -0.22 (0.13)  
Male 0.21 (0.05) *** 
ln Age (Years) 0.06 (0.06)  
Education (ref = High school or less)    
College 0.40 (0.06) *** 
Some College 0.22 (0.06) *** 
Race (ref = White)    
Black -0.43 (0.09) *** 
Other -0.07 (0.12)  
Hispanic -0.29 (0.11) ** 
Household income (ref = $30,00-$49,999)    
< $20,000 -0.03 (0.08)  
$20,00-$29,999 -0.12 (0.09)  
$50,000-$74,999 0.05 (0.07)  
$75,000+ 0.12 (0.07)  
Census Division (ref = South Atlantic)    
New England  -0.11 (0.12)  
Mid-Atlantic -0.02 (0.09)  
East North Central 0.02 (0.09)  
West North Central  0.03 (0.10)  
East South Central -0.03 (0.11)  
West South Central 0.12 (0.09)  
Mountain 0.02 (0.10)  
Pacific -0.01 (0.08)  
Party identification (ref = Independent)    
Democrat 0.40 (0.09) *** 
Republican -0.04 (0.10)  
Ideology: Conservative vs. Liberal 0.12 (0.03) *** 
ln Distance to Canada–US Border (km) 0.06 (0.09)  
ln Distance to Cdn. Border (km) x Democrat -0.25 (0.10) ** 
ln Distance to Cdn. Border (km) x Republican -0.12 (0.09)  
    
N 10,282   
Model χ2 548.89 ***  
Likelihood Ratio χ2 12.87 **  
Nagelkerke pseudo-R2 0.06   
* p ≤ 0.05, ** p ≤ 0.01, *** p ≤ 0.001  
Source: Gallup Poll, World Affairs surveys, 2001–2011 
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Table 2.9: American Favourability Toward Canada (Ordinal Logit), Expanded Model 
 
 Model 2.2.4  
 b (SE)  
Intercept 3 0.39 (0.19) * 
Intercept 2 3.95 (0.20) *** 
Year (ref = 2001)    
2011 -0.32 (0.16) * 
2010 -0.71 (0.16) *** 
2009 -0.80 (0.16) *** 
2008 -0.55 (0.14) *** 
2007 -0.62 (0.14) *** 
2006 -0.77 (0.14) *** 
2005 -0.86 (0.14) *** 
2004 -1.00 (0.14) *** 
2003 -0.58 (0.14) *** 
2002 -0.24 (0.13)  
Male 0.19 (0.05) *** 
ln Age (Years) 0.03 (0.07)  
Education (ref = High school or less)    
College 0.32 (0.06) *** 
Some College 0.18 (0.06) ** 
Race (ref = White)    
Black -0.43 (0.09) *** 
Other -0.08 (0.12)  
Hispanic -0.27 (0.11) ** 
Household income (ref = $30,00-$49,999)    
< $20,000 -0.02 (0.09)  
$20,00-$29,999 -0.11 (0.09)  
$50,000-$74,999 0.04 (0.07)  
$75,000+ 0.10 (0.07)  
Employment status (ref = Employed)    
 Unemployed -0.03 (0.12)  
 Not in Labour Force 0.00 (0.06)  
Census Division (ref = South Atlantic)    
New England  -0.13 (0.12)  
Mid-Atlantic -0.03 (0.09)  
East North Central 0.02 (0.09)  
West North Central  0.03 (0.10)  
East South Central -0.01 (0.11)  
West South Central 0.13 (0.10)  
Mountain 0.02 (0.10)  
Pacific -0.02 (0.09)  
Follow News about IR 0.08 (0.04) * 
US Role in the World 0.13 (0.03) *** 
Trade is Opportunity/Threat 0.05 (0.03)  
Economy (ref = stay about the same)    
 Getting Better -0.07 (0.10)  
 Getting Worse -0.02 (0.10)  
Bad Time to Find a Job 0.05 (0.07)  
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Table 2.8: American Favourability Toward Canada (Ordinal Logit), Expanded Model, 
cont’d. 
 Model 2.2.4  
 b (SE)  
Party identification (ref = Democrat)    
Republican -0.44 (0.06) *** 
Independent -0.38 (0.09) *** 
Ideology: Conservative vs. Liberal 0.12 (0.03) *** 
ln Distance to Canada–US Border (km) -0.19 (0.04) *** 
ln Distance to Cdn. Border (km) x Republican 0.13 (0.05) * 
ln Distance to Cdn. Border (km) x Independent 0.24 (0.10) ** 
County Unemployment Rate (%) -0.001 (0.016)  
County Median Family Income ($000) 0.002 (0.002)  
    
N 10,282   
Model χ2 592.19 ***  
Likelihood Ratio χ2 43.30 ***  
Nagelkerke pseudo-R2 0.07   
* p ≤ 0.05, ** p ≤ 0.01, *** p ≤ 0.001 
Sources: Gallup Poll, World Affairs surveys, 2001–2011; Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
Local Area Unemployment Statistics, 2001–2011 (unemployment rate); United States 
Census Bureau, Summary File 3, 2000 Census; United States Census Bureau, 
American Community Survey, 2010 and 2011 5-year estimates, Table DP03 (median 
family income). 
Notes: Results are ordinal logistic regression estimates with standard errors 
adjusted for the complex sample design (stratification and weighting) and multiple 
imputation. Continuous independent variables (age, ideology, distance to the 
Canada–US border, follow news about international relations, views of the role of 
the US in the world, views of international trade, perceptions of the national 
economy, county unemployment rate and county median family income) are mean-
centred. Missing data are multiply imputed 10 times using all available data. 
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Figure 2.1: Map, Canadian Visits to the United States 
by Census Metropolitan Area/Census Agglomeration of Residence, 2013 
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Sources: Statistics Canada, International Travel Survey Public Use Microdata File, 
Canadian Resident Trips Abroad (2013); Statistics Canada, Census Cartographic 
Boundary Files – Provinces/Territories (2011); Statistics Canada, Census 
Cartographic Boundary Files – Census Metropolitan Areas and Census 
Agglomerations. 
Note: Areas with no data (in white) are areas outside the boundaries of census 
metropolitan areas (CMAs) and census agglomerations (CAs), and for which no 
data are available. 
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Figure 2.2: Map, Canadian Visitors to the United States Per Capita 
by Census Metropolitan Area/Census Agglomeration of Residence, 2013 
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Sources: Statistics Canada, International Travel Survey Public Use Microdata File, 
Canadian Resident Trips Abroad (2013); Statistics Canada, Population and Dwelling 
Counts for Census Metropolitan Areas and Census Agglomerations (2011); Statistics 
Canada, Census Cartographic Boundary Files – Provinces/Territories (2011); 
Statistics Canada, Census Cartographic Boundary Files – Census Metropolitan 
Areas and Census Agglomerations. 
Note: Areas with no data (in white) are areas outside the boundaries of census 
metropolitan areas (CMAs) and census agglomerations (CAs), and for which no 
data are available. 
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Figure 2.3: Map, Canadian Visitors to the United States by State(s) Visited, 2013 
 
Sources: Statistics Canada, International Travel Survey Public Use Microdata File, 
Canadian Resident Trips Abroad (2013); United States Census Bureau, Cartographic 
Boundary Shapefile – States (2013). 
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Figure 2.4: Map, Canadian Visitors to the United States Per Capita by State(s) Visited, 2013 
 
Sources: Statistics Canada, International Travel Survey Public Use Microdata File, 
Canadian Resident Trips Abroad (2013); United States Census Bureau, Cartographic 
Boundary Shapefile – States (2013); United States Census Bureau, Annual Estimates 
of the Resident Population for the United States, Regions, States, and Puerto Rico: 
July 1, 2013 (vintage 2013) (NST-EST2013-01). 
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Figure 2.5: Map, American Visitors to Canada by State of Residence, 2013 
 
Sources: Statistics Canada, International Travel Survey Summary Table UP01A 
(2013); United States Census Bureau, Cartographic Boundary Shapefile – States 
(2013). 
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Figure 2.6: Map, American Visitors to Canada Per Capita by State of Residence, 2013 
 
Sources: Statistics Canada, International Travel Survey Summary Table UP01A 
(2013); United States Census Bureau, Cartographic Boundary Shapefile – States 
(2013); United States Census Bureau, Annual Estimates of the Resident Population 
for the United States, Regions, States, and Puerto Rico: July 1, 2013 (vintage 2013) 
(NST-EST2013-01). 
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Figure 2.7: Canadian Feelings toward the United States, 1997–2011 (CES) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.8: American Favourability toward Canada, 2001–2011 (Gallup Poll) 
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Figure 2.9: Histogram, Distance to Canada–US Border (CES) 
 
 
 
Figure 2.10: Histogram, Logged Distance to Canada–US Border (CES) 
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Figure 2.11: Histogram, Distance to Canada–US Border (Gallup Poll) 
 
 
 
Figure 2.12: Histogram, Logged Distance to Canada–US Border (Gallup Poll) 
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Figure 2.13: Effect Plot, Canadian Feelings toward the United States (CES) 
 
 
 
Figure 2.14: Effect Plot, American Favourability toward Canada (Gallup Poll) 
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Figure 2.15: Coefficient Plot, Effect of Conservative Party Identification (CES) 
 
 
 
Figure 2.16: Coefficient Plot, Effect of New Democratic Party Identification (CES) 
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Figure 2.17: Coefficient Plot, Effect of Bloc Québécois Identification (CES) 
 
 
 
Note: Figures. 2.15–2.17 show the party coefficients (and 95% confidence intervals) 
from model 2.1.3 with distance to the Canada–US border centred at different values. 
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Figure 2.18: Coefficient Plot, Effect of Republican Party Identification (Gallup Poll) 
 
 
 
Figure 2.19: Coefficient Plot, Effect of Independent Identification (Gallup Poll) 
 
Note: Figures. 2.18–2.19 show the party coefficients (and 95% confidence intervals) 
from model 2.2.3 with distance to the Canada–US border centred at different values. 
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2.9 Appendix 2A: Data Coding – CES 
Feeling – United States: ‚And now some questions about countries and groups. 
How do you feel about CANADA? Use any number from zero to one hundred. Zero 
means you really DISLIKE Canada and one hundred means you really LIKE 
Canada. How do you feel about the UNITED STATES?‛ 
Year: Dummy variables using indicator coding for election years 2000, 2004, 2006, 
2008 and 2011 (1997 is the reference category). 
Male: Male (1), female (0). 
ln Age (Years): Age in years; logged (base e). 
Education: Dummy variables using indicator coding for University and College 
(High school or less is the reference category). 
Employment: ‚Are you currently self-employed, working for pay, retired, 
unemployed or looking for work, a student, caring for a family, or something else?‛ 
Dummy variables using indicator coding for Unemployed/Looking for Work and 
Not in Labour Force (Retired, Student, Caring for a Family, Disabled) (Employed 
(Self-Employed, Working for Pay) is the reference category). 
Household Income: Dummy variables using indicator coding for household income 
less than $30,000, $30,000–$59,999, and $90,000+ ($60,000–$89,999 is the reference 
category). 
Province: Dummy variables using indicator coding for province of residence 
(Ontario is the reference category). 
Interest in Politics: ‚How interested are you in politics GENERALLY? Use a scale 
from 0 to 10, where zero means no interest at all, and ten means a great deal of 
interest.‛ No Interest at All (0), Great Deal of Interest (10); mean centred. 
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International Trade Creates Jobs: ‚International trade creates more jobs in Canada 
than it destroys.‛ Strongly Agree (5), Agree, (4), Not Sure (3), Disagree (2), Strongly 
Disagree (1); mean centred. 
Identify with Canada: ‚How much do you identify with each of the following? 
Canada.‛ A Great Deal (4), Quite a Lot (3), Not Very Much (2), None at All (1); mean 
centred. 
Economy Getting Better/Worse: ‚Over the past year, has Canada’s economy gotten 
better, gotten worse, or stayed about the same?‛ Dummy variables using indicator 
coding for Getting Better and Getting Worse (Stayed about the Same is the reference 
category). 
Personal Financial Situation Getting Better/Worse: ‚Over the past year, has your 
financial situation gotten better, gotten worse, or stayed about the same?‛ Dummy 
variables using indicator coding for Getting Better and Getting Worse (Stayed about 
the Same is the reference category). 
Party: ‚In federal politics, do you usually think of yourself as a Liberal, 
Conservative, NDP, *in Quebec: Bloc Québécois+, Green Party, or none of these?‛ *If 
‚none of these‛:+ ‚Do you generally think of yourself as being a little closer to one of 
the federal parties than to the others?‛ *If yes:+ ‚Which party is that?‛ Dummy 
variables using indicator coding for Conservative, NDP, Bloc Québécois, Other 
Party and No Party (Liberal is the reference category). 
Left vs. Right: ‚In politics people sometimes talk of left and right. Where would you 
place yourself?‛ Left (0), Right (10); mean centred. 
ln Distance Canada–US Border (km): Distance to the Canada–US border in 
kilometres; logged (base e) and mean centred. 
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Area Unemployment rate (%): Three-month moving average unadjusted 
unemployment rate at the Census Metropolitan Area (CMA) (where available) or 
province level for the month of the election; mean centred. Source: Statistics Canada, 
CANSIM II table 282-0135. 
Area Median Family Income ($000): Median total income for all family types at the 
Census Metropolitan Area (CMA) (where available) or province level in constant 
2011 dollars (thousands) for the year of the election; mean centred. Source: Statistics 
Canada, CANSIM II table 202-0411. 
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2.10 Appendix 2B: Descriptive Statistics – CES 
 
Mean Min Max SD N Missing 
Feeling – United States 58.65 0 100 21.73 14,654 2,367 
Year: 2011 0.15 0 1 0.35 17,021 0 
Year: 2008 0.14 0 1 0.35 17,021 0 
Year: 2006 0.12 0 1 0.32 17,021 0 
Year: 2004 0.25 0 1 0.43 17,021 0 
Year: 2000 0.17 0 1 0.37 17,021 0 
Year: 1997 0.18 0 1 0.38 17,021 0 
Male 0.49 0 1 0.50 17,021 0 
Age (years) 46.98 18 102 16.39 16,856 165 
ln Age (years) 3.78 2.89 4.62 0.38 16,856 165 
Education: University 0.28 0 1 0.45 16,883 138 
Education: College 0.19 0 1 0.39 16,883 138 
Education: High school or less 0.53 0 1 0.50 16,883 138 
Income: < $30,000 0.20 0 1 0.40 14,689 2,332 
Income: $30,000 to <$60,000 0.31 0 1 0.46 14,689 2,332 
Income: $60,000 to <$90,000 0.23 0 1 0.42 14,689 2,332 
Income: $90,000+ 0.25 0 1 0.43 14,689 2,332 
Employed 0.62 0 1 0.48 16,869 152 
Unemployed 0.04 0 1 0.20 16,869 152 
Not in labour force 0.34 0 1 0.47 16,869 152 
Province: Newfoundland and Labrador 0.02 0 1 0.14 17,021 0 
Province: Nova Scotia 0.01 0 1 0.09 17,021 0 
Province: Prince Edward Island 0.03 0 1 0.17 17,021 0 
Province: New Brunswick 0.02 0 1 0.15 17,021 0 
Province: Quebec 0.26 0 1 0.44 17,021 0 
Province: Ontario 0.36 0 1 0.48 17,021 0 
Province: Manitoba 0.04 0 1 0.19 17,021 0 
Province: Saskatchewan 0.04 0 1 0.19 17,021 0 
Province: Alberta 0.08 0 1 0.28 17,021 0 
Province: British Columbia 0.13 0 1 0.33 17,021 0 
Interest in politics 5.68 0 10 2.75 16,886 135 
International trade creates jobs 3.30 1 5 1.04 7,116 9,905 
Identify with Canada 3.21 1 4 0.76 1,033 15,988 
Economy: Getting better 0.32 0 1 0.46 16,436 585 
Economy: Same 0.45 0 1 0.49 16,436 585 
Economy: Getting worse 0.24 0 1 0.42 16,436 585 
  
130 
  
 
Mean Min Max SD N Missing 
Personal financial situation: Getting better 0.21 0 1 0.41 16,865 156 
Personal financial situation: Same 0.55 0 1 0.49 16,865 156 
Personal financial situation: Getting worse 0.23 0 1 0.42 16,865 156 
Party: Liberal 0.31 0 1 0.46 14,717 2,304 
Party: Conservative 0.26 0 1 0.44 14,717 2,304 
Party: NDP 0.12 0 1 0.32 14,717 2,304 
Party: Bloc Québécois 0.09 0 1 0.28 14,717 2,304 
Party: Other party 0.02 0 1 0.13 14,717 2,304 
Party: No party 0.20 0 1 0.40 14,717 2,304 
Left vs. right 5.23 0 10 1.88 4,773 12,248 
Distance to Canada–US border (km) 173.59 0.33 2,379.61 205.45 16,781 240 
ln Distance to Canada–US border (km) 4.64 -1.10 7.77 1.04 16,781 240 
Area unemployment rate (%) 7.34 3.20 20.80 2.33 17,021 0 
Area median family income ($000) 55.75 34.00 82.40 7.97 17,021 0 
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2.11 Appendix 2C: Data Coding – Gallup Poll 
Favourability – Canada: ‚Next, I’d like your overall opinion of some foreign 
countries. First, is your overall opinion of [READ AND ROTATE] very favourable 
(3), mostly favourable (2), mostly unfavourable (1), or very unfavourable (1)? How 
about – Canada?‛ 
Year: Dummy variables using indicator coding for years 2002–2011 (2001 is the 
reference category). 
Male: Male (1); Female (0). 
ln Age (Years): Age in years; logged (base e). 
Education: Dummy variables using indicator coding for College and Some College 
(High school or less is the reference category). 
Race: Dummy variables using indicator coding for Black and Other Race (White is 
the reference category). 
Hispanic: Hispanic (1), not Hispanic (0). 
Employment: ‚Which of the following best describes your current situation – 
employed full-time, employed part-time, retired, a homemaker, a student, 
unemployed but looking for work, or unemployed and not looking for work?‛ 
Dummy variables using indicator coding for Unemployed but Looking for Work 
and Not in Labour Force (Retired, Homemaker, Student, Unemployed and Not 
Looking for Work) (Employed Full-Time/Employer Part-Time) is the reference 
category). 
Household Income: Dummy variables using indicator coding for household income 
less than $30,000, $30,000–$59,999, $50,000–74,999, $75,000+ ($30,000–$49,999 is the 
reference category). 
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Census Division: Dummy variables using indicator coding for Census Division of 
residence (the South Atlantic Census Division is the reference category). 
Follow News about IR: ‚In general, how closely do you follow news about foreign 
countries around the world, including relations between the United States and other 
countries – very closely (4), somewhat closely (3), not too closely (2), or not at all 
(1)?‛; rescaled to 0–1 and mean centred. 
US Role in the World: ‚Next, we would like you to think about the role the U.S. 
should play in trying to solve international problems. Do you think the United 
States should – [FORM A: READ 1-4; FORM B: READ 4-1] Take the leading role in 
world affairs (4), Take a major role, but not the leading role (3), (or) Take a minor 
role (2), (or) Take no role at all in world affairs (1)‛; rescaled to 0–1 and mean 
centred. 
Trade is Opportunity/Threat: ‚What do you think foreign trade means for America? 
Do you see foreign trade more as [FORM A: READ 1-2; FORM B: READ 2-1] An 
opportunity for economic growth through increased U.S. exports (3), (or) A threat to 
the economy from foreign imports (1), both (vol.) (2), neither (vol.) (2)‛; rescaled to 
0–1 and mean centred. 
Economy Better/Worse: ‚Right now, do you think that economic conditions in the 
country as a whole are getting better (3) or getting worse (1)? Same (vol.) (2)‛; 
rescaled to 0–1 and mean centred. 
Bad Time to Find a Job: ‚Thinking about the job situation in America today, would 
you say that it is now a good time (0) or a bad time (1) to find a quality job?‛ 
Party: ‚In politics, as of today, do you consider yourself a Republican, a Democrat, 
or an Independent?‛ *If Independent, don’t know or refused:+ ‚As of today, do you 
lean more to the Democratic Party or the Republican Party?‛ Dummy variables 
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using indicator coding for Republican and Independent (Democrat is the reference 
category) 
Ideology: ‚How would you describe your political views?‛ Very conservative (1), 
Conservative (2), Moderate (3), Liberal (4), Very liberal (5); mean centred. 
ln Distance Canada–US Border (km): Distance to the Canada–US border in 
kilometres; logged (base e). 
County Unemployment Rate (%): Annual average unadjusted unemployment rate 
at the county level; mean centred. Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Local Area 
Unemployment Statistics, 2001–2011. 
County Median Family Income ($000): Median family income at the county level in 
inflation-adjusted dollars (thousands); mean centred. Sources: United States Census 
Bureau, Summary File 3, 2000 Census; United States Census Bureau, American 
Community Survey, 2010 and 2011 5-year estimates, Table DP03 (Selected Economic 
Characteristics). 
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2.12 Appendix 2D: Descriptive Statistics – Gallup Poll 
 
Mean Min Max SD N Missing 
Canada - Very favourable 0.45 0 1 0.49 10,021 261 
Canada - Somewhat favourable 0.51 0 1 0.49 10,021 261 
Canada - Unfavourable 0.04 0 1 0.19 10,021 261 
Year: 2011 0.10 0 1 0.29 10,282 0 
Year: 2010 0.10 0 1 0.29 10,282 0 
Year: 2009 0.10 0 1 0.29 10,282 0 
Year: 2008 0.10 0 1 0.29 10,282 0 
Year: 2007 0.10 0 1 0.29 10,282 0 
Year: 2006 0.09 0 1 0.28 10,282 0 
Year: 2005 0.09 0 1 0.29 10,282 0 
Year: 2004 0.09 0 1 0.29 10,282 0 
Year: 2003 0.09 0 1 0.29 10,282 0 
Year: 2002 0.10 0 1 0.29 10,282 0 
Year: 2001 0.04 0 1 0.20 10,282 0 
Male 0.48 0 1 0.49 10,282 0 
Age (Years) 47.84 18 99 17.18 10,195 87 
ln Age (Years) 3.79 2.89 4.60 0.39 10,195 87 
Education: College 0.32 0 1 0.46 10,236 46 
Education: Some College 0.32 0 1 0.46 10,236 46 
Education: High School or Less 0.37 0 1 0.47 10,236 46 
Race: White 0.87 0 1 0.33 10,049 233 
Race: Black 0.10 0 1 0.29 10,049 233 
Race: Other 0.04 0 1 0.19 10,049 233 
Hispanic 0.05 0 1 0.22 10,212 70 
Employed 0.57 0 1 0.49 10,246 36 
Unemployed 0.05 0 1 0.22 10,246 36 
Not in Labour Force 0.38 0 1 0.48 10,246 36 
HH Income: <$20,000 0.15 0 1 0.36 9,432 850 
HH Income: $20,000 to <$30,000 0.13 0 1 0.33 9,432 850 
HH Income: $30,000 to <$50,000 0.24 0 1 0.42 9,432 850 
HH Income: $50,000 to <$75,000 0.19 0 1 0.39 9,432 850 
HH Income: $75,000+ 0.29 0 1 0.45 9,432 850 
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Mean Min Max SD N Missing 
Census Division: New England 0.05 0 1 0.21 10,282 0 
Census Division: Mid-Atlantic 0.14 0 1 0.34 10,282 0 
Census Division: East North Central 0.15 0 1 0.35 10,282 0 
Census Division: West North Central 0.08 0 1 0.26 10,282 0 
Census Division: South Atlantic 0.19 0 1 0.38 10,282 0 
Census Division: East South Central 0.07 0 1 0.24 10,282 0 
Census Division: West South Central 0.10 0 1 0.30 10,282 0 
Census Division: Mountain 0.08 0 1 0.26 10,282 0 
Census Division: Pacific 0.14 0 1 0.35 10,282 0 
Follow News about IR 3.04 1 4 0.73 8,272 2,010 
US Role in the World 2.92 1 4 0.74 10,157 125 
Trade is Opportunity/Threat 2.01 1 3 0.96 4,265 6,017 
Economy: Getting Better 0.35 0 1 0.47 7,642 2,640 
Economy: Same 0.08 0 1 0.26 7,642 2,640 
Economy: Getting Worse 0.58 0 1 0.48 7,642 2,640 
Bad Time to Find a Job 0.74 0 1 0.43 8,571 1,711 
Party: Democrat 0.49 0 1 0.49 10,040 242 
Party: Republican 0.44 0 1 0.49 10,040 242 
Party: Independent 0.07 0 1 0.25 10,040 242 
Ideology: Conservative–Liberal 2.77 1 5 0.97 10,014 268 
Distance to Canada–US border (km) 799.18 1.59 2,256.20 535.78 10,282 0 
ln Distance to Canada–US border (km) 6.37 0.46 7.72 0.89 10,282 0 
County Unemployment rate (%) 6.49 1.90 29.10 2.51 10,282 0 
County Median family income ($000) 61.12 20.50 142.04 15.92 10,282 0 
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3. Partisanship, Border Proximity, and Canadian Attitudes 
toward North American Integration1 
 
3.1 Abstract 
The study of public attitudes toward continental integration has a long 
lineage in Canada. Still, the research literature has neglected the effect of spatial 
proximity to the United States. This maintains even though the cross-border trade, 
travel, and social ties constituting the daily reality of Canada–US relations 
concentrate near the Canada–US border. This article advances a spatially informed 
analysis of Canadian attitudes toward North American integration drawing on data 
from the Canadian Election Studies (1997–2011). The explanation it advances has 
three main foci: the roles of political party identification and political ideology; the 
role of spatial proximity to the Canada–US border; and the interactive relationship 
between political views and border proximity. 
3.2 Introduction 
Trade between Canada and the United States constitutes the largest trading 
relationship between two countries in the world. Their shared geography also 
entails security threats in common. Not surprisingly, then, a large literature 
examining all different facets of relations between Canada and the United States – 
trade relations, defence cooperation, border management, energy and natural 
resource policy, environmental cooperation, and even a potential (albeit unlikely) 
monetary union – has developed. Successive generations of analysts of the Canada–
US relationship have often been quick to note, however, that the relationship is 
markedly asymmetrical: Canada is far more dependent on its southern neighbour 
than vice versa (Keohane and Nye 1974; Von Riekhoff and Neuhold 1993; Lennox 
                                                                                             
1. Originally published as Gravelle (2014a). 
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2009). It is unsurprising, then, that Canada–US relations command much greater 
attention among policymakers in Ottawa than among those in Washington, DC 
(Mahant and Mount 1999). 
Nevertheless, Canadian public opinion matters beyond its own borders. In 
particular, it matters for its neighbour to the south. One recent case should serve to 
make this point. In March 2003, facing widespread public opposition to the coming 
US-led invasion of Iraq, then-prime minister Jean Chrétien announced on the floor 
of the House of Commons in Ottawa that Canada would not participate in any 
action against Iraq without an authorizing resolution from the United Nations 
Security Council. Despite this public position, Chrétien (2007) would later write in 
his political memoirs that his instinct was to have Canada join the mission (despite 
his reservations about the weak case for Iraq possessing weapons of mass 
destruction), but that he was constrained by domestic public opinion. In short, 
domestic public opinion is an important contextual factor shaping foreign policy (J. 
H. Aldrich et al. 2006; Soroka 2003). 
Even though a rich literature on Canadian attitudes toward North American 
integration has developed in the past 40 years, existing research has not given 
sufficient consideration to space. Some analyses of Canada–US relations stress 
Canada’s proximity to the US and its implications for Canadian public policy (e.g., 
Hale 2012), but it is important to observe that at the individual level, proximity to 
the US is a variable, not a constant. Moreover, though it is common to acknowledge 
that trade, personal and business travel, and the social ties of family and friendship 
are concentrated near the Canada–US border, geographic proximity to the United 
States has not been explicitly accounted for in analyses of public attitudes toward 
Canada’s ties to the US. This persists in spite of the increasing use of spatial 
approaches to social science (reviewed above in section 1.2) and the growing body 
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of theory and evidence pointing to the relevance of proximity and distance in 
shaping public attitudes. 
My research in this article is guided by three questions: How do political 
factors – party identification and ideology – shape Canadian attitudes toward 
continental integration? What is the effect of spatial proximity to the United States 
in shaping attitudes? Lastly, how do political factors and proximity interact? The 
focus here is on general attitudes toward North American integration – that is, 
general dispositions toward closer or more distant relations between Canada and 
the United States – and not attitudes toward the United States per se (the subject of 
chapter 2), or attitudes relating to specific policy areas such as trade or border 
cooperation. The article is structured as follows. First, I review the existing literature 
on public opinion toward Canada–US relations while highlighting some of its 
shortcomings. Second, I advance my research hypotheses relating to political 
partisanship and ideology, border proximity, and their interaction. With respect to 
the border proximity hypothesis, I demonstrate that classic work in social 
psychology and international relations lead to the expectation that proximity 
matters, and further that they are consistent with the findings of current political 
behaviour research in the North American and European contexts. Third, I 
introduce the data I utilize, namely the Canadian Election Studies (1997–2011), and 
describe my methods. Fourth, I present the results from a set of regression models. I 
conclude with some remarks on potential avenues of inquiry for the further study of 
attitudes toward continental integration in North America. 
3.3 Canadian Public Opinion and Continental Integration, Past and Present 
Owing to its geographic location and the historical context of its political 
development, attitudes toward the United States (both pro and con) have deeper 
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roots in Canada than anywhere else in the world (Granatstein 1996; Inwood 2005; 
Nossal 2008; Nossal 2007). The beginnings of research on mass public opinion 
toward Canada–US relations are nearly contemporaneous with the advent of 
scientific public opinion polling methods. The Canadian Institute of Public Opinion 
(CIPO), founded in 1941 as an offshoot of the US-based Gallup Organization, 
undertook periodic polls touching on Canada–US relations. In polls conducted 
during World War II, CIPO asked the Canadian public, ‚After the war, do you think 
we should have free trade with the United States – that is, that all products and 
merchandise crossing the border either way should be free of all tariff and customs 
duties?‛ A solid majority of the Canadian public expressed support for free trade: In 
June 1943, results were 67% in favour and 17% opposed; in February 1944, results 
were 70% in favour and 20% opposed.2 
Research on Canadian public opinion toward the United States greatly 
accelerated in the late 1960s and early 1970s – a development that coincided with the 
expansion of the Canadian public opinion polling industry, growing unease with 
American investment in Canada (interpreted by some as heralding the 
‚Americanization of Canada‛) and initiatives by the Trudeau government to 
diversify Canada’s international economic relations away from the United States. 
Research conducted during this period generally found little consensus among the 
Canadian public as to whether American investment in Canada was a ‚good thing‛ 
or a ‚bad thing.‛ Depending on the phrasing of the survey item, polls found that 
either a thin majority or a plurality of Canadians believed that American investment 
in Canada was a ‚good thing‛ (Munton and Poel 1977; Murray and Gerace 1972; 
Sigler and Goresky 1974). Presented with explicit choices between the policy status 
quo, closer integration with the United States and forging stronger links with the 
                                                                                             
2. CIPO poll results are taken from http://brain.gallup.com. 
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rest of the world, the Canadian public exhibited a diversity of opinion. In a series of 
polls conducted in the mid-1970s, Murray and Leduc (1976) found that a plurality of 
Canadians preferred to maintain Canada’s existing arrangements with the United 
States without any policy adjustments, fewer preferred closer cooperation with 
Europe and Asia, and even fewer still preferred to move closer to the United States. 
Literature from this period focused on two primary factors shaping Canadian 
attitudes toward the United States: political party identification and region. Munton 
and Poel (1977) and Sigler and Goresky (1974) found that Liberal and Progressive 
Conservative supporters were more likely to favour US foreign investment than 
supporters of the New Democratic Party (Canada’s left-leaning social democratic 
party). Murray and Gerace (1972) also found a similar dynamic at work when the 
Canadian public was asked about the American influence on Canada: PC and 
Liberal supporters were less likely to think that the United States had too much 
influence and NDP supporters the most likely. In terms of regional dynamics, 
support for greater American investment in Canada tended to be higher in Quebec 
and the Atlantic provinces than in Western Canada (Murray and Gerace 1972; Sigler 
and Goresky 1974). 
Beginning in the 1980s, trade between Canada and the United States replaced 
investment on the policy agenda, and the focus of public opinion research shifted 
accordingly. Copious polling was conducted to gauge Canadians’ attitudes toward, 
in the first instance, the Canada–US Free Trade Agreement (FTA), and in the second 
instance, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Examined over an 
extended time period, these polls demonstrated that attitudes toward free trade 
were both volatile and on a downward trajectory as an agreement approached 
(Dasko 1986). By contrast, data from the 1981 and 1990 World Values Surveys 
indicate that a majority of Canadians expressed trust in Americans and desired 
141 
  
closer ties with the United States (Inglehart, Nevitte, and Basañez 1996). 
Mendelsohn and Wolfe (2001) find that support for continental free trade increased 
steadily from the early 1990s onward, reaching levels of support (between 64 and 70 
percent in 2001–2002) not seen since before the FTA. As for the demographic and 
attitudinal factors shaping Canadians’ attitudes, research during this period found 
that support for free trade was highest in Quebec and Western Canada and lowest 
in Ontario (Dasko 1986; P. Martin 1995) and higher among men than women 
(Gidengil 1995). Bennett (2004) and Rankin (2004) find that left–right political 
orientation is predictive of attitudes toward NAFTA, with those identifying with the 
political right holding more positive attitudes. Nevitte, Anderson, and Brym (2002) 
similarly find left–right orientation shapes Canadians’ attitudes toward Canada–US 
ties with those on the right favouring closer ties. Bennett (2004), Nevitte and 
colleagues (2002), and Rankin (2004) also find that a strong attachment to Canadian 
national identity decreases support for continental integration. 
By the beginning of the 2000s, close economic ties to the United States had 
become largely settled as a matter of Canadian public policy. When asked in early 
2001 about the Canada–US relationship as a whole, a thin majority of Canadians 
expressed a preference to maintain the status quo; fewer preferred either closer or 
more distant relations with the United States. Despite seemingly achieving a level of 
comfort with close economic ties to the United States, the Canadian public 
overwhelmingly rejected the suggestion of formal political union (Mendelsohn, 
Wolfe, and Parkin 2002). The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 abruptly shifted 
the focus in the United States to securing the American ‚Homeland,‛ with the 
immediate and short-term result being a significant ‚thickening‛ of the Canada–US 
border (Ackleson 2009). The false claim that some of the 9/11 hijackers entered the 
United States through Canada, having acquired the status of urban myth thanks to 
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its repetition by a number of American political figures, contributed to the sense of 
threat posed by the Canada–US border. Policy responses to the changed security 
environment included the US Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative (which would 
require for the first time that Americans and Canadians crossing the Canada–US 
border present a passport) and the trilateral Canada–US–Mexico Security and 
Prosperity Partnership (SPP) designed to harmonize border security policies while 
also continuing to facilitate cross-border trade (Ackleson and Kastner 2006). As for 
Canadian attitudes toward border security, Nevitte, Anderson, and Brym (2002) 
report on data before 9/11 showing that only a minority of the Canadian public 
supports doing away with the Canada–US border altogether, with those on the 
political right more likely to express this sentiment. While not willing to erase the 
border, Cole, Kincaid, and Parkin (2002) find that in the months following 9/11, a 
majority of Canadians (66 percent) endorsed a common Canada–US border security 
policy. 
An extensive literature on Canadian attitudes toward continental integration 
– in terms of investment, trade, and security – has thus developed. What is absent 
from this literature, though, is an acknowledgement of the role of proximity to (or 
distance from) the United States in shaping attitudes toward North American 
integration. Though one might readily admit that the processes constituting 
Canada–US relations on a day-to-day basis – cross-border trade, personal and 
business travel, and social ties between family and friends – concentrate near the 
Canada–US border, proximity has not been acknowledged as shaping Canadian 
attitudes toward continental integration. As Eagles (2002) has argued, political 
behaviour bears the imprint of not just individual characteristics, attitudes, and 
beliefs; it is also shaped by geographic context. This expectation is also motivated by 
the literature advancing a spatially integrated approach to social science research 
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(Goodchild et al. 2000; Goodchild and Janelle 2004; Logan 2012; Stimson 2014). 
Further, different strands of social scientific inquiry provide motivation for the 
hypothesis that proximity plays a role in shaping attitudes and opinions. 
3.4 Hypotheses: Partisanship, Border Proximity, and Attitudes toward Continental 
Integration 
One of the best-established findings in the political behaviour literature is 
that policy attitudes among mass publics – including foreign policy attitudes – are 
shaped by political party identification and political ideology (Holsti 2004; Wittkopf 
1990). For example, Zaller (1992) has shown that partisan differences in mass public 
opinion frequently mirror differences in opinion between political elites. That is, 
those parts of the public with high levels of political information tend to mirror the 
opinions of those elites with whom they are aligned politically or ideologically. 
There is a solid basis for the expectation that Canadian attitudes toward continental 
integration will be congruent with this research. 
Canadian attitudes toward the United States (and relations with the United 
States) are influenced by the ‚filtered image of the United States provided by 
interpreters of that country‛ – with political elites playing a key role (Brooks 2008, 
31–32). Recent history serves to highlight the importance of Canada–US relations in 
Canadian electoral politics, with the prime examples being the 1988 and 2006 federal 
general elections. The former was largely fought over the Canada–US Free Trade 
Agreement, in which the Progressive Conservatives and the NDP took clear 
positions (in favour and opposed, respectively). Liberal leader John Turner publicly 
opposed the agreement, reversing his pro-business stance from the 1984 election, 
though powerful interests within the Liberal Party remained supportive of free 
trade (Clarkson 1989). In the latter, a major election issue was Canada’s 
144 
  
participation in US plans for a continental ballistic missile defence (BMD) system. 
The BMD plan was supported by the Conservatives, opposed by the NDP and Bloc 
Québécois (the federal-level, Quebec-based separatist party), with the Liberal 
government of Paul Martin looking to avoid taking a definitive position and to defer 
any decision until after the election (Bow 2008; Rudd 2005). During the campaign, 
then-Conservative opposition leader Stephen Harper was also criticized by the 
governing Liberals for his support of the US-led invasion of Iraq the previous year. 
In sum, though party positions have varied across time, and have 
occasionally reversed, the pattern of the past 30 years is for parties of the centre and 
left to take policy positions less inclined toward closer Canada–US integration, and 
on occasion to invoke anti-American sentiment for electoral gain. Parties of the right 
have been more pro-American, more ‚continentalist,‛ and have sought to 
strengthen Canada–US ties (Granatstein 1996; Inwood 2005; Nossal 2007; Nossal 
2008). Further, it is worth noting that the left and the right have been more 
consistent and unambiguous in their positions compared with the centrist Liberals. 
The theoretical expectations that follow are that Canadians will interpret such ‚elite 
cues‛ through their preexisting partisan and ideological attachments (Zaller 1992). 
Existing research on Canadian public opinion toward Canada–US relations 
(discussed above) has found exactly these types of partisan effects at work. 
Consequently, my research expectation is that Canadians identifying as 
Conservative will favour closer ties between Canada and the United States than 
those identifying as Liberals. Canadians identifying with the NDP or Bloc 
Québécois will favour more distant ties between Canada and the Unites States. 
Similarly, Canadians identifying as right-wing are more likely to favour closer ties 
between Canada and the United States than those identifying as left-wing. 
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Though the hypotheses relating to partisanship and ideology are standard in 
the political behaviour literature, the expectations regarding proximity to the 
Canada–US border are less so. Still, they can be shown to have a solid basis in a 
number of social science literatures. A review of these literatures makes it apparent 
that proximity serves as an amalgam or proxy measure of a number of different 
social processes, such as interpersonal contact, cross-cultural interaction, and 
economic exchange. Eagles (2002, 206) argues, for example, that such spatial or 
contextual measures are valuable ‚as proxies for other social or political processes 
hypothesized to have political consequences.‛ Huckfeldt and Sprague (1995) 
similarly argue that context and location are important variables in explaining 
political behaviour because they influence the political information to which 
individuals are exposed. 
The intergroup contact hypothesis, most closely identified with Allport 
(1954) is an important literature in this regard (see also Pettigrew 1998). Though 
focused mainly on the social psychology of race relations in the United States, 
Allport nevertheless provides more general insights into group relations, including 
perceptions of other nationalities. The central contention of the intergroup contact 
hypothesis is that there is typically a positive correlation between greater contact 
with persons belonging to a group (for example, another nationality, race, or ethnic 
group) and positive attitudes toward that group. A corollary of the intergroup 
contact hypothesis is that proximity to an out-group should lead to more positive 
impressions of that group, since contact can only occur in close proximity. 
Another line of inquiry focused on group relations is the intergroup 
competition hypothesis associated with Blalock (1966). Counter to the expectations 
of Allport, Blalock argues that increased contact between groups (settlers and 
indigenous populations, different social classes, or racial groups) serves to increase 
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perceptions of competition for resources and hence more negative other-group 
impressions. Both the intergroup contact and intergroup competition hypotheses 
thus expect contact (and proximity) to influence other-group impressions, though 
their expectations differ as they pertain to the direction of the relationship. 
The work of Karl Deutsch on international integration is also particularly 
germane. In his seminal works, Deutsch develops a transactionalist theory of 
integration centred on the concept of security communities. According to Deutsch, a 
security community is a group that has acquired a sense of community – a ‚we 
feeling‛ – and has agreed to resolve common problems through peaceful means 
(Deutsch 1954, 33; Deutsch et al. 1957, 5). In Deutsch’s enumeration of the many 
processes that enable the formation of a security community, the common thread is 
that contact, communication, and exchange (frequently between individuals) are 
critical to the success of a security community. Deutsch notes that the development 
of security communities is assisted by the existence of ‚all sorts of interactions – 
written and spoken messages, face-to-face contact, and dealings such as trade...‛ 
(Deutsch et al. 1957, 144). The links created through social communication, personal 
mobility, and economic ties between political units are the processes that serve to 
create and sustain a security community (Deutsch et al. 1957, 149–152, 157–158). 
Consequently, personal contact, cross-border mobility, and economic linkages are 
all seen as key to developing a sense of community between different political units. 
Further, and most importantly, these processes are a function of distance: ‚The 
density of transactions – visits, messages, interactions, general human contact – 
diminishes with distance‛ (Deutsch 1966; cf. Deutsch 1954, 59). Recent work 
employing methods from statistical physics also confirms the link between social 
interaction and spatial proximity (Levy 2010; Levy and Goldenberg 2014). 
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In addition to the classic work of Allport, Blalock, and Deutsch, several 
recent studies of public opinion in Europe and North America also demonstrate that 
policy attitudes are shaped by proximity and distance to relevant geographic 
features. For example, Díez Medrano (2003, 243–246) finds those residing in a region 
bordering another European Union member state are more likely to favour EU 
membership, while those residing at a greater distance from Brussels (the symbolic 
‚centre‛ of the EU) are less likely to favour EU membership. Berezin and Díez 
Medrano (2008, 18–22) similarly find those residing closer to Brussels are more 
likely to say they would experience regret with the hypothetical dissolution of the 
EU. Evoking the theories discussed above, Berezin and Díez Medrano (2008, 22–23) 
argue that distance matters ‚because it takes time to get there, but also because our 
visualization, our perception, of the space in-between‛ exert effects on ‚our 
emotions, our beliefs, our attitudes, and, eventually, our behaviour.‛ Drawing on 
Allport and Deutsch, Kuhn (2011) finds that residing in a border district produces 
more favourable attitudes toward European integration in Germany, though the 
same effect is not observed in France. Kuhn (2011, 103–109) further finds that this 
effect in Germany is mediated by interpersonal contact with other EU nationals and 
economic exchange such as cross-border shopping. This work is suggestive of some 
of the mechanisms through which proximity might influence political behaviour, 
and further that it is not observed in all national contexts. 
‚Border effects‛ are also at work in American public opinion on 
immigration. Drawing on the intergroup contact and competition hypotheses, 
Branton et al. (2007) find that proximity to the US–Mexico border affects voting 
behaviour on ‚nativist‛ state ballot initiatives in California to deny social services 
and education to undocumented immigrants. It is especially noteworthy that the 
effects of party identification and border proximity are interactive: in places that are 
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far from the US–Mexico border, Democrats are less likely to vote for nativist 
initiatives than Republicans, but Democrats and Republicans near the US–Mexico 
border are equally likely to vote for nativist initiatives. Dunaway, Branton, and 
Abrajano (2010) similarly find that identifying illegal immigration as the ‚most 
important problem‛ facing the United States is shaped by party identification, 
ideology, media coverage of immigration issues, and residing in a US–Mexico 
border state. What is again noteworthy here is the interactive relationship between 
border state residence and the level of media coverage: the effect of media coverage 
on immigration attitudes is stronger among residents of nonborder states than 
among residents of border states. 
Given existing theory and empirical research, a baseline expectation in the 
Canadian context would be that closer proximity to the Canada–US border should 
increase support for closer ties with the United States; increasing distance from the 
border should increase support for more distant ties. In keeping with intergroup 
contact theory and transactionalist theory, this expectation is grounded in the strong 
and enduring social and economic ties between border communities in Canada and 
the United States (Stuart 2007). It is also supported by the analysis of the Statistics 
Canada ITS data (in chapter 2 above) which found strong correlations between 
aggregate (Census Metropolitan Area/Census Agglomeration-level) visits to the US 
and proximity to the Canada–US border, and also visits per capita and proximity to 
the border. Canadian border regions may also have greater exposure to print, radio, 
and television news media from the United States (Payne and Caron 1982). News 
media tend to give greater coverage to events occurring locally or nearby, and less 
coverage to events occurring further away (Branton and Dunaway 2009a; S. R. 
Martin 1988). It is therefore credible to suggest that proximity to the Canada–US 
border increases the salience of Canada’s ties to the United States, increases the 
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likelihood of interaction (and frequency of interaction) with Americans, and thus 
increases support for closer Canada–US ties. On the other hand, increasing distance 
to the border diminishes the salience of Canada’s ties to the United States, decreases 
the likelihood (and frequency) of interaction with Americans, and thus increases 
support for more distant ties.3 
An alternative expectation is that the effect of proximity on Canadian 
attitudes toward Canada–US ties is nonconstant. This is to say that the relationship 
between partisanship and proximity may be interactive, resembling the findings of 
Branton et al. (2007), and border proximity may amplify the effects of political 
attitudes on Canada–US ties, either positive or negative. The expectations of 
intergroup contact theory and transactionalist theory arguably hold among those 
segments of the Canadian public in the political centre and on the right: closer 
proximity to the border creates stronger preferences for closer Canada–US ties. The 
                                                                                             
3. One potential strategy for measuring the salience of Canada–US ties more directly is 
through open-ended survey questions eliciting respondents’ views of the most important issue 
or most important problem (often abbreviated as ‚MIP‛) facing the country. A variant of this 
type of question exists in the Canadian Election Study datasets (discussed below), though these 
data have limitations. Specifically, the CES question was framed in terms of the current federal 
election in asking: ‚What is the most important issue to you personally in this federal election?‛ 
Given that Canada–US ties have only rarely been a (or the single) major election campaign issue, 
it is unsurprising that few respondents give such an answer. To be specific, less than 1 percent of 
CES campaign period respondents gave an open-ended response coded as ‚foreign affairs/US 
relations, security issues‛ between 2004 and 2011: 0.9% in 2004, 0.7% in 2006 (even when ballistic 
missile defence was a campaign issue), 0.3% in 2008, and 0.5% in 2011 (the 1997 and 2000 CES 
data do not contain a separate code for foreign affairs). 
Further, it stands to reason that one could follow news about American political and 
economic developments closely, and consider Canada–US relations to be a critically important 
policy issue, but when directed by the survey question wording to the federal election campaign, 
one would be more inclined to say that the most important issue is (for example) economic 
growth, unemployment, health care, or returning (or replacing) the government of the day. 
Thus, the framing of the CES most-important-issue question (and the empirical 
distributions of responses) limit its usefulness as even a low-fidelity measure of the importance 
of Canada–US ties. Arguably, better questions would be: ‚In the past six months, how closely 
have you followed news about issues and events in each of the following regions of the world? 
The United States‛ or ‚In your opinion, how important is Canada’s relationship with the United 
States? Is it very important, somewhat important, not very important, not at all important?‛ 
Though closer to the ideal, data for such questions are, unfortunately, not provided in the CES. 
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expectations of intergroup competition theory, on the other hand, may be borne out 
among those who identify with the NDP and the political left: closer proximity to 
the United States creates heightened perceptions of threat (that is, fears of the 
‚Americanization of Canada‛) and thus stronger preferences for more distant 
Canada–US ties. It is less clear how (and indeed whether) Bloc Québécois support 
and border proximity will interact. A different constellation of attitudes toward the 
United States prevails in Quebec compared with the rest of Canada. This has 
typically involved stronger support for economic ties with the United States but less 
desire for security cooperation, for example, with BMD (Haglund 2006; P. Martin 
2011). Therefore, I do not advance any explicit expectations regarding border 
proximity and Bloc Québécois support. 
3.5 Data and Methods 
The data for this study are the Canadian Election Study (CES) data sets from 
1997 to 2011.4 Conducted in conjunction with every federal general election since 
1965, the CES surveys are probability samples of the Canadian adult population 
comprising a campaign-period telephone survey and a series of recontact surveys: a 
postelection telephone survey, a mailback survey, and a web survey (first 
introduced in 2011). The key survey item from the CES, taken from the postelection 
telephone surveys (the exception being the campaign period survey in 2004), asks 
the following: ‚Do you think Canada’s ties with the United States should be much 
                                                                                             
4. The response rates (AAPOR 3) for the CES postelection surveys are the following—1997: 
41.6%; 2000: 41.7%; 2004 (campaign period): 46.7%; 2006: 39.7%; 2008: 31.2%; 2011: 22.3%. These 
response rates are calculated using sample record disposition counts provided in the survey 
technical documentation and classifying noncompletes from the postelection survey (where 
appropriate) as noncontacts. 
Earlier CES data sets exist, but they are not used here owing to the absence of sufficiently 
precise geographic indicators for geocoding before 1997. While 2004–2011 CES data sets embed a 
panel component, these panel respondents are removed from the 2006–2011 data in the analyses 
presented here and the appropriate (non-panel) weight variables are used. The data are thus 
analyzed as repeated cross-sections. 
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closer, somewhat closer, about the same as now, somewhat more distant, or much 
more distant?‛5 Thus, it purports to tap into respondents’ general or overall 
attitudes toward continental integration and not specific attitudes relating to trade, 
security, or other policy areas. 
Examined across time, the CES data paint a picture of a Canadian public 
interested in maintaining the status quo in Canada–US relations: a plurality or a 
slim majority of respondents (between 38.3 and 54.6 percent) say that ties between 
Canada and the United States should be ‚about the same as now‛ (see Figure 3.1). 
Still, substantial proportions of the Canadian population favour closer ties with the 
United States (between 24.3 and 37.5 percent) or alternatively more distant relations 
(between 15.8 and 27.1 percent). The results from the 2004 CES are notable for the 
increase in the proportions of Canadians expressing a preference for either closer 
ties or more distant ties to the United States and the decrease in the proportion of 
‚about the same as now‛ responses. These results point to more polarized attitudes 
toward the United States among the Canadian public in the early periods of the 
wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. 
The CES survey data contain the attitudinal variables of interest, but an 
operational measure of border proximity still needs to be constructed. I create this 
by geocoding both the survey data and Canada–US border crossings. The CES data 
sets variously retained different geographic indicators – census dissemination areas, 
federal electoral districts, and forward sortation areas (the first three characters of a 
Canadian postal code). These geographic indicators are used to append 
representative latitude–longitude coordinates created from Statistics Canada Postal 
Code Conversion Files dated September 2006 and March 2009 (Statistics Canada 
                                                                                             
5. In French, the wording of this survey item was: « Pensez-vous que les liens entre le 
Canada et les États-Unis devraient être beaucoup plus étroits, un peu plus étroits, ni plus ni 
moins étroits, un peu moins étroits, ou beaucoup moins étroits? ». 
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2009). Geocoding of Canada–US border crossings was performed manually using 
Google Earth (earth.google.com), while cross-referencing the locations of border 
crossings to be geocoded to the list of ports of entry to the United States published 
by US Customs and Border Protection (www.cbp.gov). I geocode a total of 145 land 
and sea crossings on the Canada–US border. With two sets of latitude–longitude 
coordinates in hand – one for the survey data, and one for the border crossings – 
geodetic distances can be calculated between each survey respondent and each 
Canada–US border crossing to find the closest border crossing. This serves as my 
operational measure of proximity (or distance) to the Canada–US border.6 Following 
existing research (Berezin and Díez Medrano 2008; Díez Medrano 2003; Kuhn 2011), 
I use a logarithmic transformation of my distance measure. This not only corrects 
the positive skew in the data, but using logged distance in kilometres also fits the 
theoretical expectation of a diminishing effect of proximity as (linear) distance to the 
border increases (Deutsch 1966, 98; cf. Deutsch 1954, 59). 
To test the hypotheses relating to political partisanship and ideology, border 
proximity, and the interactions between the political variables and border 
proximity, I analyse a series of regression models. Given the categorical nature of 
Canada–US ties survey item, ordinal logit models are appropriate (Fox 2008). This 
approach models the probabilities of a lower-ordered response as cumulative over 
the probabilities of higher-ordered responses. Positive coefficients thus imply closer 
ties and negative coefficients imply more distant ties. I recode the ‚somewhat more 
                                                                                             
6. The distances between the survey respondents (based on their census, electoral, or postal 
geography) and each Canada–U.S. border crossings are calculated using the Vincenty (1975) 
formula (as implemented by the SAS GEODIST function), which assumes the earth is an oblate 
spheroid (a sphere flatter at the poles than at the equator), giving more accurate results over long 
distances than either the Euclidean (‚flat-earth‛) or haversine formulae. It is also worth noting 
that research comparing straight-line and road driving distances has found a strong correlation 
between the two distance measures (r2 = 0.94), meaning they are practically interchangeable 
(Boscoe, Henry, and Zdeb 2012). 
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distant‛ and ‚much more distant‛ responses into a single category due to the small 
proportions registering in each, making for a four-part categorization: Much closer, 
somewhat closer, about the same as now, and somewhat/much more distant. The 
regression analysis is conducted using pooled data sets. The individual CES surveys 
represent independent samples (once the 2006, 2008, and 2011 panel respondents 
from the 2004–2006–2008–2011 panel are removed). They therefore represent 
‚independently pooled cross-sections‛ and controls for time are implemented by a 
set of dummy variables with 1997 as the reference category (Wooldridge 2009, 444–
445). 
Along with the independent variables of primary theoretical interest – 
political party identification, political ideology, and logged distance from the 
Canada–US border – the regression models include controls for demographic 
variables (sex, age, education, income, and province).7 The models additionally 
include variables measuring perceptions of the Canadian economy and attitudes 
toward international trade, factors that previous research has shown affect attitudes 
toward continental integration (Bennett 2004; Mendelsohn and Wolfe 2001; Wolfe 
and Mendelsohn 2005).  
3.6 Results and Discussion 
A number of important findings emerge from the regression models. 
Examining the effects of political party identification and political ideology, models 
3.1 and 3.2 reveal positive coefficients for the Conservative identification dummy 
variables and negative coefficients for the NDP and Bloc Québécois identification 
                                                                                             
7. The Conservative Party of Canada, as the product of the merger of the Canadian 
Alliance (previously the Reform Party) and Progressive Conservative parties in 2003, was 
evidently not on the ballot in the 1997 and 2000 federal elections. The Conservative dummy 
variables for these two election studies are created by coding Progressive Conservative, Reform 
(1997), and Canadian Alliance (2000) support as Conservative. 
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dummy variables; all are highly significant (see Table 3.1). The substantive 
interpretation of these results is that Conservative identifiers are more likely to 
support closer Canada–US ties than Liberal identifiers (the reference category); NDP 
and Bloc Québécois identifiers are less likely to support closer Canada–US ties. 
There are also positive and highly significant coefficients for the political ideology 
(left vs. right) variable, indicating that those who position themselves on the 
political right are more likely to support closer Canada–US ties; those who position 
themselves on the political left are less likely to support closer ties. These results 
confirm the expectations regarding the effects of party identification and ideology. 
Adding logged distance to the Canada–US border in model 3.2 fails to 
provide support for the hypothesis of a clear ‚border effect‛ on Canadian attitudes. 
Substantively, then, once one controls for the effects of demographics, attitudinal 
variables, and political party identification and ideology, proximity to (or distance 
from) the Canada–US border has no independent effect on attitudes toward 
continental integration. Nevertheless, it would be premature to conclude that 
proximity to the Canada–US border is theoretically and substantively unimportant. 
The specification of model 3.2 assumes that party identification and ideology and 
border proximity do not interact. Border proximity may still condition the effects of 
political party identification and ideology. In this formulation, party identification 
and ideology are the ‚focal‛ independent variables and border proximity is the 
‚moderator‛ variable (Jaccard 2001, 12–15). While adding party identification × 
border distance interaction terms in model 3.3 does not appreciably increase the 
value of the pseudo-R2 statistic, this is not of central importance: the most 
appropriate test of the significance of the interaction is an omnibus chi-square test 
(Jaccard 2001; Jaccard and Dodge 2004). This test statistics is highly significant. It 
thus holds that proximity to the Canada–US border moderates the effect of political 
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party identification. (Additional analyses revealed no interaction between ideology 
and border proximity.) Also, the interaction terms for the Conservative and Bloc 
Québécois dummy variables and logged distance to the Canada–US border are 
significant. These results thus indicate that the slopes for the effect of distance to the 
Canada–US border among Conservative and Bloc supporters are significantly 
different from the slope for Liberal supporters, which is captured in the lower-order 
term for logged distance to the Canada–US border (and at 0.01, is not significantly 
different from zero). The effect of distance to the border for Conservatives is 0.01 + 
(–0.10) = –0.09; for NDP supporters, it is 0.01 + 0.10) = 0.11. With model 3.3 
respecified with Conservative supporters as the reference category for party 
identification (see Table 3.2), the effect of logged distance to the Canada–US border 
(–0.09) is clearly significant among Conservatives.. Similarly, with model 3.3 
respecified with NDP supporters as the reference category for party identification 
(see Table 3.3), the effect of logged distance to the Canada–US border (0.11) is also 
significant among NDP identifiers. Respecifying model 3.3 with Bloc Québécois 
supporters as the reference category for party identification (see Table 3.4) confirms 
that distance to the Canada–US border no significant effect among this segment of 
the Canadian public. 
The main finding, then, is that the relationship between party identification 
and attitude toward North American continental integration is moderated by 
proximity to the Canada–US border. Still, it is difficult to fully understand the party 
identification × border distance interaction given only a set (or sets) of regression 
coefficients. Effect plots serve to clarify such patterns of relationships (Fox and 
Andersen 2006). The graphical depiction of the interaction effect in Figure 3.2 
demonstrates that proximity to the Canada–US border amplifies the effect of party 
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identification among Conservative and NDP supporters, but in opposite directions.8 
In close proximity to the Canada–US border, Conservative identifiers have a higher 
predicted probability of wanting closer ties with the United States than 
Conservative identifiers further away from the border. To illustrate, a Conservative 
identifier 5 kilometres from the border has a predicted probability of providing a 
‚much closer‛ or ‚somewhat closer‛ response (P(Y) ≥ 3) of 0.43; at the sample mean 
of 174 kilometres, the predicted probability is 0.36; at 500 kilometres from the 
border, the predicted probability is 0.34. (In the absence of an interaction between 
party identification and border proximity, the predicted probabilities would be the 
same at all distances from the Canada–US border, and the lines in the plot would be 
horizontal.) Conversely, NDP identifiers in close proximity to the Canada–US 
border have a lower predicted probability of wanting closer ties with the United 
States than NDP identifiers further away from the border. An NDP identifier 5 
kilometres from the border has a predicted probability of providing a ‚much closer‛ 
or ‚somewhat closer‛ response of 0.15; at the sample mean of 174 kilometres, the 
predicted probability is 0.20; at 500 kilometres from the border, the predicted 
probability is 0.22. The results for Bloc Québécois identifiers suggest a different 
(albeit less stark) pattern of moderation, in part owing to the few Bloc Québécois 
supporters near the border in the CES data (this will come as little surprise to those 
familiar with the electoral geography of Quebec, as Bloc Québécois support is 
concentrated in regions of Quebec further away from the border). The regression 
results indicate that a Bloc Québécois identifier at the sample mean of 174 
kilometres has a predicted probability providing a ‚much closer‛ or ‚somewhat 
closer‛ response of 0.19; at 500 kilometres from the border, the predicted probability 
is little different at 0.18. These moderated results contrast with the effect plot for 
                                                                                             
8. The cumulative probabilities plotted in Figure 3.2 and in the following discussion set 
categorical control variables at their reference values and continuous controls at their means. 
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Liberal Party identifiers, where the line is effectively horizontal, indicating that 
border proximity does not play a role in shaping their attitudes (as was previously 
inferred from the regression results in Table 3.1). A Liberal identifier 5 kilometres 
from the border has a predicted probability of providing a ‚much closer‛ or 
‚somewhat closer‛ response of 0.27; at the sample mean of 174 kilometres, the 
predicted probability is also 0.28; and at 500 kilometres from the border, the 
predicted probability is 0.29. These patterns of results serve as confirmation of the 
interactive version of the border proximity hypothesis. The expectations of 
intergroup contact theory and transactionalist theory are borne out among the part 
of the Canadian public who identifies with the Conservative Party; the expectations 
of intergroup competition theory are borne out most clearly among the part of the 
Canadian public who identify with the NDP. Both processes are seemingly at work 
simultaneously among different segments of the Canadian public. 
The interactive relationship between party identification and Canada–US 
border proximity can be further probed by rerunning the regression analysis with 
distance to the border centred at different values to see how the coefficients for 
party identification (and their confidence intervals) change (cf. Braumoeller 2004, 
815). (See Figures 3.3–3.5.) These analyses indicate that the effects of political party 
identification hold over most of the range of distances to the Canada–US border 
observed in the CES data. The effect of Conservative identification on attitude 
toward Canada–US ties holds for values of border distance less than or equal to 835 
kilometres, which constitutes the bulk of the CES sample data. Similarly, the effect 
of NDP identification on attitude toward Canada–US ties holds for values of border 
distance less than or equal to 1,062 kilometres. In sum, it is only at great distances 
from the Canada–US border (where the sample data are also relatively thin) that 
Conservative, NDP, and Liberal party identifiers are statistically indistinguishable 
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from one another. This suggests that in close proximity to the border, where border-
related issues such as cross-border trade and border security are most salient, one 
finds some of the sharpest partisan differences among the Canadian public.9 
There are significant (and negative) coefficients for the 2011 and 2008 year 
dummy variables, indicating that after controlling for demographic, attitudinal, and 
geographic variables, attitudes toward Canada–US ties leaned in the direction of 
more distant ties (compared with the reference year, 1997). Conversely, attitudes 
toward Canada–US ties leaned in the direction of closer ties in 2004. These models 
also reveal a regional dimension to Canadian attitudes toward Canada–US relations: 
There are significant (and positive) coefficients for the Newfoundland and Labrador 
and Quebec dummy variables. There is also a significant (and negative) coefficient 
for the British Columbia dummy variable. These results indicate that residents of 
these provinces are conversely more (or less) likely to favour closer Canada–US ties 
– even after controlling for demographics, attitudinal variables, political party 
identification, and ideology – than residents of Ontario (the reference group); they 
also suggest a regional dynamic to Canadian attitudes toward continental 
integration that is layered on top of proximity to the Canada–US border (cf. 
Cochrane and Perrella 2012). 
The results for Quebec can be accounted for by pointing to support among 
both Quebec separatists and moderate nationalists for pursuing trade liberalization, 
as occurred with both the FTA and NAFTA. In both cases, advancing continental 
integration was viewed as a means of either easing the costs of transitioning to 
eventual sovereign statehood, or, at a minimum, reducing the power of the 
                                                                                             
9. Additionally, analysis of the Bloc Québécois coefficient indicates that in close proximity 
to the border (20 kilometres or less), Bloc Québécois identifiers are not significantly different 
from Liberal Party identifiers, though this result is likely not robust on account of the few Bloc 
Québécois identifiers in close proximity to the border. 
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Canadian federal government. Thus, what prevails in Quebec, paradoxically, is 
‚free trade nationalism‛ (P. Martin 1995). The result for Newfoundland and 
Labrador may appear puzzling, but a possible explanation is the lingering effects of 
the large American military presence there during World War II (when it was still a 
Dominion of the British Empire and not yet part of Canada). Such a presence 
brought not only economic and employment gains during the war, and there were 
even suggestions at the time that Newfoundland ought to join the US, but also part 
of the social history of the so-called ‚friendly invasion‛ was large numbers of 
marriages between American sailors and Newfoundland women (Cardolis 1990; 
Neary 1986; Neary 1988). The legacy of this historical contact, then, may account for 
the more continentatlist views of Newfoundlanders and Labradorians than their 
distance to the US would otherwise predict. The results for British Columbia are 
arguably rooted in the trade and natural resource disputes between Canada and the 
US of recent decades (Groen 1994). The most notable of these is the protracted 
softwood lumber dispute, and of course, Canada’s softwood lumber industry is 
concentrated in British Columbia (Bernstein and Cashore 2001; Gagné 2003). 
Further, the existing level of economic integration between British Columbia and 
the US states of the Pacific Northwest remains below that of Ontario and Michigan 
(Brunet-Jailly 2006). Given the disparate impact of such trade disputes (and the 
export restrictions and import duties involved) on the British Columbian economy, 
and the absence of strong existing economic ties such as those linking Ontario to 
Michigan via the automotive industry, desire for yet closer ties with the US among 
British Columbians may be reduced as a consequence. 
Though such regional dynamics are robust, one should avoid overstating 
their size. Based on the results from model 3.3 (and thus holding distance to the 
Canada–US border at its mean), the difference in the cumulative log-odds of a 
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Newfoundland and Labrador resident and an Ontario resident is 0.23; the difference 
between a British Columbia resident and Ontario resident is –0.29. This means that 
the odds of a Newfoundland and Labrador resident providing a response in a 
higher category on the Canada–US ties survey item (e.g., ‚much closer ties‛ versus 
‚somewhat closer ties‛ or ‚somewhat closer ties‛ versus ‚about the same as now) 
are 1.26 times greater than for an Ontario resident (e 0.23 = 1.26); the odds of a British 
Columbia resident providing a response in a higher category are 0.75 times than for 
an Ontario resident (e –0.29 = 0.75). These differences are modest. By contrast, the 
absolute difference in the cumulative log-odds of a Conservative identifier and an 
NDP identifier is 0.88 (based on the results from model 3.3), meaning that the odds 
of a Conservative being in a higher category on the Canada–US ties item is 2.40 
times greater than for an NDP supporter (e 0.88 = 2.40). Thus, the effects of political 
factors are greater in magnitude than regionalism. 
While general impressions of the national economy have no discernible 
impact on attitudes toward Canada–US ties, more specific attitudes relating to the 
perceived job-creation benefits of international trade are, not surprisingly, 
associated with a greater likelihood of wanting closer Canada–US ties. Still, the 
effects of party identification and the interaction of party identification with 
proximity to the Canada–US border remain after controlling for these factors.10 
  
                                                                                             
10. One should also note that the key results from model 3.3 are robust to the inclusion of 
numerous other variables that potentially influence attitudes toward Canada–US ties, including 
interest in politics, national identity (identification with Canada), perceptions of the national 
economy, perceptions of one’s personal financial status, employment status, area unemployment 
rate, and area median family income. Including these variables in the model have no appreciable 
effects on the parameter estimates for party identification, logged distance to the Canada–US 
border, and the party identification × border distance interaction. See Table 3.5. 
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3.7 Conclusion 
I have endeavoured in this article to expand what we know about Canadian 
public opinion toward North American integration by offering a spatially informed 
approach to the analysis of policy attitudes. I have also endeavoured to contribute to 
the growing literatures on contextual effects in political behaviour and spatial 
approaches to social science. My analyses have shown that in the Canadian context, 
political party identification and ideology shape attitudes toward Canada–US ties. 
While proximity to the Canada–US border was not a significant predictor in its own 
right, border proximity is nevertheless substantively important in that it moderates 
the effects of political party identification – that is, border proximity serves to 
amplify its effect. To restate: the absence of a main effect of proximity is not 
evidence of its lack of importance. Rather, its ‚true‛ effect is only revealed when 
party supporters are examined separately (that is, interactively) – the effect of 
proximity is positive for Conservatives, negative for New Democrats, and largely 
absent for Liberals and Blocquistes. These findings reaffirm previous work that has 
found that ‚distance matters,‛ and that nuanced, contingent ‚border effects‛ are at 
work in mass public opinion (Berezin and Díez Medrano 2008; Branton et al. 2007). 
They further reaffirm the notion that the contexts and locations in which individuals 
find themselves have important implications for public opinion and political 
behaviour beyond individual-level characteristics (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995). 
While I have argued for an analytic approach that takes proximity and 
distance into explicit account and have drawn on variety of strands of social 
scientific research to motivate this argument, my conclusions should be tempered 
with a recognition of the limitations of the CES data. For example, Bennett (2004), 
Nevitte, Anderson, and Brym (2002) and Rankin (2004) have found that both 
national and pan-North American identity constructs influence support for NAFTA 
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in both the Canadian and American contexts. At the same time, consistently tracked 
measures of these identity concepts are lacking in the CES data.11 Also missing from 
the CES data are general-purpose measures of political information, including 
information about Canadian foreign policy, as opposed to specific knowledge about 
the election campaign, that might allow for an investigation of whether the party 
identification × border proximity interaction identified here varies as a function of 
political knowledge (that is, a possible three-way interaction). Omitted variable bias 
therefore remains a possibility. A proper adjudication between the explanatory 
powers of identity constructs, political information, partisanship, and geographic 
proximity – and their interactions – necessitates survey instruments measuring all of 
these. Future research should pursue these lines of inquiry. Professional and 
academic survey researchers alike should therefore consider recording and 
retaining sufficiently accurate geographic indicators to permit such analyses.  
                                                                                             
11. Employing the four-point scale capturing strength of identification with Canada from 
the 2011 CES as measure of national identity (albeit a coarse one) and using multiple imputation 
to complete the CES data failed to yield a significant effect (see Table 3.5). 
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Table 3.1: Canadian Attitudes toward Canada–US Ties (Ordinal Logit) 
 Model 3.1  Model 3.2  Model 3.3  
 b (SE)  b (SE)  b (SE)  
Intercept 4 -2.20 (0.07) *** -2.21 (0.07) *** -2.21 (0.07) *** 
Intercept 3 -0.93 (0.07) *** -0.94 (0.07) *** -0.94 (0.07) *** 
Intercept 2 1.44 (0.07) *** 1.43 (0.07) *** 1.43 (0.07) *** 
Year (ref = 1997)          
2011 -0.14 (0.06) ** -0.14 (0.06) ** -0.13 (0.06) * 
2008 -0.35 (0.06) *** -0.35 (0.06) *** -0.35 (0.06) *** 
2006 0.08 (0.06) 
 
0.08 (0.06) 
 
0.09 (0.06) 
 2004 0.28 (0.05) *** 0.28 (0.05) *** 0.28 (0.05) *** 
2000 0.07 (0.05) 
 
0.07 (0.05) 
 
0.08 (0.05) 
 Male 0.21 (0.03) *** 0.21 (0.03) *** 0.20 (0.03) *** 
ln Age (Years) 0.24 (0.08) ** 0.24 (0.08) ** 0.24 (0.08) ** 
Education (ref = High school or less)          
University -0.36 (0.04) *** -0.36 (0.04) *** -0.36 (0.04) *** 
College/CEGEP -0.10 (0.04) * -0.10 (0.04) * -0.10 (0.04) * 
Household income (ref = $60,00-$89,999)          
< $30,000 0.03 (0.06) 
 
0.03 (0.06) 
 
0.03 (0.06) 
 $30,00 to $59,999 0.00 (0.05) 
 
0.00 (0.05) 
 
0.00 (0.05) 
 $90,000+ 0.08 (0.05) 
 
0.08 (0.05) 
 
0.08 (0.05) 
 Province (ref = Ontario)       
Newfoundland and Labrador 0.15 (0.09) 
 
0.23 (0.11) * 0.23 (0.11) * 
Nova Scotia 0.11 (0.12) 
 
0.17 (0.12) 
 
0.16 (0.12) 
 Prince Edward Island 0.11 (0.09) 
 
0.16 (0.10) 
 
0.15 (0.10) 
 New Brunswick 0.09 (0.09) 
 
0.13 (0.10) 
 
0.13 (0.10) 
 Quebec 0.12 (0.05) * 0.12 (0.05) * 0.13 (0.05) ** 
Manitoba -0.03 (0.08) 
 
-0.02 (0.08) 
 
-0.03 (0.08) 
 Saskatchewan 0.03 (0.07) 
 
0.06 (0.08) 
 
0.05 (0.08) 
 Alberta -0.15 (0.06) ** -0.11 (0.07) 
 
-0.10 (0.07) 
 British Columbia -0.29 (0.05) *** -0.30 (0.06) *** -0.29 (0.06) *** 
Economy (ref = stay about the same)          
Getting better -0.01 (0.04) 
 
-0.01 (0.04) 
 
-0.01 (0.04) 
 Getting worse -0.07 (0.04) 
 
-0.07 (0.04) 
 
-0.07 (0.05) 
 International Trade Creates Jobs 0.68 (0.09) *** 0.68 (0.09) *** 0.68 (0.09) *** 
Party identification (ref = Liberal)          
Conservative 0.39 (0.05) *** 0.39 (0.05) *** 0.40 (0.05) *** 
NDP -0.48 (0.06) *** -0.47 (0.06) *** -0.48 (0.06) *** 
Bloc Québécois -0.44 (0.07) *** -0.44 (0.07) *** -0.45 (0.08) *** 
Other Party -0.44 (0.12) *** -0.44 (0.12) *** -0.44 (0.12) *** 
No Party 0.08 (0.05) 
 
0.08 (0.05) 
 
0.08 (0.05) 
 Ideology: Left vs. Right  0.54 (0.12) *** 0.54 (0.12) *** 0.53 (0.12) *** 
ln Distance to Canada–US Border (km) 
 
— 
 
-0.03 (0.02) 
 
0.01 (0.03) 
 ln Distance to Can–US Border × Conservative 
 
— 
  
— 
 
-0.10 (0.04) ** 
ln Distance to Can–US Border × NDP 
 
— 
  
— 
 
0.10 (0.05) * 
ln Distance to Can–US Border × BQ 
 
— 
  
— 
 
-0.09 (0.09) 
 ln Distance to Can–US Border × Other 
 
— 
  
— 
 
0.23 (0.13) 
 ln Distance to Can–US Border × No Party 
 
— 
  
— 
 
-0.09 (0.04) * 
      
N 17,081   17,081   17,081   
Model χ2 1,142.47 ***  1,144.86 ***  1,174.84 *** 
 Likelihood Ratio χ2 — 
 
 2.39 
 
 29.99 *** 
 Nagelkerke pseudo-R2 0.07 
 
 0.07 
 
 0.07 
  
* p ≤ 0.05, ** p ≤ 0.01, *** p ≤ 0.001 
Source: Canadian Election Studies, 1997–2011 
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Table 3.2: Canadian Attitudes toward Canada–US Ties (Ordinal Logit), Conservative 
as Reference Category 
 Model 3.3-C  
 b (SE)  
Intercept 4 -1.81 (0.07) *** 
Intercept 3 -0.54 (0.07) *** 
Intercept 2 1.83 (0.07) *** 
Year (ref = 1997)    
2011 -0.13 (0.06) * 
2008 -0.35 (0.06) *** 
2006 0.09 (0.06) 
 
2004 0.28 (0.05) *** 
2000 0.08 (0.05) 
 
Male 0.20 (0.03) *** 
ln Age (Years) 0.24 (0.08) ** 
Education (ref = High school or less)    
University -0.36 (0.04) *** 
College/CEGEP -0.10 (0.04) * 
Household income (ref = $60,00-$89,999)    
< $30,000 0.03 (0.06) 
 
$30,00 to $59,999 0.00 (0.05) 
 
$90,000+ 0.08 (0.05) 
 
Province (ref = Ontario)    
Newfoundland and Labrador 0.23 (0.11) * 
Nova Scotia 0.16 (0.12) 
 
Prince Edward Island 0.15 (0.10) 
 
New Brunswick 0.13 (0.10) 
 
Quebec 0.13 (0.05) ** 
Manitoba -0.03 (0.08) 
 
Saskatchewan 0.05 (0.08) 
 
Alberta -0.10 (0.07) 
 
British Columbia -0.29 (0.06) *** 
Economy (ref = stay about the same)    
Getting better -0.01 (0.04) 
 
Getting worse -0.07 (0.05) 
 
International Trade Creates Jobs 0.68 (0.09) *** 
Party identification (ref = Conservative)    
Liberal -0.40 (0.05) *** 
NDP -0.88 (0.06) *** 
Bloc Québécois -0.85 (0.08) *** 
Other Party -0.83 (0.12) *** 
No Party -0.32 (0.05) *** 
Ideology: Left vs. Right  0.53 (0.12) *** 
ln Distance to Canada–US Border (km) -0.09 (0.03) ** 
ln Distance to Can–US Border × Liberal 0.10 (0.04) ** 
ln Distance to Can–US Border × NDP 0.20 (0.05) *** 
ln Distance to Can–US Border × BQ 0.01 (0.08) 
 
ln Distance to Can–US Border × Other 0.33 (0.13) ** 
ln Distance to Can–US Border × No Party 0.01 (0.04) 
 
    
N 17,081   
Model χ2 1,174.84 *** 
 Likelihood Ratio χ2 29.99 *** 
 Nagelkerke pseudo-R2 0.07 
  
* p ≤ 0.05, ** p ≤ 0.01, *** p ≤ 0.001 
Source: Canadian Election Studies, 1997–2011 
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Table 3.3: Canadian Attitudes toward Canada–US Ties (Ordinal Logit), NDP 
as Reference Category 
 Model 3.3-NDP  
 b (SE)  
Intercept 4 -2.69 (0.08) *** 
Intercept 3 -1.42 (0.08) *** 
Intercept 2 0.95 (0.08) *** 
Year (ref = 1997)    
2011 -0.13 (0.06) * 
2008 -0.35 (0.06) *** 
2006 0.09 (0.06) 
 
2004 0.28 (0.05) *** 
2000 0.08 (0.05) 
 
Male 0.20 (0.03) *** 
ln Age (Years) 0.24 (0.08) ** 
Education (ref = High school or less)    
University -0.36 (0.04) *** 
College/CEGEP -0.10 (0.04) * 
Household income (ref = $60,00-$89,999)    
< $30,000 0.03 (0.06) 
 
$30,00 to $59,999 0.00 (0.05) 
 
$90,000+ 0.08 (0.05) 
 
Province (ref = Ontario)    
Newfoundland and Labrador 0.23 (0.11) * 
Nova Scotia 0.16 (0.12) 
 
Prince Edward Island 0.15 (0.10) 
 
New Brunswick 0.13 (0.10) 
 
Quebec 0.13 (0.05) ** 
Manitoba -0.03 (0.08) 
 
Saskatchewan 0.05 (0.08) 
 
Alberta -0.10 (0.07) 
 
British Columbia -0.29 (0.06) *** 
Economy (ref = stay about the same)    
Getting better -0.01 (0.04) 
 
Getting worse -0.07 (0.05) 
 
International Trade Creates Jobs 0.68 (0.09) *** 
Party identification (ref = NDP)    
Liberal 0.48 (0.06) *** 
Conservative 0.88 (0.06) *** 
Bloc Québécois 0.03 (0.09) 
 
Other Party 0.04 (0.13) 
 
No Party 0.56 (0.07) *** 
Ideology: Left vs. Right  0.53 (0.12) *** 
ln Distance to Canada–US Border (km) 0.11 (0.04) ** 
ln Distance to Can–US Border × Liberal -0.10 (0.05) * 
ln Distance to Can–US Border × Conservative -0.20 (0.05) *** 
ln Distance to Can–US Border × BQ -0.18 (0.09) * 
ln Distance to Can–US Border × Other 0.13 (0.13) 
 
ln Distance to Can–US Border × No Party -0.19 (0.05) *** 
    
N 17,081   
Model χ2 1,174.84 *** 
 Likelihood Ratio χ2 29.99 *** 
 Nagelkerke pseudo-R2 0.07 
  
* p ≤ 0.05, ** p ≤ 0.01, *** p ≤ 0.001 
Source: Canadian Election Studies, 1997–2011 
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Table 3.4: Canadian Attitudes toward Canada–US Ties (Ordinal Logit), Bloc Québécois 
as Reference Category 
 Model 3.3-BQ  
 b (SE)  
Intercept 4 -2.66 (0.10) *** 
Intercept 3 -1.39 (0.09) *** 
Intercept 2 0.98 (0.09) *** 
Year (ref = 1997)    
2011 -0.13 (0.06) * 
2008 -0.35 (0.06) *** 
2006 0.09 (0.06) 
 
2004 0.28 (0.05) *** 
2000 0.08 (0.05) 
 
Male 0.20 (0.03) *** 
ln Age (Years) 0.24 (0.08) ** 
Education (ref = High school or less)    
University -0.36 (0.04) *** 
College/CEGEP -0.10 (0.04) * 
Household income (ref = $60,00-$89,999)    
< $30,000 0.03 (0.06) 
 
$30,00 to $59,999 0.00 (0.05) 
 
$90,000+ 0.08 (0.05) 
 
Province (ref = Ontario)    
Newfoundland and Labrador 0.23 (0.11) * 
Nova Scotia 0.16 (0.12) 
 
Prince Edward Island 0.15 (0.10) 
 
New Brunswick 0.13 (0.10) 
 
Quebec 0.13 (0.05) ** 
Manitoba -0.03 (0.08) 
 
Saskatchewan 0.05 (0.08) 
 
Alberta -0.10 (0.07) 
 
British Columbia -0.29 (0.06) *** 
Economy (ref = stay about the same)    
Getting better -0.01 (0.04) 
 
Getting worse -0.07 (0.05) 
 
International Trade Creates Jobs 0.68 (0.09) *** 
Party identification (ref = Bloc Québécois)    
Liberal 0.45 (0.08) *** 
Conservative 0.85 (0.08) *** 
NDP -0.03 (0.09) 
 
Other Party 0.01 (0.13) 
 
No Party 0.53 (0.08) *** 
Ideology: Left vs. Right  0.53 (0.12) *** 
ln Distance to Canada–US Border (km) -0.07 (0.08) 
 
ln Distance to Can–US Border × Liberal 0.09 (0.09) 
 
ln Distance to Can–US Border × Conservative -0.01 (0.08) 
 
ln Distance to Can–US Border × NDP 0.18 (0.09) * 
ln Distance to Can–US Border × Other 0.32 (0.15) * 
ln Distance to Can–US Border × No Party -0.01 (0.09) 
 
    
N 17,081   
Model χ2 1,174.84 *** 
 Likelihood Ratio χ2 29.99 *** 
 Nagelkerke pseudo-R2 0.07 
  
* p ≤ 0.05, ** p ≤ 0.01, *** p ≤ 0.001 
Source: Canadian Election Studies, 1997–2011  
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Table 3.5: Canadian Attitudes toward Canada–US Ties (Ordinal Logit), Expanded Model 
 
 Model 3.4  
 b (SE)  
Intercept 4 -2.22 (0.08) *** 
Intercept 3 -0.94 (0.08) *** 
Intercept 2 1.43 (0.08) *** 
Year (ref = 1997)    
 2011 -0.19 (0.07) ** 
 2008 -0.41 (0.09) *** 
 2006 0.03 (0.08)  
 2004 0.23 (0.07) *** 
 2000 0.05 (0.07)  
Male 0.21 (0.03) *** 
ln Age (Years) 0.39 (0.09) *** 
Education (ref = High school or less)    
 University -0.35 (0.04) *** 
 College -0.11 (0.04) * 
Household income (ref = $60,00-$89,999)    
 < $30,000 0.05 (0.06)  
 $30,00-$59,999 0.02 (0.05)  
 $90,000+ 0.07 (0.05)  
Employment status (ref = Employed)    
 Unemployed 0.02 (0.10)  
 Not in Labour Force -0.08 (0.04) * 
Province (ref = Ontario)    
 Newfoundland and Labrador 0.30 (0.15) * 
 Nova Scotia 0.23 (0.15)  
 Prince Edward Island 0.26 (0.12) * 
 New Brunswick 0.24 (0.12) * 
 Quebec 0.23 (0.08) ** 
 Manitoba 0.06 (0.09)  
 Saskatchewan 0.13 (0.09)  
 Alberta -0.12 (0.08)  
 British Columbia -0.21 (0.07) ** 
Interest in Politics -0.24 (0.07) *** 
International Trade Creates Jobs 0.68 (0.09) *** 
Identify with Canada 0.01 (0.09)  
Economy (ref = stay about the same)    
 Getting Better -0.02 (0.04)  
 Getting Worse -0.06 (0.05)  
Personal Financial Status (ref = stay about the same)    
 Getting Better 0.11 (0.04) * 
 Getting Worse -0.04 (0.04)  
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Table 3.5: Canadian Attitudes toward Canada–US Ties (Ordinal Logit), Expanded Model, 
cont’d. 
 Model 2.1.4  
 b (SE)  
Party identification (ref = Liberal)    
 Conservative 0.40 (0.05) *** 
 NDP -0.47 (0.06) *** 
 Bloc Québécois -0.44 (0.08) *** 
 Other Party -0.43 (0.12) *** 
 No Party 0.05 (0.05)  
Ideology: Left vs. Right 0.52 (0.11) *** 
ln Distance to Canada–US Border (km) 0.01 (0.03)  
ln Distance to Can.-US Border × Conservative -0.10 (0.04) ** 
ln Distance to Can.-US Border × NDP 0.10 (0.05) * 
ln Distance to Can.-US Border × BQ -0.10 (0.09)  
ln Distance to Can.-US Border × Other 0.23 (0.13)  
ln Distance to Can.-US Border × No Party -0.09 (0.04) * 
Area Unemployment Rate (%) 0.009 (0.014)  
Area Median Family Income ($000) 0.009 (0.005) * 
    
N 17,081   
Model χ2 1,218,15 ***  
Likelihood Ratio χ2 43.31 ***  
Nagelkerke pseudo-R2 0.08   
 
* p ≤ 0.05, ** p ≤ 0.01, *** p ≤ 0.001 
Sources: Canadian Election Studies, 1997–2011; Statistics Canada, CANSIM II table 
282-0135 (unemployment rate); Statistics Canada, CANSIM II table 202-0411 
(median family income). 
Notes: Ordinal logistic regression estimates with clustered standard errors (applied 
to survey respondents clustered by year and province) in parentheses. Continuous 
independent variables (age, left vs. right, distance to the Canada–US border, interest 
in politics, views of international trade, identification with Canada, area 
unemployment rate and area median family income) are mean-centred. Missing 
data are multiply imputed 10 times using all available data. 
  
169 
  
Figure 3.1: Attitudes Toward Canada–US Ties, CES, 1997–2011 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2: Effect Plot, Party Identification and Canada–US Border Proximity 
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Figure 3.3: Coefficient Plot, Effect of Conservative Party Identification 
 
 
 
Figure 3.4: Coefficient Plot, Effect of New Democratic Party Identification 
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Figure 3.5: Coefficient Plot, Effect of Bloc Québécois Identification 
 
Note: Figures 3.3–3.5 show the party coefficients (and 95% confidence intervals) 
from model 3.3 with distance to the Canada–US border centred at different values. 
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3.8 Appendix 3A: Data Coding 
Canada–US Ties: ‚Do you think Canada's ties with the United States should be 
much closer (4), somewhat closer (3), about the same as now (2), somewhat more 
distant (1), or much more distant (1)?‛ 
Year: Dummy variables using indicator coding for election years 2000, 2004, 2006, 
2008 and 2011 (1997 is the reference category). 
Male: Male (1), female (0). 
ln Age (Years): Age in years; logged (loge), rescaled 0 to 1 and mean-centred. 
Education: Dummy variables using indicator coding for University and 
College/CEGEP (meaning community college and Québec junior college; high 
school or less is the reference category). 
Employment: ‚Are you currently self-employed, working for pay, retired, 
unemployed or looking for work, a student, caring for a family, or something else?‛ 
Dummy variables using indicator coding for Unemployed/Looking for Work and 
Not in Labour Force (Retired, Student, Caring for a Family, Disabled) (Employed 
(Self-Employed, Working for Pay) is the reference category). 
HH Income: Dummy variables using indicator coding for household income less 
than $30,000, $30,000 to $59,999, and $90,000+ ($60,000 to $89,999 is the reference 
category). 
Province: Dummy variables using indicator coding for province of residence 
(Ontario is the reference category). 
Interest in Politics: ‚How interested are you in politics GENERALLY? Use a scale 
from 0 to 10, where zero means no interest at all, and ten means a great deal of 
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interest.‛ No Interest at All (0), Great Deal of Interest (10); rescaled 0 to 1 and mean 
centred. 
International Trade Creates Jobs: ‚International trade creates more jobs in Canada 
than it destroys.‛ Strongly Agree (5), Agree, (4), Not Sure (3), Disagree (2), Strongly 
Disagree (1); rescaled 0 to 1 and mean centred. 
Identify with Canada: ‚How much do you identify with each of the following? 
Canada.‛ A Great Deal (4), Quite a Lot (3), Not Very Much (2), None at All (1); 
rescaled 0 to 1 and mean centred. 
Economy Getting Better/Worse: ‚Over the past year, has Canada’s economy gotten 
better, gotten worse, or stayed about the same?‛ Dummy variables using indicator 
coding for Getting Better and Getting Worse (Stayed about the Same is the reference 
category). 
Personal Financial Situation Getting Better/Worse: ‚Over the past year, has your 
financial situation gotten better, gotten worse, or stayed about the same?‛ Dummy 
variables using indicator coding for Getting Better and Getting Worse (Stayed about 
the Same is the reference category). 
Party: ‚In federal politics, do you usually think of yourself as a Liberal, 
Conservative, NDP, *in Québec: Bloc Québécois+, Green Party, or none of these?‛ *If 
‚none of these‛:+ ‚Do you generally think of yourself as being a little closer to one of 
the federal parties than to the others?‛ *If yes:+ ‚Which party is that?‛ Dummy 
variables using indicator coding for Conservative, NDP, Bloc Québécois, Other 
Party and No Party (Liberal is the reference category). 
Left vs. Right: ‚In politics people sometimes talk of left and right. Where would you 
place yourself?‛ Left (0), Right (10), rescaled 0 to 1 and mean centred. 
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ln Distance Canada–US Border (km): Distance to the Canada–US border in 
kilometres; logged (loge) and mean centred. 
Area Unemployment rate (%): Three-month moving average unadjusted 
unemployment rate at the Census Metropolitan Area (CMA) (where available) or 
province level for the month of the election; mean centred. Source: Statistics Canada, 
CANSIM II table 282-0135. 
Area Median Family Income ($000): Median total income for all family types at the 
Census Metropolitan Area (CMA) (where available) or province level in constant 
2011 dollars (thousands) for the year of the election; mean centred. Source: Statistics 
Canada, CANSIM II table 202-0411. 
  
175 
  
3.9 Appendix 3B: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Mean Min Max SD N Missing 
Canada-US Ties: Much Closer 0.11 0 1 0.31 16,556 525 
Canada-US Ties: Somewhat Closer 0.19 0 1 0.39 16,556 525 
Canada-US Ties: Same as Now 0.50 0 1 0.50 16,556 525 
Canada-US Ties: Much/Somewhat More Distant 0.20 0 1 0.40 16,556 525 
Year: 2011 0.15 0 1 0.36 17,081 0 
Year: 2008 0.14 0 1 0.35 17,081 0 
Year: 2006 0.12 0 1 0.32 17,081 0 
Year: 2004 0.25 0 1 0.43 17,081 0 
Year: 2000 0.16 0 1 0.37 17,081 0 
Year: 1997 0.18 0 1 0.38 17,081 0 
Male 0.48 0 1 0.50 17,081 0 
Age (years) 47.02 18 102 16.42 16,913 168 
ln Age (years) 3.78 2.89 4.62 0.38 16,913 168 
Education: University 0.28 0 1 0.45 16,940 141 
Education: College 0.19 0 1 0.39 16,940 141 
Education: High school or less 0.53 0 1 0.50 16,940 141 
Income: < $30,000 0.20 0 1 0.40 14,707 2,374 
Income: $30,000 to <$60,000 0.32 0 1 0.46 14,707 2,374 
Income: $60,000 to <$90,000 0.23 0 1 0.42 14,707 2,374 
Income: $90,000+ 0.25 0 1 0.43 14,707 2,374 
Employed 0.62 0 1 0.48 16,928 153 
Unemployed 0.04 0 1 0.20 16,928 153 
Not in labour force 0.34 0 1 0.47 16,928 153 
Province: Newfoundland and Labrador 0.02 0 1 0.14 17,081 0 
Province: Nova Scotia 0.01 0 1 0.10 17,081 0 
Province: Prince Edward Island 0.03 0 1 0.18 17,081 0 
Province: New Brunswick 0.03 0 1 0.16 17,081 0 
Province: Quebec 0.26 0 1 0.43 17,081 0 
Province: Ontario 0.36 0 1 0.48 17,081 0 
Province: Manitoba 0.04 0 1 0.20 17,081 0 
Province: Saskatchewan 0.04 0 1 0.19 17,081 0 
Province: Alberta 0.08 0 1 0.28 17,081 0 
Province: British Columbia 0.13 0 1 0.33 17,081 0 
Interest in politics 5.67 0 10 2.77 16,945 136 
International trade creates jobs 3.29 1 5 1.05 7,156 9,925 
Identify with Canada 3.21 1 4 0.76 1,046 16,035 
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Mean Min Max SD N Missing 
Economy: Getting better 0.31 0 1 0.46 16,477 604 
Economy: Same 0.44 0 1 0.49 16,477 604 
Economy: Getting worse 0.24 0 1 0.42 16,477 604 
Personal financial situation: Getting better 0.21 0 1 0.41 16,925 156 
Personal financial situation: Same 0.55 0 1 0.49 16,925 156 
Personal financial situation: Getting worse 0.23 0 1 0.42 16,925 156 
Party: Liberal 0.31 0 1 0.46 14,795 2,286 
Party: Conservative 0.26 0 1 0.44 14,795 2,286 
Party: NDP 0.11 0 1 0.32 14,795 2,286 
Party: Bloc Québécois 0.08 0 1 0.27 14,795 2,286 
Party: Other party 0.02 0 1 0.15 14,795 2,286 
Party: No party 0.21 0 1 0.40 14,795 2,286 
Left vs. right 5.21 0 10 1.89 4,803 12,278 
Distance to Canada–US border (km) 174.01 0.33 2,379.61 204.38 16,840 241 
ln Distance to Canada–US border (km) 4.66 -1.10 7.77 1.01 16,840 241 
Area unemployment rate (%) 7.34 3.20 20.80 2.35 17,081 0 
Area median family income ($000) 55.77 34.00 82.40 7.97 17,081 0 
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4. Politics, Proximity and the Pipeline: 
Mapping Public Attitudes toward Keystone XL1 
 
4.1 Abstract 
The politics of oil pipelines have become increasingly salient in American 
politics in recent years. In particular, debates about economic benefits, energy 
security and environmental impact have been provoked by the proposed Keystone 
XL pipeline expansion intended to take bitumen from northern Alberta in Canada to 
refineries on the Gulf Coast in Texas. Drawing on data from recent surveys 
conducted by the Pew Research Center, this article asks a series of questions. What 
levels of support for (and opposition to) the pipeline exist among the American 
public? What are the roles of political factors (such as party identification and 
ideology), economic attitudes, environmental attitudes and proximity to the 
proposed pipeline route in shaping attitudes toward the pipeline? And how do 
political factors and proximity to the pipeline interact? We find that partisanship 
and ideology drive attitudes toward the Keystone XL pipeline, and that the effect of 
ideology is attenuated by proximity to the proposed route. The policy implications 
of these findings for energy infrastructure siting controversies are discussed. 
4.2 Introduction 
The United States is covered in an extensive and complex network of energy 
pipeline infrastructure. The US Department of Transportation (2014) estimates there 
currently exists over 4 million kilometres of pipelines crisscrossing the country, or 
enough to circle the world 100 times. While existing energy pipelines usually go 
without notice, a series of high-profile events – including accidents, spills, and 
diplomatic lobbying efforts by the Canadian government – have garnered national 
                                                                                             
1. Originally published as Gravelle and Lachapelle (2015). 
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and international headlines, making the proposed Keystone XL pipeline a lightning 
rod for controversy. On the one hand, proponents with an economic stake in 
pipeline projects argue these expanded networks are not only safe, but also essential 
for creating new jobs, ensuring economic growth and increasing North American 
energy security. On the other hand, a growing chorus of environmentalists joined 
by an interested public staunchly oppose these new projects, questioning the claims 
of proponents of the economic benefits while highlighting environmental costs 
related to sensitive environmental areas and global climate change. 
At present, the proposal for the northern section of the pipeline crossing the 
Canada–US border, which was already modified to re-route the pipeline away from 
the environmentally sensitive Sand Hills area of Nebraska, is still awaiting final 
review from the State Department. Faced with opposition from many Democrats 
and environmental groups (on one side) and concerted diplomatic efforts by the 
Canadian government, pressure to approve the pipeline from Republicans along 
with a contingent of Democrats in Congress (on the other side), the Obama 
administration has repeatedly deferred its decision on issuing the Presidential 
permit required for the pipeline to cross into the US from Canada. With several 
Democrat-held seats in the Senate from Keystone-friendly states vulnerable in the 
2014 mid-term elections, the Obama administration again deferred its final decision 
until after the elections. The subsequent return of Republican control of Congress 
has since ushered in a new commitment from the Republican leadership to press 
forward with Keystone XL in spite of threats from President Obama to veto any 
such attempt. These dynamics speak clearly to the importance of mass public 
opinion and policy attitudes in American electoral politics, as well as in Presidential 
decision-making on contested issues. Indeed, the siting of infrastructure, including 
energy generation and distribution infrastructure, but also other projects such dams 
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and airports, have become a major point of contestation between state agents and 
civil society in contemporary politics (D. P. Aldrich 2008). 
 But what are the factors that shape Americans’ attitudes toward Keystone 
XL? Given that this controversy is relatively new, few studies specifically examine 
the politics of oil pipelines. What research does exist only implicitly acknowledges 
the role of public opinion in shaping the political landscape. For instance, in an 
analysis of the politics around five pipeline proposals, Hoberg (2013) argues that 
government actors are sensitive to public opposition to pipelines without presenting 
survey data on the strength or extent of such opposition. Other studies providing a 
more detailed account of mass attitudes toward particular pipeline proposals still 
fall short of identifying the factors shaping these opinions (e.g., Nanos 2013). 
Moreover, this work tends to ignore the role of geographic context in the formation 
of opinions. To the extent that public opinion helps shape the preferences of key 
government actors on controversial issues, and to the extent that attitudes may be 
formed differently in different places, attention to location in a more thorough 
analysis of public attitudes can shed light on the politics of the Keystone XL pipeline 
and other energy siting decisions more generally.  
In this article, we seek to explain patterns of support and opposition to the 
Keystone XL pipeline. To our knowledge, this is the first study that focuses on the 
politics of this specific pipeline proposal. As evidenced by the attention devoted to 
Keystone XL by the news media, this issue is highly salient. Moreover, pressure to 
find new ways of accessing markets for energy surpluses in North America is likely 
to remain an issue for as long as demand for fossil fuels exists. In this context, we set 
out to answer the following questions. To what extent are socio-political variables 
relevant in shaping public attitudes toward the construction of Keystone XL? To 
what extent does proximity to the proposed pipeline route drive support for the 
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pipeline? Which factors are most important, and how might proximity and politics 
interact? 
To answer these questions, we draw on the large literature that exists on the 
formation of mass public attitudes toward policy issues. Scholars interested in 
various types of policy attitudes have long gravitated toward a common set of 
predictors, including partisan and ideological predispositions, economic values, and 
in the case of energy and the environment, proximity to pollution or technology 
source (Smith 2002; Michaud, Carlisle and Smith 2008; Aldrich 2013). Our study 
deals with the effects of these and other factors on attitudes toward the Keystone XL 
pipeline. We are interested in the relative magnitude of these different effects, but 
also how they interact. For instance, we are interested in the role of ideological 
predispositions in shaping attitudes toward pipelines, but unlike previous studies, 
go further and seek to explore whether the impact of ideology is conditioned by 
proximity to a particular site. The empirical bases for our study are recent surveys 
conducted by the Pew Research Center seeking to gauge American public opinion 
on the Keystone XL pipeline. 
 We begin with an outline of the political context surrounding Keystone XL. 
We then review previous research from the political behaviour and environmental 
attitudes literatures that bear on the topic before outlining our theoretical 
expectations. Next, we describe our data and methods before discussing our key 
findings. We conclude by reflecting on the implications of our findings for long-
standing debates on public opinion on energy and environmental issues in the US 
and elsewhere (van der Horst 2007; Lachapelle, Borick, and Rabe 2012). The 
implications of these findings for energy infrastructure siting controversies are also 
discussed. 
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4.3 The Politics of Pipelines in the United States 
At present, six major crude oil pipeline projects are now being considered to 
transport oil from Alberta’s oil sands to various ports and refineries across North 
America. These end points include refineries on the US Gulf Coast and ports in the 
province of British Columbia. Of the six major crude oil pipeline projects that have 
been proposed, the TransCanada Keystone XL pipeline intended to ship an 
additional 830,000 barrels of Alberta bitumen per day to refineries on the Gulf Coast 
is likely the most controversial and well-known. Originally proposed in 2008, the 
Keystone XL proposal became an important electoral issue in 2012. Supported by a 
large portion of Republicans in Congress, arguments in favour of the proposal 
centre on job creation (Huber and Bowe 2014). These arguments have been 
buttressed by those who have argued that Keystone XL is good policy from an 
energy security perspective: as a stable democracy and US ally, importing Canadian 
oil is preferable to relying on imports from less stable and less friendly governments 
in Venezuela and the Persian Gulf. On the other hand, most – though not all – 
Democrats oppose the proposal, aligning themselves with a number of 
environmental groups who have mobilized around the issue – including the No Tar 
Sands Oil Coalition, Greenpeace, Sierra Club, National Wildlife Federation, and 
Friends of the Earth – who argue that Keystone XL would increase greenhouse gas 
emissions while placing local communities and aquifers at risk of contamination 
from pipeline spills (Parfomak et al. 2013). 
This issue framing is key. Like public policy, policy issues can either be 
framed as relevant for a particular group or location, or widely diffused (Hoberg 
2013). Depending on the distribution and concentration of costs and benefits, issues 
will take on different political and geographic characteristics. Political issues that 
promise geographically concentrated benefits to the local workforce, for instance, 
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will have different effects than issues that impose diffuse risks to a broader 
community.  
4.4 Theory and Hypotheses 
  Given this political context, what factors explain attitudes toward Keystone 
XL at the level of the mass public? Scholarship in political psychology and public 
opinion has repeatedly found that the average voter has little interest in or 
information about politics (Converse 1964; Delli Carpini and Keeter 1993). Given the 
cost of acquiring and processing new information, citizens will remain rationally 
uninformed on issues that fail to affect them directly (Downs 1957). For non-pocket 
book issues, most citizens are ‘satisficers’ or ‘cognitive misers’ who lack the 
incentives to form sophisticated opinions on the issues of the day, relying instead on 
a range of heuristic devices and mental shortcuts to process new information, form 
attitudes, and make decisions (Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 1991; Popkin 1991). 
 Partisan cues provide one type of heuristic allowing individuals to form 
policy attitudes with minimal cognitive effort and while remaining relatively 
uninformed. This idea dates back to the seminal work of Campbell and colleagues 
(1960) who argued that party identification could act as a perceptual filter through 
which individuals perceive issues. According to this view, people will adopt 
positions on issues that they see as being more favourable to their partisan 
orientation. This idea has inspired decades of public opinion research, which has 
provided substantial evidence that partisan and ideological attachments help shape 
voting intentions as well as opinions on a range of policy issues (Jacoby 1991; Bartels 
2002). As Zaller has shown, mass public opinion across a range of policy issues 
tends to follow elite opinion. Further, there is ‚no particular need for members of 
the general public to know the technical details of the expert debate *<+ or to know 
183 
  
why a given set of policies is conservative or liberal, in order to take positions that 
are consistent with their ideological predispositions; they need only be able to 
recognize which elites share their predispositions and take cues from them‛ (Zaller 
1992, 328). Evidence of partisan cleavages has been found in various policy areas, 
including the issues of offshore oil drilling and nuclear power, with Republicans 
more likely to be in favour than Democrats (E. R. A. N. Smith 2002). 
This type of partisan sorting is particularly evident in the area of climate 
change. Indeed, on this issue, numerous studies document increasingly divergent 
elite discourses on whether average global temperatures are increasing, and a 
corresponding polarization in perceptions of climate change among partisans 
(Dunlap and McCright 2008; McCright and Dunlap 2011a; Borick and Rabe 2010). 
To the extent that different parties have taken a clear stand on the building of new 
energy pipelines we might expect individuals to adopt the same position as that of 
the political party with which they identify. We may thus express our first 
hypothesis as follows. 
H1: Self-identified Republicans are more likely than self-identified 
Democrats to support the Keystone XL pipeline.  
Another heuristic device commonly known to affect decision-making, the 
formation of attitudes and information processing more generally is ideology. As is 
the case with partisanship, deeply held value orientations can serve as a cognitive 
shortcut, helping to form opinions in the absence of detailed knowledge or 
deliberation. Such effects have been found in the processing of new information, as 
well as in the formation of attitudes toward new technologies (Ho, Brossard, and 
Scheufele 2008; Lachapelle, Montpetit, and Gauvin 2014). Faced with a new issue, 
various mechanisms may trigger values to play such a role. For instance, following 
the system-justification mechanism known to be at work among political 
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conservatives (Jost, Nosek, and Gosling 2008; McCright and Dunlap 2011b), we 
might expect more right-leaning and conservative members of the public to support 
pipelines because they represent individual rights, free enterprise, and the promise 
of jobs, or things conservatives value most. Similarly, liberal values for collective 
goods (such as clean air and water) and equality might make them less likely to 
support pipeline projects that may concentrate benefits in the hands of large 
corporations while imposing the bulk of risks on local communities and the 
environment (E. R. A. N. Smith 2002). 
In addition, individuals may rationally form opinions via identity-protective 
cognition. That is to say, citizens with strong ideological views may be inclined to 
align their policy preferences with like-minded others in order to avoid dissonance 
and protect their status in social groups (Jost et al. 2003; Kahan et al. 2007; Kahan, 
Jenkins-Smith, and Braman 2011). Both processes may lead individuals to seek a 
position that is consistent with their deep beliefs about who they are and what they 
value. Such motivated reasoning has been found to reinforce deep political 
commitments and increase attitude polarization (Taber and Lodge 2006). To the 
extent that liberal and conservative predispositions toward politics differ, we should 
expect to see differences in attitudes toward new oil pipelines among members 
holding these value orientations.2 For example, Franchino (2014) finds anti-nuclear 
energy attitudes are associated with the political left, and pro-nuclear attitudes 
associated with the political right in Europe. Our second hypothesis is therefore: 
H2: Conservative members of the public are more likely to support the 
Keystone XL pipeline than those with liberal views.  
                                                                                             
2. Though we hypothesize that conservatives are more likely to favour the Keystone XL 
pipeline, it stands to reason that libertarians may opposite it on account of the infringement of 
landowner rights implied by the use of eminent domain laws to push forward pipeline 
construction. The data from the Pew Research Center, however, capture only party identification 
and liberal-conservative ideology, and not adherence to libertarianism as such. 
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In addition to the effects of socio-political factors on support for the pipeline, 
there are good reasons to expect public opinion toward Keystone XL to exhibit 
spatial dynamics. Indeed, spatial proximity serves as a useful proxy for a range of 
social and political processes (cf. Eagles 2002). These include differences in media 
coverage, perceptions of localized environmental risks and perceptions of economic 
benefits. Conceptualized as such, spatial dynamics have been observed across a 
range of policy attitudes, including immigration attitudes in the US (Branton et al. 
2007) and attitudes toward continental integration in Europe (Berezin and Díez 
Medrano 2008; Kuhn 2011) and in North America (Gravelle 2014a).  
 Though detailed mass media research relating specifically to the Keystone 
XL case does not as yet exist, research has repeatedly demonstrated the relationship 
between spatial proximity to events and increased news coverage (S. R. Martin 1988; 
Bendix and Liebler 2010; Molotch and Lester 1975). This literature has found that 
media organizations have economic incentives to emphasize local events and issues 
in their coverage. Events that are proximate receive more attention than those 
further away − a consequence of the geographically defined nature of the demand 
for news (Branton and Dunaway 2009a). The volume of media coverage in turn 
shapes the informational context of local residents, increasing the level of awareness 
and salience of particular issues (Dunaway, Branton, and Abrajano 2010). In light of 
this, it is reasonable to expect that proximity to the Keystone XL pipeline route 
serves to increase local media coverage of the pipeline, thereby increasing 
awareness of both the environmental risks posed by and economic benefits resulting 
from the pipeline. 
It is simple to surmise that proximity to energy sites ought to heighten 
perceptions of risk to the local environment and increase opposition. As 
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Ansolabehere and Konisky have argued, the American public devotes attention to 
energy issues ‚when the issues hit home, when they become localized and 
personalized. *<+ Americans are pragmatic and think about local, immediate 
consequences‛ (2014, 15). Proximity to energy infrastructure increases the likelihood 
of having contact with its negative aspects (such as sights or sounds) or its health or 
environmental hazards (D. P. Aldrich 2013). Indeed, some literature points to so-
called NIMBY (not-in-my-backyard) effects where proximity to particular sites 
reduces support (Kraft and Clary 1991) or raises the level of concern for 
environmental contamination (Weiner, MacKinnon, and Greenberg 2013). On 
balance, however, the literature on public opinion and controversial siting more 
frequently finds that public opinion is more nuanced (Ansolabehere and Konisky 
2009), or even that there is an ‚inverse NIMBY‛ dynamic at work (Greenberg 2009; 
E. R. A. N. Smith 2002; Michaud, Carlisle, and Smith 2008; D. P. Aldrich 2013; 
Warren et al. 2005). Such mixed evidence suggests that the NIMBY phenomenon is 
more complex than is sometimes assumed (van der Horst 2007). 
 When theorizing the role of proximity in energy siting controversies, the 
geographic distribution of costs and benefits is a crucial element to consider.3 These 
benefits and costs can either be broad and diffuse or local and concentrated. We 
propose that the most plausible account of NIMBY reactions is the result of local 
populations engaging in a weighing of economic benefits and environmental risks. 
                                                                                             
3.  These perceived benefits and costs might in turn be affected by levels of media and 
campaign spending by both project proponents and opponents in communities living near the 
proposed pipeline route (and also at the national level). Preliminary investigations, however, 
have shown that such data are limited. For instance, data from the Center for Responsive Politics 
provides data on spending by different lobbies at the state level, which is at a coarser spatial 
scale than spatially-referenced public opinion data such as ours. The data are also incomplete, 
documenting spending levels by one type of proponent – the fossil fuel lobby – while 
comparable data for pipeline opponents, including environmental groups, are not available. 
Future research in this area might develop more complete and refined measures for spending at 
the local and national levels by major proponents and project opponents. 
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Depending on the distribution of benefits and risks, local populations may come to 
support or oppose a new energy project at the proposal phase. 
In the case of the Keystone XL pipeline proposal, nearly all of the potential 
benefits accrue at the local community level, where the pipeline is expected to 
generate an estimated 2,500 to 4,650 construction jobs (Skinner and Sweeney 2012). 
Since the risk of pipeline spills is likely to affect a relatively small number of people 
who live unusually close to the proposed route, or who are acutely familiar with the 
local landscape and its vulnerabilities, such risks are unlikely to fundamentally alter 
the balance of opinion at the community level. Conversely, the opposite is true at 
the national level, where the proposed pipeline offers few economic benefits for the 
nation as a whole. Indeed, the Keystone XL energy pipeline is primarily intended to 
move Canadian oil sands bitumen closer to export markets offshore, where it can 
fetch a higher price. Meanwhile, this new infrastructure will allow the continued 
expansion of oil sands production, thereby contributing to an increase in 
greenhouse gas emissions and global climate change. This latter risk has made 
Keystone XL a salient issue in national politics, as environmental groups have 
largely framed the Keystone XL pipeline as a symbol of America’s inability to act on 
the problem of global climate change. On balance, the Keystone XL pipeline 
proposal thus presents economic benefits that are locally concentrated and 
environmental risks that are largely diffuse. We therefore expect to find an inverse 
NIMBY dynamic where support for the Keystone XL energy pipeline is higher 
among residents living closer to the proposed route, relative to Americans living 
further away. Our third hypothesis is thus: 
H3: As proximity to the proposed route of the Keystone XL pipeline 
increases, support for the pipeline should also increase. 
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In hypothesizing an effect of proximity, care ought to be taken to, first, 
distinguish the effect of proximity from differences in regional (or state-level) 
political context, and second, to parameterize the effect of proximity in such a way 
that acknowledges such an effect is likely to be highly localized and non-linear. 
With respect to the first consideration, we include regional (Census region) controls 
as part of the regression modelling in order to estimate the effect of spatial 
proximity to the pipeline net of regional context. With respect to the second 
consideration, we take explicit account of the ‚distance decay function‛ (Taylor 
1971; Gimpel et al. 2008) in measuring distance to the Keystone XL pipeline. Our 
expectation is in line with Smith’s conjecture that proximity ‚may make a difference, 
but perhaps only when the proposed development is – as the NIMBY acronym 
implies – literally in one’s backyard‛ (2002, 161). Simply put, our expectation is that 
there should be a diminishing effect as distance increases: the effect of moving from 
10 kilometres to 20 is not the same as moving from 100 to 110; 10 to 20 implies a 
larger increase in distance. Further, this expectation is supported by recent research 
that has repeatedly found a logarithmic relationship – not a linear one – between 
distance and policy attitudes in a variety of domains (Berezin and Díez Medrano 
2008; Branton et al. 2007; Gravelle 2014a). We therefore follow this practice and use 
logged distance to the pipeline in kilometres as our distance measure. We further 
deem this approach preferable to alternative measures of proximity such as a 
categorical indicator of residing within specific distance to a site in question, or 
residing within a county containing a site (Michaud, Carlisle, and Smith 2008; 
Greenberg 2009; Weiner, MacKinnon, and Greenberg 2013; E. R. A. N. Smith 2002). 
While such measures are simple to implement, the distance limits or geographic 
units (such as counties) chosen to distinguish ‚close‛ from ‚far‛ are often arbitrary. 
They also imply a significant loss of information in reducing spatial distance, which 
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is by definition continuous, to a far coarser categorical measure. The sum of these 
considerations points to operationalizing distance as a continuous measure while 
acknowledging that the effect of proximity decays as distance increases. 
The relationship between proximity and support for pipelines, however, is 
likely to be more complex than such a straightforward additive effect such as this. It 
is reasonable to assume that residents living closer to a proposed energy project are 
more likely to be attentive to the issue, and aware of the potentially significant 
economic benefits accruing at the local level (E. R. A. N. Smith 2002, 145), thus 
diminishing the need for cognitive shortcuts. To the extent that proximity to the 
pipeline increases the awareness one has of net economic gains for the local 
community, we might expect such considerations to crowd out the role of ideology 
in shaping opinions on this issue. This is especially true in the case of Keystone XL, 
where the discourse around its risks are primarily framed as being global and 
diffuse, while its benefits are concentrated at the local level. Further support for this 
expectation is offered by Franchino (2014), who finds that proximity to nuclear 
power stations reduces the marginal effect of ideology on attitudes toward nuclear 
power in Britain, the Netherlands, Spain and Sweden. Our fourth hypothesis may 
therefore be expressed as: 
H4: Ideological polarization decreases (is attenuated) with proximity 
to the proposed Keystone XL pipeline route; ideological polarization 
increases (is amplified) with distance to the proposed route.  
In addition to these hypotheses, and consistent with the existing literature, we 
also include a number of controls that are commonly employed in studies of public 
opinion toward energy and environmental issues. Previous studies have found that 
environmental attitudes tend to be stronger among women, youth and more 
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educated individuals (Zelezny, Chua, and Aldrich 2000; Jones and Dunlap 1992). 
We thus include such sociodemographic variables in our models as age, sex, and 
education. In addition, work by Ansolabehere and Konisky (2012; 2014) identifies an 
essential mental trade-off between the economic implications of an energy source 
and its environmental externalities. Following this work, we expect support for 
Keystone XL to increase with materialist values and perceptions of economic 
insecurity, and decrease with environmental values and concern. Finally, and 
consistent with the argument that attitudes are shaped by particular regional 
contexts, we also control for region of the US (using Census Bureau regional 
definitions).  
4.5 Data and Methods 
Our data are comprised of probability-based, representative survey samples 
of the American population. Specifically, they come from three separate surveys 
conducted by the Pew Research Center between March 13–17, 2013 (n = 1,501), 
September 4–8, 2013 (n = 1,506), and February 27–March 16, 2014 (n = 3,335). The 
response rates (AAPOR RR3 definition) for the three surveys were 8.7%, 6.8% and 
9.7%, respectively. We limit our analysis to data from the lower 48 continental states 
(excluding respondents from Alaska and Hawaii, since these states are not 
contiguous with the rest of US territory, which is where the Keystone XL pipeline is 
located). This brings our samples to 1,488, 1,494 and 3,304, respectively. The sample 
design for each wave was a dual-frame sample comprising landline and cellular 
telephone samples. Interviewing was conducted in both English and Spanish. While 
the three Pew Research Center surveys did not employ a common questionnaire, 
they nevertheless included common questions relating to political party 
identification, self-rated ideology, and attitudes toward the Keystone XL pipeline. 
We also take advantage of survey data capturing perceptions of the national 
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economy (asked in the March and September 2013 waves) and on attitudes toward 
global warming (asked in the March 2013 wave). 
Our key measure of Americans’ views of the Keystone XL pipeline is a 
dichotomous survey item asking: ‚Do you favour or oppose building the Keystone 
XL pipeline that would transport oil from Canada’s oil sands region through the 
Midwest to refineries in Texas?‛ The marginal distribution of this survey item 
indicates that roughly three-fifths of the American public favour building the 
Keystone XL pipeline – 66 percent in March 2013, 65 percent in September 2013, and 
61 percent in February-March 2014. At the same time, approximately one-quarter of 
the public (between 23 and 30 percent) opposes the pipeline. Results from the three 
surveys point to broad stability in American public opinion toward Keystone XL 
with a majority consistently in favour but a substantial proportion of the public 
opposed (see Table 4.1). 
These levels of support are broadly in line with those found in other surveys. 
For example, in a poll from March–April 2013, Nanos (2013, 25) finds that 74 percent 
of the American public supports the Keystone XL project while 21 percent oppose it. 
A USA TODAY/Stanford University/Resources for the Future poll conducted in 
November–December 2013 found support at 56 percent and opposition at 41% when 
respondents were presented with the dual prospects of reducing the amount of oil 
the US imports from the Middle East but with the consequence of creating higher 
greenhouse gas emissions from the Canadian oil sands (Koch 2014). In a February–
March 2014 Washington Post–ABC News poll, 65 percent of Americans said the US 
government should approve the pipeline, with 22 percent saying it should not 
(Eilperin and Clement 2014), representing an increase in support from March 2012 
when a Gallup poll found that 57 percent of Americans wanted the pipeline 
approved while 29 percent did not (Mendes 2012). Presented with competing 
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arguments about US energy security and the environmental risk posed by the 
pipeline, a December 2013 Bloomberg News poll found that 56 percent of 
Americans viewed Keystone XL more as an opportunity to improve US energy 
security while 35 percent viewed it more as a potential threat to the environment 
from oil spills or greenhouse gas emissions (Snyder 2013). In sum, while individual 
polls have varied in the specific ways they have measured American public opinion 
toward the Keystone XL pipeline, taken together, they paint the picture of a public 
positively inclined toward the pipeline, though a substantial segment of the public 
remains opposed. 
 While the Pew survey data contain items capturing most of the relevant 
concepts, additional work is needed to create measures of proximity to the Keystone 
XL pipeline. To do so, we rely on the geographic indicators contained in the survey 
data to geocode (append latitude-longitude coordinates to) individual survey 
respondents. In the Pew survey instruments, respondents were asked to provide 
their ZIP codes; ZIP codes were also retained from the telephone sample files, 
allowing for a high match rate. Fully 98 percent of respondents were geocoded 
based on ZIP code.4 The remaining 2 percent of respondents were geocoded based 
on county FIPS codes (originating from the telephone sample files) and matched to 
county centroids created from the 2013 US Census Bureau TIGER/Line county 
shapefile.  
 To calculate the distance to the pipeline, we use detailed geodetic data 
compiled and made publicly available by the Keystone Mapping Project 
(keystone.steamingmules.com), a civil society organization that has assumed the 
mandate to inform the American public by publicizing the proposed pipeline route 
                                                                                             
4. ZIP code Geocoding was conducted using the GEOCODE procedure in the SAS 
statistical package and the October 2013 ZIP code lookup dataset provided by the SAS Institute. 
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through maps created using Google Earth (earth.google.com). While this 
organization is not neutral in its stance toward Keystone XL, its mapping work is 
strictly factual and endeavours to apply the best practices of cartographic science. 
Specifically, we use the northern section of the proposed pipeline route from the its 
point of entry into the US from Canada in Phillips County, Montana, proceeding 
southeasterly through South Dakota and terminating at Steele City, Nebraska; the 
section of the original Keystone pipeline connecting Steele City to Cushing, 
Oklahoma by a southerly route through Kansas; the now-built southern section of 
Keystone XL originating in Cushing, Oklahoma and proceeding southerly to 
Nederland, Texas on the Gulf Coast; and the proposed extension to Houston, Texas 
also on the Gulf Coast (see Figure 4.1). Given these two sets of spatially located data 
(the survey data and the pipeline route data), calculating individual survey 
respondents’ distance to the pipeline is easily done by joining the two sets of data 
and finding the minimum distance to the pipeline (see Figures 4.2–4.3). 
To assess the contribution of attitudes toward the economy, the environment 
and political factors to explaining American attitudes toward the Keystone XL 
pipeline we use binary logistic regression models. Binary logit is indicated given the 
dichotomous favour/oppose survey item employed in the Pew surveys.5 The survey 
data contain items capturing overall attitudes toward the national economy (using 
                                                                                             
5. Some readers might consider a multilevel (or hierarchical, or mixed) model most 
appropriate given our data and hypotheses in light of the contextual nature of proximity to the 
Keystone XL pipeline. Such a strategy would conceive of respondents as nested within larger 
contextual units (such as counties or ZIP codes). Multilevel analysis, as a theoretical matter, 
assumes a multi-stage sample design, e.g., random sampling of clusters (counties or ZIP codes) 
and random sampling within each cluster. As a practical matter, it also assumes a minimum 
sample size within each cluster for acceptable statistical power (Hox 2010; West, Welch, and 
Galecki 2014). Neither assumption is met with the Pew data analyzed here, which were collected 
as a national random sample without clustering or stratification, and a substantial number of 
respondents being the sole respondent from their respective counties or ZIP codes. Our analyses 
are therefore appropriately undertaken as ‚single-level,‛ contextual analyses (as described by 
Books and Prysby 1991) and not multilevel or hierarchical analyses. 
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an excellent-good-fair-poor scale), views of the seriousness of global warming (in 
general, and not specifically relating to the Keystone XL pipeline or its effects),6 and 
standard measures of political party identification and political ideology (using a 
five-point very conservative-very liberal scale). The models also include controls for 
sex, age (in years logged), education and region. Full details of the coding of these 
variables appear in the appendix. 
 In order to retain all cases in the regression analysis, and to avoid 
introducing bias or reducing statistical power by using only complete cases, missing 
survey item responses were imputed 10 separate times using multiple imputation 
(MI) routines (Allison 2001; Little and Rubin 2002). Given that the national economy 
and global warming survey questions were not asked in all three surveys, our 
implementation is thus an application of ‚cross-survey MI‛ and is undertaken using 
the procedures advanced by Rendall et al. (2013) for conducting MI in such 
instances. These include conducting the imputations using only jointly-observed 
variables and increasing the number of imputations performed to compensate for 
the larger fraction of missing data – in our case, 10 imputations, more than the 
standard 3 to 5. Binary logit models of the multiply-imputed data were then fit 
using procedures that account for the complex sample design used for the survey 
data collection, with these results then combined using procedures articulated by 
Rubin (1987) to produce the final results reported here.7 This process produces 
                                                                                             
6. As a measure of environmentalism, concern over global warming covers only part of the 
conceptual terrain. It is, however, the best measure available in the Pew data, even though it may 
not be the most relevant measure in the context of attitudes toward energy (Ansolabehere and 
Konisky 2012). Still, it is interesting to ask whether those rating high on concern over global 
warming further object to the Keystone XL pipeline due to concern for localized environmental 
risks or an objection to American dependence on fossil fuels (attitudes which are likely 
correlated with one another). 
7. The multiple imputations were conducted using the IVEware 0.1 add-in program for 
SAS (Raghunathan et al. 2001). The logit models were fit using SAS PROC SURVEYLOGISTIC, 
with results then submitted to SAS PROC MIANALYZE to combine the imputations. 
195 
  
parameter estimates and standard errors that account for both the complex sample 
designs employed to collect the Pew survey data as well as the statistical 
uncertainty associated with imputing missing data. With the survey data having 
been collected in three distinct time periods, controls for time are included in the 
model through dummy variables for the September 2013 and February-March 2014 
time periods (with the March 2013 time period serving as the reference category). 
The data are thus analysed as independently-pooled repeated cross-sections 
(Wooldridge 2009, 444–445). 
4.6 Results and Discussion 
Several important findings emerge from the logit models. First, men are 
more likely to favour building the pipeline, as are older Americans, while college 
educated Americans are less likely to support it. These results arguably speak to 
higher levels of concern for the environmental impact of the pipeline among women 
and younger Americans, as well as the reduced importance of the job opportunities 
implied by pipeline construction among the college educated. Looking at results 
across the Census regions of the US, the only significant result is a difference 
between the West and the Northeast (the reference category) with the West region 
less likely to favour the Keystone XL pipeline. The Midwest and South regions 
(which include the six states through which the proposed pipeline route passes) are 
statistically indistinguishable from the Northeast. Further, it is notable that the effect 
of residing in the West census region remains significant even when distance to the 
pipeline is included in the model (see Table 4.2).  
Turning to attitudes toward the economy and the environment, in line with 
our expectations, we find a significant effect of rating the national economy either 
fair or poor on favouring the Keystone XL pipeline. Thus, those parts of the 
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American public viewing national economic conditions as remaining in a fragile 
state exhibit a higher propensity for endorsing the construction of the pipeline. At 
the same time, environmental attitudes exert a negative effect. Viewing global 
warming as a problem serves to decrease support for building the pipeline. This 
result stands in contrast with other work that finds that concern about global 
warming is only weakly correlated with attitudes toward particular fuels 
(Ansolabehere and Konisky 2012, 69). It suggests that efforts of opponents to link 
the Keystone XL pipeline proposal to increased greenhouse gas emissions have been 
at least partly successful in doing so.  
 Examining the effects of party identification and political ideology in model 
4.1, we see that the results confirm our expectations: Consistent with our first 
hypothesis, Republicans are more likely to favour the construction of the Keystone 
XL pipeline than Democrats (the reference category). Similarly, moderates and 
conservatives are, in turn, significantly more likely to favour the pipeline than 
liberals (the reference category), confirming our second hypothesis. At the same 
time, the effect of distance to the pipeline is significant and negative. This implies 
that proximity to the pipeline leads to a greater likelihood of favouring the pipeline. 
Conversely, greater distance from the proposed route implies a lower likelihood of 
favouring the pipeline. We thus find evidence of an inverse NIMBY effect similar to 
that found in the cases of energy siting controversies (Michaud, Carlisle, and Smith 
2008; Greenberg 2009; Warren et al. 2005; E. R. A. N. Smith 2002) and confirm our 
third hypothesis.  
 It may still be the case, as expected, that the effects of political factors vary 
depending on proximity (or distance) to the pipeline. This is to say that party 
identification and political ideology (on the one hand) and proximity to the pipeline 
(on the other) may interact. We test this in models 4.2 and 4.3 with separate 
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interactions between party identification and pipeline proximity, and ideology and 
pipeline proximity. Model 4.2 fails to find any interaction between party 
identification and proximity to the pipeline. The finding, then, is that proximity to 
(and distance from) the pipeline affects Republicans and Democrats in the same 
manner. However, model 4.3 identifies an interactive relationship between 
proximity to the pipeline and political ideology, as indicated by a significant 
coefficient for the distance to pipeline × conservative interaction term. More to the 
point, a likelihood ratio chi-square test of the interaction comparing model 4.1 to 
model 4.3 indicates a significant interaction (p = 0.004). To explain further, the lower-
order coefficient for logged distance to the Keystone XL pipeline (–0.28) is the 
estimate of the effect of distance to the pipeline for liberals (the reference category 
for political ideology). Thus, among liberals, distance to the Keystone XL pipeline 
acts to decrease support for the pipeline; conversely, proximity to the pipeline acts 
to increase support. By contrast, the effect of proximity to the Keystone XL pipeline 
among conservatives is obtained by adding the lower-order coefficient for logged 
distance to the pipeline and the higher-order coefficient for distance to the pipeline × 
conservative interaction term: –0.28 + 0.30 = 0.02. This value is nearly zero, 
indicating little effect. A direct test of this value is obtained by respecifying model 
4.3 with conservatives set as the reference category for political ideology; this 
confirms that the effect of logged distance to the Keystone XL pipeline is not 
statistically significant among conservatives (see Table 4.4). The results of this 
respecified model indicate a significant coefficient for the logged distance to the 
Keystone XL pipeline × liberal interaction term as expected. Adding the lower-order 
coefficient for logged distance to the pipeline and the higher-order coefficient for 
distance to the pipeline × liberal interaction term yields: 0.02 + (–0.30) = –0.28, which 
reconfirms the result previously obtained from the originally specified model with 
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liberals as the reference category (see Table 4.2). Again respecifying model with 
political moderates as the reference category (see Table 4.3) yields a negatively-
signed but insignificant effect of logged distance to the Keystone XL pipeline among 
this segment of the American public. The results thus indicate that the spatial 
patterns for moderates and conservatives, are not significantly different from one 
another. At the same time, there is weak evidence of a difference between liberals 
and moderates, with the higher-order logged distance to the Keystone XL pipeline × 
liberal coefficient approaching conventional levels of statistical significance (p = 
0.084). The main conclusion remains a highly significant difference in the effect of 
proximity to the Keystone XL pipeline between liberals and conservatives. This 
result is congruent with those from the European context, where proximity to 
nuclear power plants moderated the effect of ideology on attitudes toward nuclear 
energy (Franchino 2014). In sum, we can conclude that the effect of political 
ideology on attitudes toward the Keystone XL pipeline is contingent upon 
(moderated by) proximity to the pipeline. 
To visualize this pattern of contingent effects, we examine graphical displays 
of the interaction (Brambor, Clark, and Golder 2006; Fox 2008). As Figure 4.4 makes 
clear, conservatives are nearly equally likely to favour the pipeline regardless of 
proximity or distance to the pipeline. As was previously shown in discussing the 
regression results, the attitudes of American conservatives do not exhibit a spatial 
dynamic in this respect. By contrast, among American liberals, the likelihood of 
favouring the pipeline decreases as distance to the pipeline increases. As a result, 
there is no ideological divide as it relates to the Keystone XL near the proposed 
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route; it is only at a substantial distance from the pipeline that differences between 
liberals and conservatives emerge (see Figure 4.4).8 
 Given that the attitudes of liberals and conservatives toward the Keystone 
XL pipeline converge with greater proximity to the pipeline, further probing of this 
moderated relationship is useful to determine the range over which ideology 
continues to exert an effect. This involves re-centring distance to the pipeline at 
different values, re-running the model and examining how the ideology coefficients 
change (Cohen et al. 2003; Braumoeller 2004). Performing this analysis reveals that 
the ideological cleavage exists at distances of 158 kilometres or greater. At distances 
less than 158 kilometres, liberals and conservatives are statistically indistinguishable 
from one another. Further, liberals and moderates are indistinguishable from one 
another at distances of less than 371 kilometres (see Figures 4.5–4.6).9 
                                                                                             
8. One should also note that the key results from model 4.3 are robust to the inclusion of 
numerous other variables that potentially influence attitudes toward support for the Keystone 
XL pipeline, including perceptions of the direction of the national economy, perceptions of one’s 
personal financial situation, perceptions of change in one's family's financial situation, 
employment status, attitudes toward environmental laws, county unemployment rate, and 
county median family income. Including these variables in the model have no appreciable effects 
on the parameter estimates for political ideology, logged distance to the Keystone XL pipeline, 
and the ideology × pipeline distance interaction. See Table 4.5. 
In further examining the ideology × distance interaction effect by conducting separate 
analyses for the three waves of survey data, we find that the interaction is non-significant in the 
first (March 2013) wave (though the conservative × distance coefficient is correctly signed) and 
significant in the second (September 2013) and third (February-March 2014) waves. The reasons 
for this are not entirely clear, though it is worth pointing out that President Obama made a 
highly-publicized statement in June 2013 (his clearest up to that time) that approval of Keystone 
XL would only be granted if it did not increase net greenhouse gas emissions. In providing such 
an ‚elite cue‛ (Zaller 1992), Obama may have altered the political and spatial dynamics of 
opinion formation on Keystone XL. 
9.  In order to build confidence in our results, we tested to see whether liberals living in 
both Keystone XL and non-Keystone states XL are similar with respect to another important 
environmental issue, climate change. A t-test confirms that liberals living in Keystone XL states 
are no different from liberals living outside Keystone XL states on the question of how serious a 
problem they perceive global warming to be. Thus, our results are not driven by the possibility 
that liberals living in Keystone XL states are somehow different from liberals living elsewhere on 
questions pertaining to the environment.  
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 Overall, our results support our theoretical expectations. Consistent with 
what has been found in the literature, we find that individuals tend to adopt policy 
attitudes consistent with their ideological predispositions and fellow partisans. We 
also find support for the effect of proximity, and equally compelling evidence for 
our interactive hypotheses. The simple additive effect of distance to the pipeline is 
negative, and such an inverse NIMBY effect suggests that the promise of local jobs 
and other economic benefits work against environmental considerations of local 
spills and global risks related to climate change (cf. D. P. Aldrich 2013). Equally 
interesting is the finding that ideological differences increase with distance from the 
pipeline, or conversely, that such differences decrease (and disappear altogether) 
with ever greater proximity to the pipeline. This fits partially with the heuristic 
model of ideology, whereby individuals rely on underlying political predispositions 
to inform their policy preferences in the absence of being fully informed on 
potential benefits and risks. In the case of pipelines, distance increases the 
probability of liberals opposing Keystone XL, while proximity appears to increase 
the relevance of economic considerations among liberals, crowding out the effect of 
ideology. In this light, liberals living in closer proximity to the proposed pipeline are 
faced with a tradeoff not faced by liberals living further away. In contrast, approval 
among political conservatives is consistently high regardless of distance, suggesting 
that such an economy-environment tradeoff is not part of the calculus among this 
ideological group.  
This conditional effect of political ideology thus points to the importance of 
issue characteristics and local context in determining the effect of proximity and 
distance. Depending on the distribution and concentration of risks and benefits, we 
might expect a different interactive dynamic. When risks are framed as global and 
diffuse, and when benefits are concentrated locally, proximity may attenuate the 
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role of ideology, as we find to be the case with Keystone XL. However, where risks 
and benefits are both locally concentrated and highly contested, we might expect 
proximity to play a more polarizing role, as individuals react to these risks and 
benefits differently as a function of their ideology. Future work should build on this 
finding regarding the way in which distance to risks and benefits may moderate the 
role of ideology in the formation of opinions.  
4.7 Conclusion 
  Given the economic and environmental stakes involved, the issue of building 
new energy pipelines is likely to remain on the American political agenda for some 
time. Indeed, the expected increase in American domestic production of oil and 
natural gas will contribute to the need for new energy infrastructure to be built in 
the US, both for domestic consumption and export (United States Energy 
Information Administration 2014). That environmental groups recognize the 
strategic importance of pipelines for climate change further suggests that pipelines 
will remain controversial and will remain an issue of public concern for the 
foreseeable future.  
 In this article, we have identified a number of factors that are predictive of 
public support for (and opposition to) the Keystone XL pipeline. We find that public 
attitudes are shaped by political factors as well as attitudes toward the economy and 
the environment. A further key finding relates to the role of proximity, which we 
find conditions the effect of ideological predispositions toward proposed oil 
pipeline infrastructure. Thus, spatial context matters, but in different ways for 
different segments of the American public. This finding has important implications 
for debates surrounding patterns of locally concentrated support and opposition 
(van der Horst 2007), as it points to the need to evaluate how individual-level 
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political beliefs and contextual factors interact to affect policy attitudes (Books and 
Prysby 1991).  
Several policy-relevant implications also flow directly from these findings. 
First, as highlighted by the broad mobilization against Keystone XL in the US, 
policy actors have been able to link localized energy transportation infrastructure 
projects to national-level debates on broader risks and benefits like that over climate 
change. This move broadens the level of public discussion to include input from a 
wider array of societal interests and concerns, making it difficult for decision 
makers to find solutions that appease everyone. The Obama administration’s 
decision to extend the political half-life of the issue by repeatedly deferring a final 
decision on Keystone XL is consistent with this interpretation, as the President was 
caught between liberal pipeline supporters in the heartland, and liberal pipeline 
opponents on the coasts. In the aftermath of the election, the rejection of the 
Keystone XL energy pipeline project by President Obama likely proved less costly, 
providing the President with a potential bargaining chip in a Republican-dominated 
Congress. 
At the same time, our findings have additional implications for the framing 
strategies employed by policy actors, and suggest that environmental groups may 
have had more success had they put more emphasis on such local concerns as water 
safety and land rights in an effort to mobilize opinion locally. Instead, project 
proponents successfully appealed to the local population in terms of economic 
benefits, which appears to have successfully countered the environmental 
movement’s primary concern regarding Keystone XL’s impact on greenhouse gas 
emissions, at least for individuals living in close proximity to the pipeline. Thus, at 
least in the case of Keystone XL, local framing of economic benefits appears to have 
outweighed counter-frames regarding risks. 
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More generally, our results speak to broader considerations on the siting and 
scale of public opposition to energy infrastructure projects. While the case of 
Keystone XL provides some evidence of an inverse NIMBY dynamic, we suggest 
that the spatial distribution of support and opposition will vary according to the 
spatial distribution of risks and benefits for a particular project. Because these risks 
and benefits can be framed in different ways (e.g. as being primarily local or 
primarily global), whether or not governments should expect to deal with 
concentrated local opposition or support will in part be influenced by the framing 
contest between project proponents and opponents in a given energy project siting 
controversy. Spatial and contextual considerations therefore have an important 
place in the study of mass policy attitudes on energy siting decisions, and future 
research in this policy domain ought to pay close attention to the interaction 
between politics and space. 
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Table 4.1: American Public Opinion toward the Keystone XL Pipeline 
‚Do you favour or oppose building the Keystone XL pipeline that would transport oil from 
Canada’s oil sands region through the Midwest to refineries in Texas?‛ 
 
March 
2013 
September 
2013 
February–March 
2014 
Favour 66% 65% 61% 
Oppose 23% 30% 27% 
Don’t Know/Refused 11% 5% 12% 
Source: Pew Research Center, 2013–2014 
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Table 4.2: Explaining American Attitudes toward the Keystone XL Pipeline 
(Binary Logit) 
 Model 4.1  Model 4.2  Model 4.3  
 b (SE)  b (SE)  b (SE)  
Intercept 0.38 (0.17) * 0.38 (0.17) * 0.41 (0.17) * 
Wave (ref = March 2013)          
September 2013 -0.38 (0.13) ** -0.38 (0.13) ** -0.39 (0.13) ** 
February–March 2014 -0.23 (0.10) * -0.23 (0.10) * -0.24 (0.10) * 
Male 0.19 (0.08) * 0.20 (0.08) * 0.20 (0.08) * 
ln Age (Years) 0.37 (0.09) *** 0.37 (0.09) *** 0.37 (0.09) *** 
Education: College -0.29 (0.08) *** -0.29 (0.08) *** -0.28 (0.08) *** 
Region (ref = Northeast)          
Midwest -0.18 (0.13)  -0.18 (0.13)  -0.19 (0.13)  
South -0.06 (0.11)  -0.06 (0.11)  -0.08 (0.11)  
West -0.33 (0.12) ** -0.34 (0.12) ** -0.35 (0.12) ** 
Economy is fair/poor 0.21 (0.10) * 0.21 (0.10) * 0.21 (0.10) * 
Global warming is serious problem -0.37 (0.09) *** -0.36 (0.09) *** -0.37 (0.09) *** 
Party (ref = Democrat)          
Independent 0.36 (0.12) ** 0.36 (0.12) ** 0.36 (0.12) ** 
Republican 1.53 (0.10) *** 1.53 (0.10) *** 1.54 (0.10) *** 
Ideology (ref = Liberal)          
Moderate 0.45 (0.09) *** 0.44 (0.09) *** 0.43 (0.09) *** 
Conservative 0.95 (0.11) *** 0.95 (0.11) *** 0.94 (0.11) *** 
Distance to Pipeline (km logged) -0.12 (0.05) * -0.13 (0.06) * -0.28 (0.08) *** 
Distance to Pipeline × Independent  —  -0.07 (0.14)   —  
Distance to Pipeline × Republican  —  0.08 (0.10)   —  
Distance to Pipeline × Moderate  —   —  0.18 (0.10)  
Distance to Pipeline × Conservative  —   —  0.30 (0.11) ** 
          
N 6,286   6,286   6,286   
Model χ2 1,157.47 ***  1,159.43 ***  1,168.62 ***  
Likelihood Ratio χ2 Test —   1.96   11.15 **  
Nagelkerke R2 0.24   0.24   0.24   
* p ≤ .05, ** p ≤ .01, *** p ≤ .001 
Source: Pew Research Center, 2013–2014 
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Table 4.3: Explaining American Attitudes toward the Keystone XL Pipeline 
(Binary Logit), Political Moderates as Reference Category 
 Model 4.3-M  
 b (SE)  
Intercept 0.84 (0.18) *** 
Wave (ref = March 2013)    
September 2013 -0.39 (0.13) ** 
February–March 2014 -0.24 (0.10) * 
Male 0.20 (0.08) * 
ln Age (Years) 0.37 (0.09) *** 
Education: College -0.28 (0.08) *** 
Region (ref = Northeast)    
Midwest -0.19 (0.13)  
South -0.08 (0.11)  
West -0.35 (0.12) ** 
Economy is fair/poor 0.21 (0.10) * 
Global warming is serious problem -0.37 (0.09) *** 
Party (ref = Democrat)    
Independent 0.36 (0.12) ** 
Republican 1.54 (0.10) *** 
Ideology (ref = Moderate)    
Liberal -0.43 (0.09) *** 
Conservative 0.51 (0.10) *** 
Distance to Pipeline (km logged) -0.10 (0.08)  
Distance to Pipeline × Independent  —  
Distance to Pipeline × Republican  —  
Distance to Pipeline × Liberal -0.18 (0.10) † 
Distance to Pipeline × Conservative 0.12 (0.11)  
    
N 6,286   
Model χ2 1,168.62 ***  
Likelihood Ratio χ2 Test 11.15 **  
Nagelkerke R2 0.24   
† p ≤ .084; * p ≤ .05, ** p ≤ .01, *** p ≤ .001 
Source: Pew Research Center, 2013–2014 
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Table 4.4: Explaining American Attitudes toward the Keystone XL Pipeline 
(Binary Logit), Political Conservatives as Reference Category 
 Model 4.3-C  
 b (SE)  
Intercept 1.35 (0.18) *** 
Wave (ref = March 2013)    
September 2013 -0.39 (0.13) ** 
February–March 2014 -0.24 (0.10) * 
Male 0.20 (0.08) * 
ln Age (Years) 0.37 (0.09) *** 
Education: College -0.28 (0.08) *** 
Region (ref = Northeast)    
Midwest -0.19 (0.13)  
South -0.08 (0.11)  
West -0.35 (0.12) ** 
Economy is fair/poor 0.21 (0.10) * 
Global warming is serious problem -0.37 (0.09) *** 
Party (ref = Democrat)    
Independent 0.36 (0.12) ** 
Republican 1.54 (0.10) *** 
Ideology (ref = Conservative)    
Liberal -0.94 (0.11) *** 
Moderate -0.51 (0.10) *** 
Distance to Pipeline (km logged) 0.02 (0.08)  
Distance to Pipeline × Independent  —  
Distance to Pipeline × Republican  —  
Distance to Pipeline × Liberal -0.30 (0.11) ** 
Distance to Pipeline × Moderate -0.12 (0.11)  
    
N 6,286   
Model χ2 1,168.62 ***  
Likelihood Ratio χ2 Test 11.15 **  
Nagelkerke R2 0.24   
* p ≤ .05, ** p ≤ .01, *** p ≤ .001 
Source: Pew Research Center, 2013–2014 
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Table 4.5: Explaining American Attitudes toward the Keystone XL Pipeline 
(Binary Logit), Expanded Model 
 Model 4.4  
 b (SE)  
Intercept 0.65 (0.27) * 
Wave (ref = March 2013)    
September 2013 -0.40 (0.14) ** 
February–March 2014 -0.24 (0.10) * 
Male 0.19 (0.08) * 
ln Age (Years) 0.41 (0.11) *** 
Education: College -0.23 (0.09) * 
Region (ref = Northeast)    
Midwest -0.19 (0.13)  
South -0.09 (0.12)  
West -0.38 (0.12) ** 
Employment status (ref = Employed)    
Unemployed -0.16 (0.16)  
Not in Labour Force -0.05 (0.11)  
Economy is fair/poor 0.17 (0.11)  
Economy (ref = stay about the same)    
Getting Better -0.12 (0.13)  
Getting Worse 0.15 (0.13)  
Personal Fin. Situation (ref = Fair)    
Excellent/Good 0.05 (0.10)  
Poor -0.04 (0.14)  
Family Fin. Situation (ref = Stay the same)    
Improving 0.08 (0.19)  
Getting Worse 0.05 (0.17)  
Global warming is serious problem -0.33 (0.10) ** 
Environmental Laws Worth the Cost -0.30 (0.10) ** 
Party (ref = Democrat)    
Independent 0.30 (0.13) * 
Republican 1.45 (0.11) *** 
Ideology (ref = Liberal)    
Moderate 0.39 (0.09) *** 
Conservative 0.85 (0.11) *** 
Distance to Pipeline (km logged) -0.30 (0.08) *** 
Distance to Pipeline × Independent  —  
Distance to Pipeline × Republican  —  
Distance to Pipeline × Moderate 0.18 (0.10) † 
Distance to Pipeline × Conservative 0.30 (0.11) ** 
County Unemployment Rate (%) 0.036 (0.024)  
County Median Family Income ($000) -0.001 (0.003)  
    
N 6,286   
Model χ2 1,216.39 ***  
Likelihood Ratio χ2 Test 47.77 ***  
Nagelkerke R2 0.25   
† p ≤ .088; * p ≤ .05, ** p ≤ .01, *** p ≤ .001 
209 
  
Sources: Pew Research Center, 2013–2014; Bureau of Labor Statistics, Local Area 
Unemployment Statistics, 2013; United States Census Bureau, American 
Community Survey, 2013 5-year estimates, Table DP03. 
Notes: Results are binary logistic regression coefficients with standard errors (in 
parentheses) adjusted for the complex sample design (stratification and weighting) 
and multiple imputation. Continuous independent variables (age, and distance to 
the Keystone XL pipeline) are mean-centred. 
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Figure 4.1: Map, Keystone XL Pipeline Route 
 
Sources: Keystone Mapping Project; United States Census Bureau, Cartographic 
Boundary Shapefile – States (2013)  
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Figure 4.2: Histogram, Distance to Keystone XL Pipeline Route 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3: Histogram, Distance to Keystone XL Pipeline Route, logged 
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Figure 4.4: Effect Plot, Ideology and Proximity to the Keystone XL Pipeline Route 
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Figure 4.5: Coefficient Plot: Effect of Ideology (Conservative) 
 
 
Figure 4.6: Coefficient Plot: Effect of Ideology (Moderate) 
 
Note: Figures 4.5–4.6 show the ideology coefficients (and 95% confidence intervals) 
from model 4.3 with distance to the Keystone XL pipeline centred at different 
values. 
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4.8 Appendix 4A: Data Coding 
Favour KXL: ‚Do you favour or oppose: building the Keystone XL pipeline that 
would transport oil from Canada’s oil sands region through the Midwest to 
refineries in Texas?‛ Favour (1), oppose (0). 
Wave: Dummy variables using indicator coding for the September 2013 and 
February–March 2014 waves (March 2013 wave is the reference category). 
Male: Male (1); Female (0). 
ln Age (Years): Age in years; logged (base e); mean centred. 
Education: Dummy variable using indicator coding for college education (some 
college or less is the reference category). 
Census Region: Dummy variables using indicator coding for Census Region of 
residence (the Northeast Census Region is the reference category). 
Employment: ‚Are you now employed full-time, part-time, retired or are you not 
employed for pay? [If not employed for pay:] Are you currently looking for work, or 
not?‛ Dummy variables using indicator coding for Unemployed and Looking for 
Work and Not in Labour Force (Retired, Unemployed and Not Looking for Work, 
Disabled, Student, Other) (Employed Full-Time/Employed Part-Time/Self-
Employed) is the reference category). 
Economy is Fair/Poor: ‚Thinking about the nation’s economy, how would you rate 
economic conditions in this country today... as excellent (0), good (0), only fair (1), or 
poor (1)?‛ 
Economy Better/Worse: ‚a year from now, do you expect that economic conditions 
in the country as a whole will be better than they are at present, or worse, or just 
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about the same as now?‛ Dummy variables using indicator coding for ‚Better‛ and 
‚Worse‛ (‚About the Same as Now‛ is the reference category). 
Personal Financial Situation: ‚How would you rate your own personal financial 
situation? Would you say you are in excellent shape (0), good shape (0), only fair 
shape (1) or poor shape financially (1)?‛ 
Family Financial Situation Improving/Worse: ‚Over the course of the next year, do 
you think the financial situation of you and your family will improve a lot, improve 
some, get a little worse or get a lot worse?‛ Dummy-coded with indicators for 
‚Improve a lot‛ and ‚Improve some‛ (combined ‚Improving‛) and ‚Get a little 
worse‛ and ‚Get a lot worse‛ (combined ‚Getting Worse‛); ‚Stay the Same‛ 
(volunteered response) is the reference category). 
Global Warning is Serious Problem: ‚In your view, is global warming a very serious 
problem (1), somewhat serious (1), not too serious (0), or not a problem (0)?‛ 
Environmental Laws Worth the Cost: ‚Which statement comes closer to your views, 
even if neither is exactly right? Stricter environmental laws and regulations cost too 
many jobs and hurt the economy (0), [or] Stricter environmental laws and 
regulations are worth the cost (1).‛ 
Party: ‚In politics today, do you consider yourself a Republican, a Democrat, or 
Independent?‛ *If Independent, don’t know or refused:+ ‚As of today do you lean 
more to the Republican Party or the Democratic Party?‛ Dummy variables using 
indicator coding for Republican and Independent (Democrat is the reference 
category). 
Ideology: ‚In general, would you describe your political views as< Very 
conservative, Conservative, Moderate, Liberal, Very liberal.‛ Dummy variables 
using indicator coding for Very conservative/Conservative (combined 
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‚Conservative‛) and Moderate. Very liberal/Liberal (combined ‚Liberal‛) is the 
reference category. 
Distance to Pipeline (km logged): Distance to the Keystone XL pipeline in 
kilometres; logged (base e). 
County Unemployment Rate (%): Annual average unadjusted unemployment rate 
at the county level; mean centred. Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Local Area 
Unemployment Statistics, 2013. 
County Median Family Income ($000): Median family income at the county level in 
inflation-adjusted dollars (thousands); mean centred. Sources: United States Census 
Bureau, American Community Survey, 2013 5-year estimates, Table DP03 (Selected 
Economic Characteristics). 
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4.9 Appendix 4B: Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Min Max SD N Missing 
Favour KXL 0.70 0 1 0.46 5,671 615 
Wave: March 2013 0.24 0 1 0.43 6,286 0 
Wave: September 2013 0.24 0 1 0.43 6,286 0 
Wave: February-March 2014 0.53 0 1 0.50 6,286 0 
Male 0.49 0 1 0.50 6,286 0 
Age (Years) 46.61 18 96 17.88 6,199 87 
ln Age (Years) 3.76 2.89 4.56 0.42 6,199 87 
Education: College 0.27 0 1 0.45 6,253 33 
Region: Northeast 0.19 0 1 0.39 6,286 0 
Region: Midwest 0.22 0 1 0.41 6,286 0 
Region: South 0.37 0 1 0.48 6,286 0 
Region: West 0.22 0 1 0.41 6,286 0 
Employed 0.56 0 1 0.50 1,481 4,805 
Unemployed 0.09 0 1 0.29 1,481 4,805 
Not in labour force 0.34 0 1 0.47 1,481 4,805 
Economy: Excellent/Good 0.18 0 1 0.38 2,968 3,318 
Economy: Fair/Poor 0.82 0 1 0.38 2,968 3,318 
Economy: Getting Better 0.28 0 1 0.45 2,212 4,074 
Economy: Same 0.45 0 1 0.50 2,212 4,074 
Economy: Getting Worse 0.27 0 1 0.45 2,212 4,074 
Personal Financial Situation: Excellent/Good 0.38 0 1 0.49 1,477 4,809 
Personal Financial Situation: Fair/Poor 0.62 0 1 0.49 1,477 4,809 
Personal Financial Situation: Getting Worse 0.29 0 1 0.45 1,455 4,831 
Personal Financial Situation: Same 0.08 0 1 0.28 1,455 4,831 
Personal Financial Situation: Improving 0.63 0 1 0.48 1,455 4,831 
Global Warming is Serious Problem 0.67 0 1 0.47 1,459 4,827 
Global Warming is Not Serious Problem 0.33 0 1 0.47 1,459 4,827 
Environmental Laws Cost Jobs 0.43 0 1 0.50 3,120 3,166 
Environmental Laws Are Worth the Cost 0.57 0 1 0.50 3,120 3,166 
Party: Democrat 0.49 0 1 0.50 6,174 112 
Party: Republican 0.10 0 1 0.30 6,174 112 
Party: Independent 0.40 0 1 0.49 6,174 112 
Ideology: Liberal 0.24 0 1 0.43 6,028 258 
Ideology: Moderate 0.36 0 1 0.48 6,028 258 
Ideology: Conservative 0.39 0 1 0.49 6,028 258 
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 Mean Min Max SD N Missing 
Distance to Keystone XL Pipeline (km) 1,178.43 1.65 2,456.13 594.33 6,286 0 
ln Distance to Keystone XL Pipeline (km) 6.82 0.50 7.81 0.91 6,286 0 
County Unemployment Rate (%) 7.48 1.50 25.70 2.05 6,286 0 
County Median Family Income ($000) 66.52 26.74 139.24 17.00 6,286 0 
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5. Party Identification, Contact, Contexts, 
and Public Attitudes toward Illegal Immigration1 
 
5.1 Abstract 
Illegal immigration is a contentious issue on the American policy agenda. To 
understand the sources of public attitudes toward immigration, social scientists 
have focused attention on political factors such as party identification; they have 
also drawn on theories of intergroup contact to argue that contact with immigrants 
shapes immigration attitudes. Absent direct measures, contextual measures such as 
respondents’ ethnic milieu or proximity to salient geographic features (such as 
borders) have been used as proxies of contact. Such a research strategy still leaves 
the question unanswered – is it contact or context that really matters? Further, which 
context, and for whom? This article evaluates the effects of both personal contact with 
undocumented immigrants and contextual measures (county Hispanic population 
and proximity to the US–Mexico border) on American attitudes toward illegal 
immigration. It finds that these contextual and spatial factors moderate the effects of 
political party identification on attitudes toward illegal immigration; personal 
contact has no effect. These findings challenge the assumption that contextual 
measures proxy interpersonal contact. 
5.2 Introduction 
Current estimates now place the number of undocumented immigrants in 
the United States at over 11 million (Baker and Rytina 2013; Passel et al. 2014), 
making the challenge of illegal immigration one of the most pressing issues on the 
American policy agenda. In recent years, deadlock between the House of 
Representatives and the Senate on reforms to immigration and naturalization 
                                                                                             
1. Forthcoming as Gravelle (2016). 
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policy, state-level initiatives targeting undocumented immigrants, President Barack 
Obama’s executive action staying the enforcement of deportation for millions of 
undocumented immigrants, and provocative statements by candidates for the 
Republican presidential nomination in 2016 have all contributed to raising the 
political temperature on immigration issues in the US. The manner in which the 
debate around illegal immigration plays out highlights the diversity of opinion 
among the American public (Segovia and Defever 2010; Muste 2013), and public 
opinion will remain an important consideration in any new policy proposals. 
What, then, are the factors that account for Americans’ policy preferences 
regarding illegal immigration? In endeavouring to explain mass public opinion 
toward illegal immigration (and immigration attitudes more generally), social 
scientists point to political predispositions, perceptions of competition for jobs 
between native-born and immigrant workers, and perceptions of cultural threat. In 
addition to these individual-level factors, numerous studies borrow from the long 
tradition of research on racial attitudes in the US in developing explanations of 
immigration attitudes grounded in intergroup contact (Berg 2009; Harrison 2006; 
McLaren 2003; Newman 2013). A different approach is pursued by those seeking a 
contextual explanation of immigration attitudes in the demographic composition of 
individuals’ local areas, though results are mixed (A. L. Campbell, Wong, and Citrin 
2006; Hood and Morris 1997; Hood and Morris 2000). A similarly contextually- and 
spatially-oriented approach analyzes immigration attitudes as function of proximity 
to the US–Mexico border (Branton et al. 2007). Work on the effects of racial/ethnic 
context and spatial proximity often assumes that such contextual measures serve as 
a proxy for personal contact (e.g., Branton and Jones 2005; Dunaway, Branton, and 
Abrajano 2010; Fetzer 2000). This assumption often is due to the fact that measures 
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of personal contact with (unauthorized) immigrants are rare in social surveys while 
contextual data are often available. 
The current state of research on public opinion toward immigration, then, is 
one of disparate results relating to the effects of both intergroup contact and ethnic 
and spatial context, which typically are not evaluated in tandem (but see Harrison 
2006; McLaren 2003). This leaves the question unanswered – does context serve as a 
proxy for personal contact, or does it capture other psychological or social 
processes? Put more plainly, is it contact or context that ultimately matters for 
immigration policy attitudes? Further, which context (or contexts) matter, and for 
whom? 
In this article, I take up these questions. I contend that the contexts 
individuals occupy are characterized by a variety of concurrently-operating 
dynamics, and so it makes sense to measure and model the effects of context in 
multiple ways. Further, I demonstrate that how individuals experience a given 
context is contingent upon their pre-existing political characteristics. To advance 
these arguments, I draw on nationally representative survey data to evaluate the 
effects of party identification, personal contact with undocumented immigrants, and 
contextual measures on attitudes toward illegal immigration. To preview my key 
findings, larger Hispanic populations at the local level, larger increases in the local 
Hispanic population over time, and increasing proximity to the US–Mexico border 
all amplify the partisan cleavage in attitudes toward illegal immigration between 
Democrats and Republicans. At the same time, reported personal contact with 
undocumented immigrants has no significant effect. These findings challenge the 
assumption that contextual measures proxy interpersonal contact. 
The remainder of the article is structured as follows. First, I review the 
current immigration policy attitudes literature, paying particular attention to 
222 
  
research dealing with party identification, contact and contextual influences. Next, I 
advance my hypotheses relating to: party identification, contact with 
undocumented immigrants, and the interaction of party identification with contact 
and contextual measures. I then discuss my survey data and methods before 
presenting the results of my analyses. Lastly, I discuss the implications of my 
findings for existing explanations of attitudes toward illegal immigration and 
directions for future inquiry. 
5.3 The Sources of (Illegal) Immigration Attitudes 
In seeking to explain why individuals are alternatively open and 
accommodating or strict and restrictionist in their views toward illegal immigration 
(or immigration more broadly), the social science literature offers a range of 
hypotheses (see Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014 for a recent review). Research in a 
political economy tradition focuses on economic self-interest in the form of labour 
market competition between native-born and foreign-born workers, with native-
born workers more likely to experience competition for jobs expressing more 
restrictionist attitudes (Citrin et al. 1997; Espenshade and Calhoun 1993; Malhotra, 
Margalit, and Mo 2013; Scheve and Slaughter 2001). Other work has focused on 
concern over the fiscal burden posed by spending on social services for immigrants 
(Mayda 2006). Research testing the sociotropic effects of national economic 
conditions on immigration attitudes generally finds that area unemployment levels 
exert little effect on immigration attitudes (A. L. Campbell, Wong, and Citrin 2006), 
though changes in unemployment over time or a downturn in the national economy 
increase restrictionist sentiment (Goldstein and Peters 2014; Hopkins 2010). Other 
explanations emphasize the ‚symbolic‛ threat posed by immigrants to core national 
values or national culture in engendering restrictionist attitudes (Hainmueller and 
Hopkins 2014; Newman, Hartman, and Taber 2012; Schildkraut 2011) or the 
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liberalizing effect of higher education (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007; Haubert and 
Fussell 2006). 
In the American context, policy responses to the challenge of illegal 
immigration ranging from Propositions 187 and 227 in California in the mid-1990s 
to SB-1070 in Arizona in 2011 take on a partisan cast at the level of political elites 
and among the mass public. Research testing the effect of party identification on 
immigration attitudes finds that Republicans tend to favour restrictionist 
immigration policies more frequently than Democrats (Hainmueller and Hopkins 
2014; G. Hawley 2011; Schildkraut 2011). 
Some authors draw on strands of inquiry first developed in the study of 
racial attitudes in the US to understand immigration policy attitudes. One such 
strand is intergroup contact theory (Allport 1954; Pettigrew 1998; Pettigrew and 
Tropp 2006; Pettigrew et al. 2011). Its core argument is that contact between 
members of different groups holds the potential to decrease out-group prejudice. 
For this to occur, contact requires close acquaintance, equal status, and common 
goals (Allport 1954; Amir 1969). Conversely, in situations involving competition for 
scarce resources, contact serves to increase out-group prejudice (Blalock 1966). In 
transferring the concepts and hypotheses of intergroup contact theory from racial 
attitudes to immigration attitudes, research finds that some forms of close contact 
decrease restrictionist immigration attitudes (Berg 2009; Harrison 2006; McLaren 
2003). On the other hand, incidental contact increases restrictionist attitudes through 
increased perceptions of cultural threat (Enos 2014; Newman 2015). 
Another strand of inquiry originating in the racial attitudes literature focuses 
on the effects of local demographic context. In classic work focusing on the southern 
US by Key (1949) and Blalock (1956; 1957), the proportion of African Americans is 
shown to be positively associated with more racially conservative attitudes among 
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whites – findings that have been reconfirmed and extended (Glaser 1994). Similar 
contextual approaches are applied to analyses of immigration attitudes, but with 
mixed results. Some studies find that increases in the proportion of foreign born 
residents or Hispanics in the local area increases the likelihood of expressing 
restrictionist immigration attitudes (A. L. Campbell, Wong, and Citrin 2006; Hero 
and Tolbert 1996; Tolbert and Hero 1996), while others find the opposite – larger 
proportions of foreign born residents or Hispanics decrease restrictionist attitudes 
toward immigration (Hood and Morris 1997; Hood and Morris 1998). Still others 
report inconsistent or null results (Citrin, Reingold, and Green 1990; Fetzer 2000; 
Hood and Morris 2000). Others argue that it is not the ethnic context per se that 
influences attitudes toward immigration policy; rather, it is change in the context 
over time – for example, local areas experiencing rapid growth in the Hispanic 
population exhibit higher levels of restrictionist immigration attitudes (Hopkins 
2010; Newman and Velez 2014).  
A final line of research emphasizes proximity to (or conversely distance 
from) the US–Mexico border, as Mexico serves as the country providing the largest 
number of immigrants to the US. This work finds that individuals residing closer to 
the US–Mexico border are more likely to support nativist policy initiatives such as 
restricting undocumented immigrants’ access to social services (Branton et al. 2007). 
5.4 Theory and Hypotheses 
 Given the multiplicity of both theoretical explanations for individual-level 
immigration policy attitudes and empirical findings, I elect to focus on the 
hypothesized effects of party identification, ethnic and spatial contextual factors, 
and their interactions. I readily acknowledge other competing explanations (as 
discussed above) and account for them by including controls in my analysis. 
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In the American case, the theoretical basis for partisan or ideological 
differences in immigration attitudes are not readily apparent. Consider that the long 
history of American immigration policy has seen incongruous left–right coalitions: 
both free-market conservatives and liberal cosmopolitans have favored more open 
immigration while conservative cultural exclusionists and liberal economic 
protectionists have favored more restrictionist policies (Tichenor 2002, 8, 35). 
Nevertheless, recent attempts at immigration reform at the federal level and state-
level political developments such as Propositions 187 and 227 in California and SB-
1070 in Arizona produced a partisan and ideological sort among political elites. 
Partisan polarization translates into greater cue-taking among the mass public and 
thus sharpens partisan cleavages in mass opinion on immigration issues (cf. Zaller 
1992).  
Moreover, research on different conceptions of American national identity 
finds that the ethno-cultural aspect of American identity, where belonging is 
defined in terms of particular ascribed characteristics – being white, Protestant, of 
northern European descent and English speaking – resonates most strongly with 
conservatives and Republicans (Schildkraut 2005; Schildkraut 2011). Manifestations 
of this are seen in conservative talk radio, where one hears the argument that 
Latinos have made insufficient efforts to ‚Americanize‛ – to learn English and to 
identify with the US as opposed to their country of origin. Conservative cable news 
has also had an anti-immigrant tone. It is therefore unsurprising that Republicans 
exhibit higher levels of immigrant resentment (akin to symbolic racism) than 
Democrats. Republicans are also more likely to support official-English legislation 
and to favor English-only election ballots (Schildkraut 2011). By contrast, Democrats 
and liberals are more likely to endorse ‚incorporationism‛ – a set of beliefs about 
American identity that acknowledges the role of immigration in shaping the 
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country, and that values pluralism and tolerance of difference (Hajnal and Rivera 
2014; Schildkraut 2007). My hypothesis linking party identification to attitudes 
toward undocumented immigrants is thus:  
H1: Democrats are more likely to favour allowing undocumented 
immigrants to remain in the US; Republicans are more likely to favour 
requiring undocumented immigrants to leave. 
As for the expected effects of contact and contextual factors on attitudes 
toward illegal immigration, it is useful to distinguish between the expected effects 
of interaction (that is, direct, personal contact), proximity (that is, to a given 
outgroup), and proportions (of an outgroup within an area), since each implies 
different processes (Forbes 1997). With respect to the hypothesized effects of contact, 
expectations are straightforward. There is now large literature on intergroup 
contact, which has shown a robust, generalizable relationship between personal 
contact and the reduction of prejudice toward a wide range of racial and ethnic 
outgroups (Pettigrew and Tropp 2006; Pettigrew et al. 2011). In line with the 
literature dealing specifically with intergroup contact and immigration attitudes, 
my hypothesis is: 
H2: Individuals having personal contact with undocumented 
immigrants are more likely to favour allowing them to stay in the US; 
those not having experienced such contact are more likely to favour 
requiring undocumented immigrants to leave. 
As for contextual factors, the milieu inhabited by individuals can be 
characterized in multiple ways. Both the proportions of and proximity to particular 
outgroups are potentially relevant (Forbes 1997). It is therefore reasonable to 
examine the effects of ethnic (Hispanic) context, change in ethnic context, and 
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proximity to the US–Mexico border on attitudes toward illegal immigration. All of 
these measures may bear on attitudes toward illegal immigration as ‚people 
develop subjective understandings of the places they live in based on objective local 
characteristics, particularly the social composition‛ (Cutler 2007, 579). The focus on 
Hispanics and proximity to Mexico in the context of American immigration issues is 
warranted not only by Mexico’s position as the first-ranked source of immigrants to 
the US, but also because the issue of illegal immigration is repeatedly tied to 
Mexicans in public debate (A. L. Campbell, Wong, and Citrin 2006). Non-Hispanic 
whites’ attitudes toward immigration and specifically Latino immigration are found 
to be highly correlated (Ayers et al. 2009). Survey-based experiments have also 
found that support for restrictionist immigration policies is in part grounded in anti-
Hispanic prejudice (Hartman, Newman, and Bell 2013). 
It is also plausible to claim that these contextual factors will not exert the 
same effects on all segments of the American public. Indeed, recent research on 
contextual effects suggests that demographic and spatial contexts are more relevant 
for their moderating effects on individual-level partisanship than as predictors of 
policy attitudes in their own right. In this formulation, party identification is the 
‚focal‛ independent variable and contextual factors are the moderator variables 
(Jaccard and Dodge 2004). Recent work shows that Democrats and Republicans are 
influenced by context (variously measured) in different ways. Generally, those on 
the political right are more likely to react defensively to perceived local threats 
(Fischhoff et al. 2003). For example, Hopkins (2014) finds that high-density 
Republican-registration Census block groups in California exhibit stronger support 
for Proposition 227 when English–Spanish bilingual ballots are employed in their 
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county than comparable block groups with English-only ballots. Branton and 
colleagues (2007) find that support for Propositions 187 and 227 among California 
Democrats increases as the US–Mexico border becomes more proximate while again 
remaining consistently high among Republicans. Drawing on national data, Hawley 
(2011) finds a somewhat different pattern: Republicans are consistent in their 
support of more restrictionist immigration policies regardless of spatial or 
demographic context, but Democrats become less (not more) restrictionist as the 
county-level proportion of foreign born increases. Research finds that providing an 
explicit ethnic (Mexican) cue in survey item wording elicits a stronger restrictionist 
response among Iowa Republicans (Knoll, Redlawsk, and Sanborn 2010, 449). Taken 
in sum, these spatially and contextually contingent results point toward the 
following hypotheses: 
H3: With increasing Hispanic concentration in the local area, 
partisans’ attitudes will further diverge, with Republicans becoming 
less likely to favour allowing undocumented immigrants to stay in the 
US, and Democrats becoming comparatively more likely to favour 
such a policy. 
H4: With increasingly large changes in the Hispanic population in 
the local area over time, partisans’ attitudes will similarly further 
diverge, with Republicans becoming less likely to favour allowing 
undocumented immigrants to stay in the US, and Democrats 
becoming comparatively more likely to do so.  
H5: With increasing proximity to the US–Mexico border, partisans’ 
attitudes will again further diverge, with Republicans becoming less 
likely to favour allowing undocumented immigrants to stay in the US 
and Democrats becoming more likely to favour such a policy. 
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Does it make sense, though, to advance hypotheses relating to (and to model 
simultaneously) reported contact and contextual factors? One view might 
characterize this as a form of double counting at the level of theory and an invitation 
to collinearity at the level of empirical analysis. Empirical measures such as 
Hispanic density, Hispanic change and US–Mexico border proximity are, in this 
view, simply proxies of personal, face-to-face contact, and serve as a second-best 
solution when more direct measures of contact are not available (Hopkins, Tran, 
and Williamson 2014; Newman 2015). What matters at the level of theory, then, is 
still contact, not context. Some research makes this proxy admission explicit, 
arguing that this is reasonable given that ‚geographic proximity increases the 
likelihood of contact‛ (Ayers et al. 2009, 596). Other work exhibits ambiguity on this 
point, for example when intergroup contact theory is described as ‚point*ing+ to an 
explanation based on ethnic context‛ (Dunaway, Branton, and Abrajano 2010, 363), 
or the percentage of foreign-born residents or Hispanics at the county level is 
described as a measure of ‚interaction‛ or ‚contact‛ with immigrants (Berg 2009, 21; 
Fetzer 2000, 17; Hood and Morris 1997, 315). Still, if it follows as a matter of theory 
that contextual measures serve only as proxies for direct intergroup contact, then as 
an empirical matter one should not find effects of contextual measures on 
immigration attitudes when controlling for contact. 
There is some doubt, though, that ethnic context proxies intergroup contact: 
‚local intergroup contact may be limited by language barriers and may be 
overwhelmed by the real or perceived threat that immigrants pose‛ (Hainmueller 
and Hopkins 2014, 236). Indeed, those few studies that parse out the effects of 
contact and context ‚highlight the importance of distinguishing context from 
contact in theory and measurement and suggest strong caution in relying upon the 
former as an indicator of the latter‛ (Newman, Hartman, and Taber 2012, 641). In 
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light of this, if contextual measures are not mere proxies for contact, then what do 
they capture? Recent literature points to two alternative social processes: passive 
exposure to the Spanish language and media exposure. 
In a field experiment involving the random assignment of native Spanish 
speakers to commuter trains, Enos finds that passive exposure to Spanish shifts 
attitudes in the direction of tighter restrictions on immigration: ‚Treated subjects 
were far more likely to advocate a reduction in immigration from Mexico and were 
far less likely to indicate that illegal immigrants should be allowed to remain in this 
country‛ (2014, 3701). More restrictionist immigration attitudes are also observed in 
survey-based experiments when test subjects are exposed to Spanish-language text 
(Hopkins, Tran, and Williamson 2014; Newman, Hartman, and Taber 2012). It is a 
reasonable expectation that such passive exposure to Spanish will occur more 
frequently in areas with larger proportions of Hispanics or with rapidly growing 
Hispanic populations. The reason for observing such effects is that ‚the Spanish 
language operates as a potent cue on immigration-related issues,‛ increasing the 
salience of immigration (Hopkins, Tran, and Williamson 2014, 37). Exposure to 
Spanish within one’s own local milieu may also engender a sense of cultural threat, 
which in turn leads to more restrictionist immigration attitudes (Enos 2014; 
Newman, Hartman, and Taber 2012). 
 While proximity to the US–Mexico border provides cues through border 
checkpoints, fences and warning signs and thus heightens perceptions of threat, 
border proximity also influences the media environment in which individuals 
reside. Media content analysis has shown that newspapers closer to the US–Mexico 
border publish negative stories about immigration (both authorized and 
unauthorized) more frequently than those further away (Branton and Dunaway 
2009a; Branton and Dunaway 2009b). Dunaway and colleagues (2010) find that 
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media coverage of immigration in turn raises both the salience of the issue among 
the public and engenders more restrictionist immigration attitudes, though Lawlor 
(2015) finds that the effects of contextual factors (such as the proportion of foreign-
born residents) on media framing of immigration are inconsistent. 
5.5 Data and Methods 
 The data for this study are a representative survey of the American public 
conducted by the Pew Research Center between June 12–16, 2013 using a dual-frame 
sample design comprising landline and cellular telephone samples (n = 1,512). The 
response rates (AAPOR RR3 definition) for the survey were 8.7 percent and 5.8 
percent for the landline and cell phone samples, respectively. In keeping with both 
the substantive focus and methodological practice of much of the literature on 
American immigration attitudes, I limit my analysis to the sub-sample of non-
Hispanic white respondents. I further limit my analysis to data from the lower 48 
continental states (since Alaska and Hawaii do not share a border with Mexico), 
bringing my final sample to 1,086. 
 The key measure of Americans’ attitudes toward illegal immigration is a 
dichotomous survey item that asks: ‚Which comes closer to your view about how to 
handle undocumented immigrants who are now living in the US? They should not 
be allowed to stay in the country legally, [or] there should be a way for them to stay 
in the country legally, if certain requirements are met.‛ The first response category 
thus expresses a restrictionist sentiment in that it proposes to continue to exclude 
undocumented immigrants from legal residence and citizenship in the US, while the 
second response category expresses greater openness to immigration and greater 
willingness to extend the rights of citizenship. The first response is a form of moral 
parochialism, in that the right to reside in the US ought to be restricted largely to 
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those having acquired that right by birth, or those having become naturalized 
citizens or having other legal status (cf. Wong 2010). The second response speaks to 
the liberal (or Tocquevillian) tradition in American national identity that stresses 
openness, freedom and egalitarianism (R. M. Smith 1993) as well as incorporationist 
notions of pluralism and tolerance (Schildkraut 2007). In the statistical analyses that 
follow, the second response category (‚there should be a way for them to stay in the 
country legally‛) serves as the modelled outcome. 
The Pew data indicate that 32 percent of non-Hispanic white Americans 
would exclude undocumented immigrants from residence and citizenship, while 66 
percent are prepared to allow them to regularize their status in the US given a set of 
requirements. These results are consistent with those of other research organizations 
from the mid-2000s to the present, with opposition to allowing undocumented 
immigrants to stay typically in the range of 26 to 32 percent, and support for 
allowing them to say (whether as temporary workers or as citizens) in the range of 
64 to 70 percent (Muste 2013, 407–409).  
The Pew survey data contain the individual attitudinal and behavioural 
variables of interest, including measures of party identification, contact with 
undocumented immigrants, as well as relevant demographic and attitudinal 
controls. (Full details of the data coding appear in Appendix 5A.) To measure of 
respondents’ ethnic context, I use the percentage of Hispanics at the county level 
taken from the 2010 US Census of Population (www.census.gov/popest/). I also 
calculate the percentage point change in Hispanic population between the 2000 and 
2010 decennial censes (see Figures 5.1–5.2 and 5.5–5.6). While counties are not the 
most granular measure of local context, the only indicators available in the Pew data 
are county FIPS codes and ZIP codes. Still, it is important to stress that counties are 
politically consequential ‚containers‛ in the American context: elections and the 
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provision of certain public goods take place at the county level (Branton and Jones 
2005; Glaser 1994). Counties also approximate media markets (cf. Branton and 
Dunaway 2009a; Branton and Dunaway 2009b).2 
Obtaining a measure of spatial proximity to the US–Mexico border is more 
involved. To calculate this, I first geocode (append latitude-longitude coordinates 
to) individual survey respondents based on reported ZIP codes and ZIP codes 
retained from the telephone sample files. Nearly all respondents (1,076, or 99 
percent) were geocoded using ZIP codes, with the remaining 10 respondents 
geocoded based on county FIPS codes. Next, I perform a join between the survey 
data and a digitized map (shapefile) of the US–Mexico border to calculate the 
distance between each respondent and the border (see Figures 5.3–5.4).3 
  Since missing data can introduce bias into the model parameter estimates 
and also reduce statistical power, missing survey data were imputed 10 times in 
order to retain all cases in the regression analysis (Allison 2001; Little and Rubin 
2002). The binary logit models of the multiply-imputed data were then fit using 
procedures that account for the complex sample design used in collecting the survey 
                                                                                             
2. A comment is warranted on how contextual variables ought to be scaled. Most research 
simply uses the percentage of a racial or ethnic group within a particular area (see e.g., Branton 
et al. 2007; Citrin, Reingold, and Green 1990; Hood and Morris 1997; Schildkraut 2011), or the 
percentage point change in area ethnic composition over time (Hopkins 2010; Hopkins 2011; 
Newman 2013; Newman and Velez 2014). This reflects the assumption that the relationship 
between the percentage (or percentage point change) of a group in a given area and individual 
attitudes is linear. By contrast, classic work in the psychology of sensory perception 
(psychophysics) points to a logarithmic relationship. ‚Fechner’s law‛ states that the perceived 
magnitude of a stimulus is a logarithmic function of its physical magnitude (Laming 2011; 
Leshner and Pfaff 2011). Modelling a logarithmic relationship has the further intuitive appeal 
that an increase in the local Hispanic population from, say, 5 percent to 10 percent registers as a 
larger increase than a nominally identical increase from 40 percent to 45 percent. 
3. As with ethnic context, a similar argument can be made in favour of a logarithmic 
transformation of geodetic distances (such as distance to the US–Mexico border). The idea of a 
‚distance decay function‛ has a long lineage in geography (Taylor 1971). Further, research on 
policy attitudes in several substantive domains finds that the effect of distance to salient 
geographic features follows a logarithmic (and not a linear) trend (Berezin and Díez Medrano 
2008; Gravelle 2014a; Gravelle 2014b). 
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data. These results were then combined according to procedures detailed by Rubin 
(1987) to produce the final reported results.4 
5.6 Results and Discussion 
The models reported in Table 5.1 yield several findings of note. Looking at 
the main effects of the independent variables in Model 5.1, there is only a 
marginally significant negative effect (p = 0.070) of Republican Party identification 
(after controlling for demographics, contact, and contextual factors) on allowing 
authorized immigrants to stay, suggesting that the partisan cleavage between 
Democrats and Republicans is neither large nor robust. The data thus fail to confirm 
H1. This contrasts with previous findings of a partisan cleavage in immigration 
policy attitudes (e.g., Hajnal and Rivera 2014). 
Also, while the coefficient for contact with undocumented immigrants is 
positively signed (and thus in the theoretically expected direction), it does not 
approach conventional levels of statistical significance. This finding of no significant 
effect of contact with undocumented immigrants is in line with the null results for 
different forms of ‚impersonal contact‛ (such as contact with recent immigrants in 
service establishment settings) reported by Harrison (2006). It contrasts, however, 
with the results reported by Ellison and colleagues (2011) and McLaren (2003) 
where contact reduces restrictionist sentiment. The critical distinction appears to be 
in the quality of contact. The Pew questionnaire prompts respondents to think about 
contact with known or suspected undocumented immigrants in one’s daily life, 
while the data relied upon by Ellison and colleagues and McLaren ask specifically 
about Latino or immigrant friends. This arguably speaks to the distinction between 
                                                                                             
4. The multiple imputations were conducted using the IVEware 0.1 add-in program for 
SAS (Raghunathan et al. 2001). The logit models were fit using SAS PROC SURVEYLOGISTIC, 
with results then submitted to SAS PROC MIANALYZE to combine the imputations. 
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‚casual contact‛ and more meaningful ‚acquaintance‛ in Allport’s (1954) original 
articulation of contact theory. The measure of contact provided by the Pew data 
thus may not tap the kinds of contact necessary to influence immigration policy 
attitudes.5 
The effects of the contextual variables (county Hispanic percentage, Hispanic 
percentage-point change and proximity to the US–Mexico border) in Model 5.1 
appear even more disappointing, as none yield significant results, though it is 
important to recall that no specific expectations about their simple main effects were 
advanced. Still, it appears that the significant effects of being college educated and 
holding a positive view of the direction of the national economy point to the merit 
of the liberalizing education and labour market competition hypotheses. 
It may still be case, however, that the effect of partisanship is conditional 
upon ethnic or spatial context. Models 5.2 to 5.4 test the expectation that different 
contexts influence Democrats and Republicans differently by testing separate 
interactions between party identification and each of county-level Hispanic 
population percentage, Hispanic population percentage point change, and 
proximity to the US–Mexico border (corresponding to H3, H4, and H5, respectively). 
The results confirm that an interaction is present in each instance. Each of the 
interaction effects is statistically significant (using a likelihood ratio chi-square test 
comparing each of Models 5.2 to 5.4 to the main effects-only Model 5.1). Further, the 
statistically significant coefficients for the product terms between Republican Party 
identification and Hispanic percentage (Model 5.2), Hispanic percentage point 
change (Model 5.3), and distance to the US–Mexico border (Model 5.4) imply that 
                                                                                             
5. It is worth noting that these results are not due to collinearity between self-reported 
contact and the contextual measures. The bivariate (Pearson) correlations between contact and 
county-level Hispanic percentage (r = 0.17), county-level Hispanic percentage point change (r = 
0.13), and logged distance to the US–Mexico border (r = –0.16) are weak. 
236 
  
the attitudes of Republican Party identifiers toward illegal immigration are 
influenced by ethnic and spatial context differently than Democrats. The results 
therefore confirm each of H3, H4, and H5. They also reconfirm the finding of 
heterogeneous effects of context on Democrats’ and Republicans’ immigration 
policy attitudes (G. Hawley 2011; Hopkins 2014). 
To gain a better substantive understanding of these interactions, predicted 
probabilities for the ‚stay in the country legally‛ response can be plotted for the 
separate categories of party identification (the focal independent variable) while 
varying the values of the moderator variables, county Hispanic percentage, county 
Hispanic percentage point change, and distance to the US–Mexico border. Given a 
categorical focal independent variable and a continuous moderator variable, this is 
the strategy recommended by Jaccard and Dodge (2004, 245–246). How these 
predicted probabilities vary when values of the moderator variables range from low 
values to high values gives us insight into the interaction effects. I thus generate 
predicted probabilities for Democrats and Republicans separately, setting all other 
variables at their means (or reference categories), setting the Census Region to the 
West, and then varying the values of the contextual and spatial factors in Models 5.2 
to 5.4. (The Y axes in the figures plot the predicted probabilities of providing a ‚stay 
in the country legally‛ response.) These plots provide visual confirmation that the 
effects of ethnic (Hispanic) context on non-Hispanic white Democrats and 
Republicans differ markedly. As Figure 5.7 (based on Model 5.2) indicates, a 
Democrat in a county with a 5 percent Hispanic population has a predicted 
probability of supporting undocumented immigrants staying in the US of 0.79 while 
a Republican has a predicted probability of 0.73. In a county with a 10 percent 
Hispanic population, the predicted probabilities for Democrats and Republicans are 
0.83 and 0.73, respectively. Further increasing the county Hispanic population to 20 
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or even 50 percent puts the predicted probabilities for Democrats and Republicans 
at 0.87 and 0.72, and 0.91 and 0.72, respectively. The substantive conclusions, then, 
are that while increasing Hispanic concentration at the county level leads to more 
accommodationist immigration attitudes among Democrats, there is no effect 
among Republicans. Further, increasing prevalence of Hispanics at the county level 
creates more polarized opinions about illegal immigration among non-Hispanic 
white partisans. 
Looking at the interaction between party identification and Hispanic 
population percentage point change in Model 5.3 (and plotted in Figure 5.8), it is 
clear that there is a similar dynamic in that progressively larger changes in the 
county-level ethnic context produces ever greater partisan cleavages. A Democrat in 
a county that experienced a 2 percentage point increase in the Hispanic population 
between 2000 and 2010 has a predicted probability of supporting undocumented 
immigrants staying in the US of 0.79 while a Republican has a predicted probability 
of 0.75. Considering a county that experienced a 4 percentage point increase in the 
Hispanic population the respective predicted probabilities for Democrats and 
Republicans are 0.83 and 0.71. Considering counties that experienced either a 6 or 8 
percentage point increase, the predicted probabilities for Democrats and 
Republicans are 0.86 and 0.69, and 0.87 and 0.65, respectively. These results suggest 
that change in ethnic context – and the fear associated with change – has a greater 
moderating effect than ethnic context as such. 
In the case of spatial context in Model 5.4 (plotted in Figure 5.9), proximity to 
the US–Mexico border similarly acts to amplify partisan differences (or conversely, 
distance acts to mute partisan differences). To illustrate, a Democrat 50 kilometres 
from the US-Mexico border has a predicted probability of supporting 
undocumented immigrants staying in the US of 0.95 while a Republican has a 
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predicted probability of 0.54. Moving to 200 kilometres, the predicted probabilities 
for Democrats and Republicans are 0.91 and 0.63. Moving further still to 1,000 or 
even 2,000 kilometres from the border, the predicted probabilities for Democrats 
and Republicans are 0.83 and 0.72, and 0.79 and 0.75, respectively. 
Further insight into these interactive relationships can be gained by repeating 
the regression analysis and re-centring the contextual variables at different values to 
see how the coefficients for party identification (and their confidence intervals) 
change. These methods reveal the range of values of the moderator variables over 
which the effect of party identification holds (Brambor, Clark, and Golder 2006; 
Braumoeller 2004; Jaccard 2001). Probing the party identification × county Hispanic 
percentage interaction in this way reveals that the effect of Republican Party 
identification is only significant in counties with a Hispanic population of 6.3 
percent or greater (see Figure 5.10). This is to say that in counties where the 
Hispanic population is a relatively small proportion – roughly one in 16 people or 
fewer – party identification plays no role in attitudes toward permitting 
undocumented immigrants to remain in the US. It is only in areas with 
proportionately larger Hispanic populations that party identification becomes 
activated, producing an effect on policy preference, where Republicans are less 
likely to favour allowing undocumented immigrants to stay in the country. 
Probing the party identification × county Hispanic percentage point change 
interaction reveals that the effect of Republican identification is significant only in 
counties where the percentage point change in the Hispanic population is a 2.8 
percentage point increase or greater (see Figure 5.12). Increases of this magnitude 
were observed in 801 of 3,143 (or 25.5 percent) of the counties in the US between the 
2000 and 2010 decennial censes. Thus, it is only in counties where there is marked 
growth in the proportion of Hispanics that Republicans exhibit more restrictionist 
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attitudes than Democrats. In those areas where the relative size of the Hispanic 
population is unchanged over time (or is growing only slowly), all else equal, 
Republicans and Democrats are statistically indistinguishable from one another.6 
As for the party identification × US–Mexico border proximity interaction, 
probing reveals that the partisan difference between Democrats and Republicans is 
significant for distances less than or equal to 1,481 kilometers – somewhat less than 
the weighted sample mean of 1,660 kilometers, and roughly the distance from 
northern California to Tijuana, Mexico, or Missouri to Nuevo Laredo, Mexico (see 
Figure 5.14). What this implies, then, is that proximity to the US–Mexico border 
widens the differences in opinions between non-Hispanic white partisans over a 
large expanse of the US, but not among those in the densely-populated (and 
evidently far-removed) Northeast. Nevertheless, ethnic context (and change in 
ethnic context) may still be pertinent in these parts of the US. 
Though there is little theoretical basis for expecting self-reported contact to 
exert different effects on Democrats and Republicans, one may still test an 
interaction between reported contact with undocumented immigrants and party 
identification as an empirical exercise. Such an interaction, however, turns out to be 
                                                                                             
6. The results also indicate that Republicans are more (not less) likely to favour a policy of 
allowing undocumented immigrants to remain in the US when the percentage point change is 
–2.3 or less. This result, however, is very likely a statistical artefact, as such a decrease describes 
only 9 of 3,143 (or 0.3 percent) of counties in the US, and only a single county contained in the 
Pew data – Arlington County, Virginia. 
One should also note that the key results from Models 5.2–5.4 are robust to the addition 
of numerous other variables that may also influence attitudes toward undocumented 
immigrants, including views of undocumented immigrants taking jobs, the importance of 
immigration legislation, perceptions of change in one's family's financial situation, employment 
status, county unemployment rate, and county median family income. Including these 
additional individual-level and contextual variables in the model do yield some additional 
significant effects (specifically for the variables measuring views of undocumented immigrants 
taking jobs and the importance of immigration legislation – variables that are closely related 
conceptually to the dependent variable), but their inclusion in the model has no appreciable 
effects on the parameter estimates for the interactions between party identification, county 
Hispanic percentage, county Hispanic percentage point change, and distance to the US–Mexico 
border tested in Models 5.2–5.4. See Models 5.6–5.8 in Table 5.4. 
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non-significant. Consequently, there is neither a simple main effect of contact nor a 
more nuanced moderated effect involving party identification. (These results are 
reported as Model 5.5 in Table 5.1) 
Given the focus on contact, demographic and spatial contexts, and partisan 
identification in these analyses, a comment is warranted on self-selection bias. It 
may be the case that individuals select into (or out of) specific demographic contexts 
or situations where particular types of contact are expected based on their political 
(or other) characteristics (Pettigrew and Tropp 2006). A scenario in line with this 
argument is that Republicans select out of ethno-racially diverse areas, and 
conversely, Democrats select into such areas. Similarly, Republicans may be more 
likely than Democrats to view any Hispanic they encounter as a possible 
undocumented immigrant. While outwardly plausible, tests of such residential 
selection processes in previous research on racial and immigration attitudes find 
little support. For example, Ha (2008, 37–39) finds that racial prejudice fails to 
predict whites’ proximity to minority groups. Oliver and Wong (2003, 578–579) 
similarly find that the effect of demographic context on anti-Latino affect remains 
robust to the inclusion of a variable capturing preferences for living in a majority-
white neighbourhood in the model. Prejudice thus fails explain away the 
relationship between area demographic composition and anti-Latino affect. Most 
convincingly, Hopkins (2010) uses panel data to address the limitations of cross-
sectional data and similarly concludes that the direction of the relationship is from 
local context to individual immigration attitudes, and not the reverse. 
As further confirmation of this point, supplementary analyses regress contact 
with undocumented immigrants and the contextual variables on party 
identification, ideology and demographic controls (see Tables 5.3 and 5.4). For the 
residential self-selection argument to have support, party identification (and 
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possibly also ideology) ought to have significant effects on these measures of contact 
and context. The results fail to demonstrate any consistent relationships between the 
political variables and measures of contact and context. The effect of party 
identification is not significant in any of these models, and only modest effects for 
conservative ideological self-placement occur in the models for county-level 
Hispanic percent and distance to the US–Mexico border. Underwhelming results 
such as these cast further doubt on the residential self-selection argument. 
5.7 Conclusion 
 This article began by asking whether contact or context mattered more in 
shaping Americans’ attitudes toward illegal immigration. The results I present here 
point in favour of context over contact. Having contact with known or suspected 
undocumented immigrants did not have a significant effect on attitudes toward 
illegal immigration. One should not be too quick, though, to take this as a finding 
contrary to intergroup contact theory, as the measure of contact employed here may 
not adequately capture the kinds of close personal contact and friendship that the 
proponents of intergroup contact theory stipulate are required to reduce out-group 
prejudice (Allport 1954; Amir 1969; Pettigrew 1998). Further research should 
endeavour to test the effects of more refined measures of intergroup contact on 
immigration policy attitudes while simultaneously testing the effects of racial/ethnic 
and spatial context. 
The findings of this article do make a compelling case for the relevance of 
context – or rather, contexts – and also for conceptualizing context as more than a 
mere proxy or substitute measure of contact. Individual-level preferences over 
whether undocumented immigrants should be permitted to remain in the US or 
compelled to leave bear the imprint of local ethnic context and the change in this 
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context that occurs over time. They also bear the imprint of spatial context, namely 
proximity to Mexico, the primary source of immigrants to the US. Further, I show 
that different contexts have important roles in amplifying (or muting) the effect of 
party identification. The varied results of previous research in testing the effects of 
different contextual measures may be due to the failure to consider that not all 
individuals experience a given context in the same way. A Democrat and a 
Republican in a high-density Hispanic area, or an area experiencing rapid 
demographic change with an influx of Hispanics, or in a locale close to the US–
Mexico border will perceive their milieu differently, and their attitudes about how 
the US ought to deal with the challenges posed by undocumented immigrants will 
differ as a consequence. 
While this article presents evidence that a number of spatial and contextual 
factors moderate the effect of party identification on attitudes toward illegal 
immigration, there is a need for further research clarifying the mechanisms through 
which these factors operate. Local ethnic context, change in ethnic context and 
proximity to the US–Mexico border may be linked to attitudes toward illegal 
immigration through other factors, such as passive language exposure (Enos 2014; 
Hopkins, Tran, and Williamson 2014), exposure to negative media content on illegal 
immigration (Dunaway, Branton, and Abrajano 2010), and feelings of cultural threat 
(Newman, Hartman, and Taber 2012). Other possible paths through which spatial 
and contextual variables might influence immigration attitudes are local discussion 
networks (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995) and perceptions of local group interests 
(Cutler 2007). Designing survey instruments to test such possible mediated 
relationships will further advance our understanding of Americans’ attitudes 
toward immigration issues. 
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Finally, it is important to note that my analyses do not exhaust the ways in 
which context might be conceptualized and measured. Specifically, in testing the 
effects of demographic context at the county level, it is important to remain open to 
the possibility of other, perhaps countervailing dynamics operating at an even more 
local level (Baybeck 2008). In short, numerous avenues of inquiry relating to the 
politics of immigration in the US and the interactive dynamics of individual political 
characteristics, spatial context, and proximity remain to be explored. 
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Table 5.1: Explaining American Attitudes toward Illegal Immigration (Binary Logit) 
 
 
 Model 5.1  Model 5.2  Model 5.3  
 
b (SE) 
 
b (SE) 
 
b (SE)  
Intercept 0.63 (0.33) † 0.76 (0.33) * 0.71 (0.33) * 
Male -0.03 (0.17) 
 
-0.03 (0.17) 
 
-0.02 (0.17)  
Age (ln years) -0.14 (0.20) 
 
-0.14 (0.21) 
 
-0.13 (0.21)  
Education: College 0.60 (0.17) *** 0.57 (0.17) ** 0.59 (0.17) *** 
Region (ref = Northeast)          
Midwest 0.15 (0.26) 
 
0.09 (0.26) 
 
0.12 (0.26)  
South 0.40 (0.27) 
 
0.34 (0.27) 
 
0.38 (0.27)  
West 0.77 (0.34) * 0.71 (0.35) * 0.75 (0.34)  
Economy (ref = About the same)          
Getting worse -0.73 (0.19) *** -0.75 (0.19) *** -0.74 (0.19) *** 
Getting better 0.75 (0.23) *** 0.73 (0.23) ** 0.74 (0.23) ** 
Party identification (ref = Democrat)          
Independent -0.35 (0.31) 
 
-0.46 (0.31) 
 
-0.42 (0.32)  
Republican -0.39 (0.22) † -0.47 (0.22) * -0.45 (0.22) * 
Ideology (ref = Liberal)          
Moderate 0.04 (0.27) 
 
0.05 (0.27) 
 
0.06 (0.27)  
Conservative -0.39 (0.30) 
 
-0.38 (0.30) 
 
-0.39 (0.30)  
Contact with Unauthorized Immigrants 0.25 (0.19) 
 
0.26 (0.19) 
 
0.25 (0.19)  
ln County Hispanic % 0.13 (0.16) 
 
0.41 (0.21) * 0.13 (0.16)  
ln County Hispanic % point change -0.12 (0.51) 
 
-0.08 (0.52) 
 
0.94 (0.63)  
ln Distance to US-Mexico border (km) 0.21 (0.16) 
 
0.14 (0.16) 
 
0.18 (0.16)  
Independent × ln County Hispanic %  — 
 
-0.53 (0.30) †  —  
Republican × ln County Hispanic %  — 
 
-0.45 (0.18) *  —  
Independent × 
ln County Hispanic % point change 
 — 
 
 — 
 
-0.94 (1.07)  
Republican × 
ln County Hispanic % point change 
 — 
 
 — 
 
-1.71 (0.64) ** 
Independent × 
ln Distance to US-Mexico border 
 — 
 
 — 
 
 —  
Republican × 
ln Distance to US-Mexico border 
 — 
 
 — 
 
 —  
Independent × Contact w/ Unauth. Immig.  —   —   —  
Republican × Contact w/ Unauth. Immig.  —   —   —  
N 1,086  
  
 1,086  
  
 1,086    
Model χ2 135.82 *** 
 
146.72 *** 
 
145.26 ***  
Likelihood Ratio χ2 — 
  
10.90 ** 
 
9.44 **  
Nagelkerke pseudo-R2 0.16 
  
0.18 
  
0.17   
† p ≤ 0.10; * p ≤ 0.05; ** p ≤ 0.01; *** p ≤ 0.001 
Source: Pew Research Center, 2013 
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Table 5.1: Explaining American Attitudes toward Illegal Immigration (Binary Logit), 
cont’d. 
 Model 5.4  Model 5.5  
 
b (SE) 
 
b (SE) 
 
Intercept 0.83 (0.35) * 0.55 (0.34)  
Male -0.08 (0.17)  -0.02 (0.17)  
Age (ln years) -0.16 (0.20)  -0.22 (0.34)  
Education: College 0.61 (0.17) *** 0.6 (0.17) *** 
Region (ref = Northeast)       
Midwest 0.06 (0.26)  0.14 (0.26)  
South 0.29 (0.28)  0.42 (0.27)  
West 0.66 (0.35) † 0.76 (0.34) * 
Economy (ref = About the same)       
Getting worse -0.73 (0.19) *** -0.74 (0.19) *** 
Getting better 0.76 (0.23) *** 0.75 (0.23) *** 
Party identification (ref = Democrat)       
Independent -0.44 (0.31)  -0.43 (0.34)  
Republican -0.48 (0.22) * -0.25 (0.24)  
Ideology (ref = Liberal)       
Moderate 0.04 (0.27)  0.05 (0.27)  
Conservative -0.38 (0.30)  -0.39 (0.30)  
Contact with Unauthorized Immigrants 0.25 (0.19)  0.56 (0.37)  
ln County Hispanic % 0.17 (0.16)  0.13 (0.16)  
ln County Hispanic % point change -0.27 (0.51)  -0.13 (0.52)  
ln Distance to US-Mexico border (km) -0.41 (0.34)  0.21 (0.16)  
Independent × ln County Hispanic %  —   —  
Republican × ln County Hispanic %  —   —  
Independent × 
ln County Hispanic % point change 
 —   —  
Republican × 
ln County Hispanic % point change 
 —   —  
Independent × 
ln Distance to US-Mexico border 
1.23 (0.46) **  —  
Republican × 
ln Distance to US-Mexico border 
0.67 (0.33) *  —  
Independent × Contact w/ Unauth. Immig.  —  0.22 (0.79)  
Republican × Contact w/ Unauth. Immig.  —  -0.54 (0.43)  
N  1,086    1,086    
Model χ2 147.79 ***  139.46 ***  
Likelihood Ratio χ2 11.98 **  3.64   
Nagelkerke pseudo-R2 0.18  0.17  
† p ≤ 0.10; * p ≤ 0.05; ** p ≤ 0.01; *** p ≤ 0.001 
Source: Pew Research Center, 2013 
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Table 5.2: Explaining American Attitudes toward Illegal Immigration (Binary Logit), 
Republican as Reference Category 
 Model 5.2-R  Model 5.3-R  Model 5.4-R  
 
b (SE) 
 
b (SE) 
 
b (SE)  
Intercept 0.29 (0.37) 
 
0.71 (0.33) * 0.35 (0.37)  
Male -0.03 (0.17) 
 
-0.02 (0.17) 
 
-0.08 (0.17)  
Age (ln years) -0.23 (0.35) 
 
-0.13 (0.21) 
 
-0.27 (0.34)  
Education: College 0.57 (0.17) ** 0.59 (0.17) *** 0.61 (0.17) *** 
Region (ref = Northeast)          
Midwest 0.09 (0.26) 
 
0.12 (0.26) 
 
0.06 (0.26)  
South 0.34 (0.27) 
 
0.38 (0.27) 
 
0.29 (0.28)  
West 0.71 (0.35) * 0.75 (0.34) 
 
0.66 (0.35) † 
Economy (ref = About the same)          
Getting worse -0.75 (0.19) *** -0.74 (0.19) *** -0.73 (0.19) *** 
Getting better 0.73 (0.23) ** 0.74 (0.23) ** 0.76 (0.23) *** 
Party identification (ref = Republican)          
Democrat 0.47 (0.22) * -0.42 (0.32) 
 
0.48 (0.22) * 
Independent 0.01 (0.30) 
 
-0.45 (0.22) * 0.05 (0.29)  
Ideology (ref = Liberal)          
Moderate 0.05 (0.27) 
 
0.06 (0.27) 
 
0.04 (0.27)  
Conservative -0.38 (0.30) 
 
-0.39 (0.30) 
 
-0.38 (0.30)  
Contact with Unauthorized Immigrants 0.26 (0.19) 
 
0.25 (0.19) 
 
0.25 (0.19)  
ln County Hispanic % -0.04 (0.17) 
 
0.13 (0.16) 
 
0.17 (0.16)  
ln County Hispanic % point change -0.08 (0.52) 
 
-0.77 (0.58) 
 
-0.27 (0.51)  
ln Distance to US-Mexico border (km) 0.14 (0.16) 
 
0.18 (0.16) 
 
0.25 (0.17)  
Democrat × ln County Hispanic % 0.45 (0.18) *  —   —  
Independent × ln County Hispanic % -0.08 (0.28) 
 
 —   —  
Democrat × 
ln County Hispanic % point change 
 — 
 
1.71 (0.64) **  —  
Independent × 
ln County Hispanic % point change 
 — 
 
0.77 (1.01) 
 
 —  
Democrat × 
ln Distance to US-Mexico border 
 — 
 
 — 
 
-0.67 (0.33) * 
Independent × 
ln Distance to US-Mexico border 
 — 
 
 — 
 
0.57 (0.36)  
N  1,086  
  
 1,086  
  
 1,086    
Model χ2 146.72 *** 
 
145.26 *** 
 
145.26 ***  
Likelihood Ratio χ2 10.90 ** 
 
9.44 ** 
 
9.44 **  
Nagelkerke pseudo-R2 0.18 
  
0.17 
  
0.17   
† p ≤ 0.10; * p ≤ 0.05; ** p ≤ 0.01; *** p ≤ 0.001 
Source: Pew Research Center, 2013 
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Table 5.3: Explaining American Attitudes toward Illegal Immigration (Binary Logit), 
Independent as Reference Category 
 Model 5.2-I  Model 5.3-I  Model 5.4-I  
 
b (SE) 
 
b (SE) 
 
b (SE)  
Intercept 0.30 (0.42) 
 
0.30 (0.43) * 0.40 (0.42)  
Male -0.03 (0.17) 
 
-0.02 (0.17) 
 
-0.08 (0.17)  
Age (ln years) -0.23 (0.35) 
 
-0.22 (0.35) 
 
-0.27 (0.34)  
Education: College 0.57 (0.17) ** 0.59 (0.17) *** 0.61 (0.17) *** 
Region (ref = Northeast)          
Midwest 0.09 (0.26) 
 
0.12 (0.26) 
 
0.06 (0.26)  
South 0.34 (0.27) 
 
0.38 (0.27) 
 
0.29 (0.28)  
West 0.71 (0.35) * 0.75 (0.34) 
 
0.66 (0.35) † 
Economy (ref = About the same)          
Getting worse -0.75 (0.19) *** -0.74 (0.19) *** -0.73 (0.19) *** 
Getting better 0.73 (0.23) ** 0.74 (0.23) ** 0.76 (0.23) *** 
Party identification (ref = Independent)          
Democrat 0.46 (0.31) 
 
0.42 (0.32) 
 
0.44 (0.31)  
Republican -0.01 (0.30) 
 
-0.04 (0.31) * -0.05 (0.29)  
Ideology (ref = Liberal)          
Moderate 0.05 (0.27) 
 
0.06 (0.27) 
 
0.04 (0.27)  
Conservative -0.38 (0.30) 
 
-0.39 (0.30) 
 
-0.38 (0.30)  
Contact with Unauthorized Immigrants 0.26 (0.19) 
 
0.25 (0.19) 
 
0.25 (0.19)  
ln County Hispanic % -0.12 (0.30) 
 
0.13 (0.16) 
 
0.17 (0.16)  
ln County Hispanic % point change -0.08 (0.52) 
 
0.00 (1.02) 
 
-0.27 (0.51)  
ln Distance to US-Mexico border (km) 0.14 (0.16) 
 
0.18 (0.16) 
 
0.82 (0.36) * 
Democrat × ln County Hispanic % 0.53 (0.30) †  —  -1.23 (0.46) ** 
Republican × ln County Hispanic % 0.08 (0.28) 
 
 —  -0.57 (0.36)  
Democrat × 
ln County Hispanic % point change 
 — 
 
0.94 (1.07) 
 
 —  
Republican × 
ln County Hispanic % point change 
 — 
 
-0.77 (1.01) 
 
 —  
Democrat × 
ln Distance to US-Mexico border 
 — 
 
 — 
 
-0.67 (0.33) * 
Republican × 
ln Distance to US-Mexico border 
 — 
 
 — 
 
0.57 (0.36)  
N  1,086  
  
 1,086  
  
 1,086    
Model χ2 146.72 *** 
 
145.26 *** 
 
145.26 ***  
Likelihood Ratio χ2 10.90 ** 
 
9.44 ** 
 
9.44 **  
Nagelkerke pseudo-R2 0.18 
  
0.17 
  
0.17   
† p ≤ 0.10; * p ≤ 0.05; ** p ≤ 0.01; *** p ≤ 0.001 
Source: Pew Research Center, 2013 
248 
  
Table 5.4: Explaining American Attitudes toward Illegal Immigration (Binary Logit), 
Expanded Models 
 
 Model 5.6  Model 5.7  
 
b (SE) 
 
b (SE) 
 
Intercept 0.37 (0.56) 
 
0.56 (0.56) 
 
Male 0.06 (0.18) 
 
0.05 (0.18) 
 
Age (ln years) -0.38 (0.37) 
 
-0.39 (0.37) 
 
Education: College 0.26 (0.19) 
 
0.22 (0.19) 
 
Region (ref = Northeast)       
Midwest 0.16 (0.29) 
 
0.12 (0.29) 
 
South 0.30 (0.31) 
 
0.25 (0.31) 
 
West 0.86 (0.36) * 0.80 (0.36) * 
Economy (ref = About the same)       
Getting Worse -0.39 (0.21) † -0.41 (0.21) † 
Getting Better 0.63 (0.25) * 0.62 (0.25) * 
Family Fin. Situation (ref = Stay the same)       
Getting Worse -0.15 (0.43)  -0.19 (0.43)  
Improving -0.04 (0.40)  -0.07 (0.40)  
Undocumented Immigrants Take Jobs -2.61 (0.32) *** -2.64 (0.32) *** 
Importance of Immigration Legislation 0.68 (0.30) * 0.64 (0.30) * 
Party identification (ref = Democrat)       
Independent -0.02 (0.35) 
 
-0.15 (0.35) 
 
Republican -0.17 (0.24) 
 
-0.25 (0.24) 
 
Ideology (ref = Liberal)       
Moderate 0.03 (0.30) 
 
0.02 (0.31) 
 
Conservative -0.37 (0.33) 
 
-0.36 (0.33) 
 
Contact with Unauthorized Immigrants 0.14 (0.21) 
 
0.16 (0.21) 
 
ln County Hispanic % 0.11 (0.19) † 0.39 (0.23) 
 
ln County Hispanic % point change -0.19 (0.60) 
 
-0.13 (0.62) 
 
ln Distance to US-Mexico border (km) 0.18 (0.17) 
 
0.10 (0.17) 
 
Independent × ln County Hispanic %  — 
 
-0.67 (0.34) * 
Republican × ln County Hispanic %  — 
 
-0.43 (0.19) * 
Independent × 
ln County Hispanic % point change 
 —   —  
Republican × 
ln County Hispanic % point change 
 —   —  
Independent × 
ln Distance to US-Mexico border 
 — 
 
 — 
 
Republican × 
ln Distance to US-Mexico border 
 — 
 
 — 
 
County Unemployment Rate (%) -0.014 (0.053)  -0.005 (0.055)  
County Median Family Income ($000) -0.003 (0.007)  -0.002 (0.007)  
N 1,086  
  
1,086  
  Model χ2 278.89 *** 
 
289.23 *** 
 
Likelihood Ratio χ2 — *** 
 
10.34 ** 
 
Nagelkerke pseudo-R2 0.32 
  
0.33 
  
† p ≤ 0.10; * p ≤ 0.05; ** p ≤ 0.01; *** p ≤ 0.001 
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Table 5.4: Explaining American Attitudes toward Illegal Immigration (Binary Logit), 
Expanded Models, cont’d. 
 
 Model 5.8  Model 5.9  
 
b (SE) 
 
b (SE)  
Intercept 0.55 (0.56) 
 
0.60 (0.57)  
Male 0.06 (0.18) 
 
0.02 (0.18)  
Age (ln years) -0.38 (0.37) 
 
-0.42 (0.37)  
Education: College 0.24 (0.19) 
 
0.27 (0.20)  
Region (ref = Northeast)       
Midwest 0.14 (0.29) 
 
0.08 (0.29)  
South 0.28 (0.31) 
 
0.20 (0.31)  
West 0.81 (0.36) * 0.75 (0.37) * 
Economy (ref = About the same)       
Getting Worse -0.40 (0.21) † -0.39 (0.21) † 
Getting Better 0.64 (0.25) * 0.63 (0.25) * 
Family Fin. Situation (ref = Stay the same)       
Getting Worse -0.18 (0.43)  -0.20 (0.44)  
Improving -0.09 (0.41)  -0.09 (0.41)  
Undocumented Immigrants Take Jobs -2.62 (0.32) *** -2.65 (0.32) *** 
Importance of Immigration Legislation 0.62 (0.30) * 0.74 (0.31) * 
Party identification (ref = Democrat)       
Independent -0.12 (0.36) 
 
-0.12 (0.34)  
Republican -0.24 (0.24) 
 
-0.28 (0.25)  
Ideology (ref = Liberal)       
Moderate 0.02 (0.31) 
 
0.03 (0.30)  
Conservative -0.38 (0.33) 
 
-0.36 (0.33)  
Contact with Unauthorized Immigrants 0.15 (0.21) 
 
0.14 (0.21)  
ln County Hispanic % 0.11 (0.18) 
 
0.15 (0.19)  
ln County Hispanic % point change 0.93 (0.74) 
 
-0.40 (0.62)  
ln Distance to US-Mexico border (km) 0.15 (0.17) 
 
-0.51 (0.37)  
Independent × ln County Hispanic %  —   —  
Republican × ln County Hispanic %  —   —  
Independent × 
ln County Hispanic % point change 
-1.61 (1.31)   —  
Republican × 
ln County Hispanic % point change 
-1.69 (0.73) *  —  
Independent × 
ln Distance to US-Mexico border 
 — 
 
1.49 (0.51) ** 
Republican × 
ln Distance to US-Mexico border 
 — 
 
0.72 (0.36) * 
County Unemployment Rate (%) -0.010 (0.054)  -0.002 (0.053)  
County Median Family Income ($000) -0.003 (0.007)  -0.002 (0.007)  
N  1,086  
  
 1,086    
Model χ2 286.79 *** 
 
292.62 ***  
Likelihood Ratio χ2 7.90 * 
 
13.73 **  
Nagelkerke pseudo-R2 0.32 
  
0.33   
 
Sources: Pew Research Center, 2013; Bureau of Labor Statistics, Local Area 
Unemployment Statistics, 2013; United States Census Bureau, American 
Community Survey, 2013 5-year estimates, Table DP03.  
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Table 5.5: Checks for Residential Self-Selection 
Contact with 
Unauthorized Immigrants 
(Binary Logit) 
 b (SE) 
 
Intercept -1.21 (0.29) *** 
Male 0.36 (0.16) * 
Age (ln years) -0.71 (0.33) * 
Education: College 0.31 (0.16) † 
Region (ref = Northeast)    
Midwest -0.21 (0.26)  
South 0.09 (0.24)  
West 0.63 (0.26) * 
Economy (ref = About the same)    
Getting worse 0.12 (0.20)  
Getting better -0.17 (0.21)  
Party identification (ref = Democrat)    
Independent 0.04 (0.30)  
Republican 0.18 (0.22)  
Ideology (ref = Liberal)    
Moderate -0.30 (0.25)  
Conservative -0.03 (0.27)  
N 1,086  
  Model χ2 47.16 *** 
 
Likelihood Ratio χ2 — 
  
Nagelkerke pseudo-R2 0.06 
  
† p ≤ 0.10; * p ≤ 0.05; ** p ≤ 0.01; *** p ≤ 0.001 
Source: Pew Research Center, 2013 
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Table 5.6: Checks for Residential Self-Selection, cont’d. 
 
County Hispanic 
% (logged) 
(OLS) 
 
County Hispanic 
% point change 
(2000-2010) 
(+5, logged) 
(OLS) 
 
Distance to 
US–Mexico 
Border 
(km logged) 
(OLS) 
 
 
b (SE) 
 
b (SE)  b (SE)  
Intercept 0.16 (0.13)  -0.01 (0.03)  0.51 (0.06) *** 
Male 0.03 (0.07)  0.01 (0.02)  -0.03 (0.04)  
Age (ln years) 0.07 (0.13)  0.03 (0.03)  0.00 (0.08)  
Education: College -0.04 (0.01) *** -0.01 (0.00) ** 0.02 (0.01) *** 
Region (ref = Northeast)          
Midwest -0.36 (0.10) *** -0.08 (0.03) ** -0.43 (0.02) *** 
South 0.18 (0.11) † 0.11 (0.03) *** -0.77 (0.04) *** 
West 1.15 (0.10) *** 0.22 (0.03) *** -1.54 (0.08) *** 
Economy (ref = About the same)          
Getting worse -0.05 (0.09)  0.01 (0.02)  0.03 (0.05)  
Getting better 0.05 (0.09)  0.02 (0.03)  0.01 (0.05)  
Party identification (ref = Democrat)          
Independent -0.09 (0.12)  -0.02 (0.03)  -0.01 (0.07)  
Republican 0.09 (0.09)  0.02 (0.02)  -0.09 (0.05) † 
Ideology (ref = Liberal)          
Moderate -0.14 (0.10)  -0.02 (0.03)  0.09 (0.06)  
Conservative -0.22 (0.11) * -0.05 (0.03)  0.14 (0.07) * 
N 1,086  
  
 1,086     1,086    
R2 0.26  
 
0.16   0.45   
† p ≤ 0.10; * p ≤ 0.05; ** p ≤ 0.01; *** p ≤ 0.001 
Source: Pew Research Center, 2013 
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Figure 5.1: Histogram, County Hispanic Percentage, 2010 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2: Histogram, County Hispanic Percentage Point Change, 2000–2010 
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Figure 5.3: Histogram, Distance to US–Mexico Border 
 
 
 
Figure 5.4: Histogram, Distance to US–Mexico Border, Logged 
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Figure 5.5: Map, County Hispanic Population, 2010 
 
Sources: United States Census Bureau, Population Estimates, Intercensal Estimates 
(2000–2010) – Counties; United States Census Bureau, Cartographic Boundary 
Shapefile – Counties (2013). 
  
255 
  
Figure 5.6: Map, County Hispanic Population Percentage Point Change, 2000–2010 
 
Sources: United States Census Bureau, Population Estimates, Intercensal Estimates 
(2000–2010) – Counties; United States Census Bureau, Cartographic Boundary 
Shapefile – Counties (2013). 
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Figure 5.7: Effect Plot, Party Identification and County Hispanic Percentage 
 
 
 
Figure 5.8: Effect Plot, Party Identification and County Hispanic Percentage Point Change, 
2000–2010 
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Figure 5.9: Effect Plot, Party Identification and US–Mexico Border Proximity 
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Figure 5.10: Coefficient Plot, Effect of Republican Party Identification 
by County Hispanic Percent, 2010 
 
 
 
Figure 5.11: Coefficient Plot, Effect of Independent Identification 
by County Hispanic Percent, 2010 
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Figure 5.12: Coefficient Plot, Effect of Republican Party Identification 
by County Hispanic Percentage Point Change, 2000–2010 
 
 
 
Figure 5.13: Coefficient Plot, Effect of Independent Identification 
by County Hispanic Percentage Point Change, 2000–2010 
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Figure 5.14: Coefficient Plot, Effect of Republican Party Identification 
by US–Mexico Border Proximity 
 
 
 
Figure 5.15: Coefficient Plot, Effect of Independent Identification 
by US–Mexico Border Proximity 
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5.8 Appendix 5A: Data Coding 
Stay: ‚Which comes closer to your view about how to handle undocumented 
immigrants who are now living in the US? They should not be allowed to stay in 
the country legally (0), [or] there should be a way for them to stay in the country 
legally, if certain requirements are met (1).‛ 
Sex: male (1), female (0). 
Age: years logged (loge), rescaled 0 to 1 and mean centred. 
Education: College (1), less than college (0). 
Region: Dummy variables using indicator coding for Census Region of residence 
(the Northeast Census Region is the reference category). 
Economy Better/Worse: ‚a year from now, do you expect that economic conditions 
in the country as a whole will be better than they are at present, or worse, or just 
about the same as now?‛ Dummy variables using indicator coding for ‚Better‛ and 
‚Worse‛ (‚About the Same as Now‛ is the reference category). 
Personal Financial Situation Improving/Worse: ‚Over the course of the next year, do 
you think the financial situation of you and your family will improve a lot, improve 
some, get a little worse or get a lot worse?‛ dummy-coded with indicators for 
‚Improve a lot‛ and ‚Improve some‛ (combined ‚Improving‛) and ‚Get a little 
worse‛ and ‚Get a lot worse‛ (combined ‚Getting Worse‛); ‚Stay the Same‛ 
(volunteered response) is the reference category). 
Undocumented Immigrants Take Jobs: ‚Next, I’m going to read you some 
statements about undocumented immigrants currently in the U.S. Please tell me 
whether you agree or disagree with each statement. First, [randomize]: do you 
strongly agree (5), somewhat agree (4), somewhat disagree (2) or strongly disagree 
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(1)? How about [next item]? Granting undocumented immigrants legal status would 
take jobs from U.S. citizens.‛ Rescaled 0 to 1 and mean-centred. 
Importance of Immigration Legislation: ‚How important is it to you that the 
President and Congress pass significant new immigration legislation this year – 
extremely important (5), very important (4), somewhat important (3), not too 
important (2), or not important at all (1)?‛ Rescaled 0 to 1 and mean-centred. 
Party: ‚In politics today, do you consider yourself a Republican, a Democrat, or 
Independent?‛ *If Independent, don’t know or refused:+ ‚As of today do you lean 
more to the Republican Party or the Democratic Party?‛ Dummy variables using 
indicator coding for Republican and Independent (Democrat is the reference 
category). 
Ideology: ‚In general, would you describe your political views as... Very 
conservative, Conservative, Moderate, Liberal, Very liberal.‛ Dummy variables 
using indicator coding for Very conservative/Conservative (combined 
‚Conservative‛) and Moderate. Very liberal/Liberal (combined ‚Liberal‛) is the 
reference category. 
Contact with Unauthorized Immigrants: ‚Thinking about your daily life, do you 
have personal contact with any recent immigrants who you know for a fact (1), or 
who you suspect (1), are in the United States illegally, or not? (0).‛ 
ln County Hispanic %: County-level percentage of the population that is Hispanic 
(2010 Census) logged (loge), mean centred. 
ln County Hispanic % point change: County-level percentage point change in the 
Hispanic population (2010 Census – 2000 Census) logged (loge), mean centred. 
ln Distance to US–Mexico Border: kilometres logged (loge), mean centred. 
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County Unemployment Rate (%): Annual average unadjusted unemployment rate 
at the county level; mean centred. Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Local Area 
Unemployment Statistics, 2013. 
County Median Family Income ($000): Median family income at the county level in 
inflation-adjusted dollars (thousands); mean centred. Sources: United States Census 
Bureau, American Community Survey, 2013 5-year estimates, Table DP03 (Selected 
Economic Characteristics). 
Note on geocoding and distance calculations: 
ZIP code geocoding was conducted using the GEOCODE procedure in the 
SAS statistical package and the July 2013 ZIP code lookup dataset provided by the 
SAS Institute (2014b). County FIPS code-based geocoding was performed by 
matching county codes from the telephone sample files to county centroids created 
from the 2013 US Census Bureau TIGER/Line county shapefile. 
For the frontier line, I use the line segment of the US–Mexico border 
subsetted from the Large Scale International Boundaries (LSIB), Africa and 
Americas shapefile obtained from the US Department of State, Humanitarian 
Information Unit (hiu.state.gov/data/). I then perform a Cartesian join between the 
survey data and the border line segment, and then select the minimum distance for 
each respondent. 
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5.9 Appendix 5B: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Mean Min Max SD N Missing 
Should be way for undocumented 
immigrants to stay 
0.67 0 1 0.47 1,064 22 
Male 0.48 0 1 0.50 1,086 0 
Age (ln years) 3.82 2.89 4.57 0.41 1,074 12 
Region: Northeast 0.19 0 1 0.40 1,086 0 
Region: Midwest 0.26 0 1 0.44 1,086 0 
Region: South 0.35 0 1 0.48 1,086 0 
Region: West 0.19 0 1 0.39 1,086 0 
Education: College 0.30 0 1 0.46 1,083 3 
Economy: Getting Worse 0.24 0 1 0.43 1,067 19 
Economy: About the Same 0.51 0 1 0.50 1,067 19 
Economy: Getting Better 0.25 0 1 0.43 1,067 19 
Party: Democrat 0.29 0 1 0.45 1,067 19 
Personal Fin. Situation: Getting Worse 0.07 0 1 0.25 1,067 19 
Personal Fin. Situation: About the Same 0.64 0 1 0.48 1,067 19 
Personal Fin. Situation: Improving 2.69 1 4 1.11 1,073 13 
Party: Republican 3.33 1 5 1.20 1,062 24 
Undocumented Immigrants Take Jobs 0.39 0 1 0.49 1,081 5 
Importance of Immigration Legislation 0.51 0 1 0.50 1,081 5 
Party: Independent 0.10 0 1 0.31 1,081 5 
Ideology: Conservative 0.39 0 1 0.49 1,062 24 
Ideology: Moderate 0.41 0 1 0.49 1,062 24 
Ideology: Liberal 0.20 0 1 0.40 1,062 24 
Contact with Undocumented Immigrants 0.30 0 1 0.46 1,067 19 
County Hispanic % (2010) 11.81 0.44 79.58 12.57 1,086 0 
ln County Hispanic % (2010) 1.93 -0.83 4.38 1.09 1,086 0 
County Hispanic % point change 
(2000-2010) 
3.18 -3.52 16.06 2.43 1,086 0 
ln County Hispanic % point change 
(2000-2010) (+5) 
2.06 0.39 3.05 0.28 1,086 0 
Distance to US-Mexico border (km) 1,659.78 23.45 3,375.41 763.95 1,086 0 
ln Distance to US-Mexico border (km) 7.22 3.15 8.12 0.76 1,086 0 
County Unemployment Rate (%) 7.22 2.70 15.80 1.86 1,086 0 
County Median Family Income ($000) 67.03 28.83 139.24 16.93 1,086 0 
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6. Conclusion: The Role of Proximity and Space in 
Shaping Policy Attitudes Among Mass Publics 
 
The central argument of this thesis has been that spatial proximity to relevant 
geographic features conditions the effects of political factors (such as party 
identification and ideology) on policy attitudes held by mass publics. In making this 
argument, the articles comprising this thesis have advanced the public opinion and 
political behaviour research literatures by adding an important qualification to the 
long-standing thesis that individual political characteristics such as party 
identification and ideology shape policy attitudes (e.g., Bartels 2002; A. Campbell et 
al. 1960; Converse 1964; Jacoby 1991; Zaller 1992) by demonstrating how policy 
attitudes are contingent upon (moderated by) spatial proximity (e.g., to 
international borders or energy infrastructure). Further, the interaction of spatial 
proximity and political variables is neither a unique feature of public opinion in a 
single country nor of a single policy area. Such interactive dynamics are a feature of 
public opinion in both Canada and the United States. They are also a feature of 
policy attitudes in a number of domains: Canada–US relations, energy policy, and 
immigration policy. In advancing these arguments, the thesis has endeavoured to 
extend the long tradition of spatial social science (Porter and Howell 2012), and 
more specifically to demonstrate the value of taking a spatial approach to the study 
of mass public opinion and political behaviour (cf. Nall 2015; Tam Cho and Gimpel 
2012). 
Though the articles of this thesis have repeatedly offered confirmation that 
‚proximity matters‛ (Berezin and Díez Medrano 2008) and have added a spatial and 
geographic nuance to the literature on party identification, ideology and policy 
attitudes, the articles raise a series of questions that ought to be pursued in future 
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research. In this conclusion, I thus offer a review of the main findings of the thesis 
and some reflections on the questions implied by the four articles. 
One direction for future research suggested by the four articles is the 
relationship between spatial proximity and intergroup contact. The theoretical 
discussion in chapters 2 and 3 focusing on Canada–US relations assumed that 
proximity functioned as a proxy of intergroup contact. This assumption was 
grounded in existing research on cross-border social relations (e.g., Deutsch 1954; 
Deutsch et al. 1957; Kuhn 2011) as well as initial probes examining the link between 
Canada–US border proximity and cross-border travel (drawing on data from the 
Statistics Canada International Travel Survey). This assumption was explicitly 
tested in the context of immigration attitudes in the US in chapter 5, where the 
results indicated that proximity did not, in that context, serve as a simple proxy 
measure of contact. Reflecting on this apparent discrepancy between theory and 
evidence, it is important to keep in mind that the Canada–US and US–Mexico 
borders are very different contexts with respect to the trade and security issues they 
raise (Ackleson 2005; Ackleson 2009; Andreas 2003; Andreas 2005; Meyers 2003). 
Also, the respective foci of these chapters are very different: cross-border relations 
(on the one hand) and immigration policy, a nominally intra-state policy area (on 
the other), albeit with cross-border implications. It is not unreasonable to suggest 
that the types of personal contacts that bear on Canada–US relations are 
substantively different from those that bear on attitudes toward immigration and 
naturalization in the US, and further that the interplay of proximity and contact will 
differ in each case. A topic for future research, then, is when and where contact 
mediates the effect of proximity, and in what circumstances proximity captures 
other social or psychological processes. 
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While each article hypothesizes (and finds) an interaction between proximity 
and political variables, they do not all have the same substantive interpretations. In 
chapters 2, 3 and 5, proximity widens (or amplifies) partisan cleavages in policy 
attitudes. In chapter 4, proximity attenuates (or mutes) ideological cleavages. What 
accounts for these different patterns of interactive relationships? A partial answer is 
likely found in the larger context in which attitudes are formed, including 
informational cues coming political elites, and the economic context. 
With respect to the polarizing effect of proximity seen in Canada and the US 
in the context of attitudes toward the other country and Canada–US relations 
(chapters 2 and 3), it is worth recalling the competing views of the US (and Canada’s 
relationship with the US) current in Canadian politics: the US is cast as either 
Canada’s close ally and trading partner or as a pernicious economic and cultural 
influence. Indeed, these themes represent currents in Canadian politics since before 
Confederation (Granatstein 1996; Inwood 2005; Nossal 2007). These elite cues were 
hypothesized as becoming more salient with increasing proximity to the Canada–
US border. 
In the case of American attitudes toward Canada (chapter 2), the result was 
somewhat different, with favourable attitudes toward Canada increasing with 
greater proximity among Democrats, but no significant effect among Republicans. 
This pattern of relationships may reflect greater awareness of Canada–US ties with 
increasing proximity, with the effect that partisan cues become more salient among 
Democrats, who have long viewed the social democratic aspects of the Canadian 
state favourably (Brooks 2008; Gecelovsky 2006). 
A different explanation is suggested in the case of the interactive relationship 
between proximity to the proposed Keystone XL pipeline route and ideology as 
they relate to attitudes toward the pipeline (chapter 4). With increasing proximity to 
268 
  
the pipeline route, the attitudes of liberals and conservatives converge toward 
support for Keystone XL. Attitudes toward Keystone XL only exhibit ideological 
polarization when the pipeline is literally a distant consideration, with conservatives 
in favour and liberals opposed. Here, the explanation offered is that increasing 
proximity brings with it greater awareness of the (presumed) economic gains to 
result from the pipeline, and thus proximity ‚crowds out‛ the effect of (liberal) 
ideology. 
This crowding out stands in contrast to the effect of proximity to the US–
Mexico border on attitudes toward illegal immigration (chapter 5). As with 
Canadian attitudes toward Canada–US relations and proximity to the Canada–US 
border, increasing proximity to the US–Mexico border serves to polarize American 
attitudes along partisan lines as it relates to the issue of allowing unauthorized 
immigrants to stay in the US. With increasing proximity to the US–Mexico border, 
Republicans become more restrictionist in their immigration attitudes, while 
Democrats become more open and accommodating. This result holds even when 
accounting for other important contextual factors – namely the local ethnic 
(Hispanic) context and change over time in the local ethnic context. In this light, one 
might go so far as to suggest that Mexico plays the role in American public opinion 
that the US plays in Canadian public opinion, insofar as proximity to the southern 
border serves to polarize public attitudes. 
The explanations of these different patterns of moderated relationships have 
thus been advanced on a case-by-case basis with a mind to the political dynamics 
operating in a particular policy area in either Canada or the US, as well as a 
sensitivity to what proximity to a given geographic feature serves to encapsulate. In 
this way, the theoretical grounding of the thesis aligns with Hawley’s human 
ecology approach, since the environment is not assumed to refer to a single factor or 
269 
  
a single dynamic; the definition of ‚environment‛ is both flexible and open-ended 
(A. H. Hawley 1986, 10–12). Still, this implies a need for a more general but also a 
more precisely specified theory that advances clear expectations for when we 
should expect proximity (and distance) to exert effects on policy attitudes, and in 
what circumstances we should expect either an amplifying/polarizing or 
attenuating/depolarizing dynamic to prevail. 
Such a theory might also emerge as a result of – or at least be aided by –
further research into possible interactions between proximity and political variables 
in other substantive areas of mass public opinion. In other words, we should add to 
the policy areas and country cases in which the politics–proximity interaction is 
tested. In the North American context, there are the obvious cases of public opinion 
toward Canada–US and US–Mexico border security – that is, concern over border 
security threats, support for tighter security measures on the two borders, and 
support for closer border security cooperation. Within the ambit of energy policy, 
research is already under way to more precisely test the effects of alternative 
environmental (climate change) and economic (job growth) frames on attitudes 
toward different oil pipeline proposals, namely Keystone XL in the US and the 
Energy East pipeline from Alberta to New Brunswick in Canada; the effects of these 
frames may vary as a function of proximity to the pipeline routes (Lachapelle, 
Gravelle, and Borick 2015). Similarly, work is under way on support among the 
Canadian and American public for hydraulic fracturing (‚fracking‛) as an energy 
extraction technology (Lachapelle et al. 2014). Beyond the Canadian–American 
context, intergroup relations, perceptions of neighbouring countries, and attitudes 
toward border security, trade policy, immigration policy, energy policy and energy 
infrastructure siting (among others) are all potential fields for the exploration of the 
interactive dynamics of politics and space. Reflecting on the recent 2014 Scottish 
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referendum in which 44.7 percent of Scottish voters (or nearly 9 in 20) voted to leave 
the United Kingdom, there may be an opportunity for research on how attitudes 
among the Scottish and English populations toward the Union (and reform of the 
Union) are shaped by proximity to the Scottish–English border.  
Further, proximity and distance may be involved in other complex, 
interactive relationships beyond the interactions with party identification and 
ideology that have been the focus of this thesis. One potentially fruitful direction for 
future research is the interplay between proximity to relevant geographic features 
and identity constructs. Chapters 2 and 3 explicitly raised the possibility that 
national and continental (pan-North American) identity constructs may interact 
with spatial proximity in shaping attitudes toward Canada–US relations. Chapter 5 
also raised the possibility that the effects of US–Mexico border proximity on 
immigration policy attitudes operate through mechanisms such as heightened 
feelings of cultural threat. Another conjecture deserving investigation is the ways in 
which proximity might moderate the effects of the liberal, ethnocultural and 
incorporationist facets of American national identity on immigration attitudes 
(Schildkraut 2007; Schildkraut 2011). In sum, there is space for additional theory and 
empirical research that integrates how we define ourselves (identity) and where we 
find ourselves (spatial context) in the study of policy attitudes. 
  In proposing these avenues of inquiry for future research, it is important to 
stress that the availability of spatially-referenced survey data is essential. Chapters 2 
and 3 concluded by making the point that spatial data need to be recorded and 
retained as part of survey data collection – and further, these data points need to be 
made available to researchers for secondary data analyses. These goals obviously 
need to be balanced against researchers’ ethical obligations to protect respondent 
confidentiality and to mitigate the potential for deductive disclosure (Gutmann et al. 
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2007). Consequently there is a need for research – and discussion among research 
practitioners – at the intersection of survey methodology and research ethics on the 
concrete questions of what kinds of respondent-level spatially-referenced data 
ought to be disclosed as a matter of course, what should be restricted (to researchers 
with a demonstrated need for particular spatial data), and what should not be 
disclosed (or retained subsequent to data collection) in any circumstance. 
Research practice at present varies widely. For example, the archived data 
sets of the World Values Survey and the International Social Survey Programme 
make nothing available below the level of state or province (or equivalent). In the 
case of the US General Social Survey, the National Opinion Research Center 
(NORC) at the University of Chicago makes county FIPS codes available only by 
special arrangement; the Pew Research Center (whose data are relied on in chapters 
4 and 5) similarly makes ZIP codes and county codes available only by special 
arrangement. At the other end of the spectrum, the public-use 2011 Canadian 
Election Study data set (forming part of the data used in chapters 2 and 3) contains 
census dissemination area codes – location data which in theory could be combined 
with respondent-level demographic data to uniquely identify respondents (though 
the possible harm to respondents of a political survey such as the CES in the event 
of disclosure is low compared to other types of human subjects research). 
Such wide variation in research practice speaks to the need for research and 
discussion among applied social scientists on how to strike the balance between 
these considerations, and how to facilitate further research linking individuals’ 
opinions toward important public policy issues, their political characteristics, and 
the spatial and demographic contexts in which they reside. 
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